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Abstract
Tampere University of Technology
Siikanen Milla: INVESTORS, INFORMATION ARRIVALS, AND MARKET LIQ-
UIDITY: Empirical Evidence from Financial Markets
Key words: Stock market, FX market, Investor behavior, Investor sophistication, Deci-
sion making, Social media, Company announcement, Liquidity, Limit order book, Liquidity
aggregator, Transaction costs, High-frequency data
Well-functioning financial markets can be argued to benefit society widely. Investors,
information arrivals, and market liquidity are all key aspects of financial markets. Without
investors who trade, there would be no markets to begin with. Furthermore, information
arrivals are important because information drives prices: new information may affect the
valuation of assets traded. Finally, for prices to adjust efficiently to new information, the
market needs to be sufficiently liquid, meaning that investors can trade when they want
at a low transaction cost.
Earlier research on these topics exists, but the interrelations between these factors have
not been studied in depth. The objective of this thesis is to improve our knowledge of
the interrelations between investors, information arrivals, and liquidity in the context
of financial markets. By addressing several research gaps related to these themes, this
thesis aims to provide new empirical evidence in order to help the scientific community
develop more reliable and robust models that describe the markets; in general, a better
understanding of these topics and such interrelations may help improve regulations,
exchange organizations, and investment management.
This thesis consists of an introductory part and four research papers (Articles I– IV).
Article I uses logistic regression to study how Nokia’s Facebooks posts and related
activities are associated with investors’ decisions to buy versus sell Nokia stock. In Article
II, a framework from event studies is combined with high-frequency limit order book data
to examine how liquidity in stock limit order books evolves around scheduled and non-
scheduled company announcements. Article III applies regression analysis to identify the
factors affecting the magnitude of order book liquidity shocks that company announcement
releases cause in the limit order books. Finally, Article IV uses a unique data set to
study the proportion of liquidity streams that a trader observes in a foreign exchange
(FX) liquidity aggregator, as well as quantifies a trader’s theoretical improvements in
the observed spread and the cost savings when comparing the current situation with the
optimal combination of streams; the optimal combinations are solved using a genetic
algorithm (GA).
Earlier literature has studied how news articles affect the trading of different investors,
and this thesis contributes by providing evidence that the (potentially biased) information
a company releases on social media affects the behaviors of different investors in the stock
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market differently. While the decisions of arguably less sophisticated investors—passive
households and non-profit organizations—are associated with Facebook data, those of
more sophisticated investors—financial institutions—seem to be independent of Facebook
data.
Moreover, company announcements are found to cause significant changes in the stock
limit order book liquidity, which is inconsistent with the finding of an earlier study
using news data. In particular, scheduled announcement releases may improve liquidity
to an abnormally high level, indicating that scheduled announcement releases resolve
asymmetric information problems in the market, whereas the order book liquidity remains
relatively low in many cases still an hour after the non-scheduled announcement releases.
The immediate liquidity shocks following the announcement releases are amplified by
order book asymmetry prior to the announcements releases. Moreover, a fast reaction is a
strong reaction (the faster the illiquidity peak is reached after the announcement release,
the larger the peak usually is), and in case of non-scheduled announcement releases, recent
losses amplify the liquidity shocks. The findings also indicate that liquidity measured over
multiple order book price levels behaves quite differently compared to the conventional
bid–ask spread calculated using data from the best order book levels, indicating that
measuring liquidity just using top-of-the-book data may lead to misleading inferences.
Finally, the results show that in a liquidity aggregator, traders observe only a small
proportion of liquidity streams available: on average, a trader observes 5.4 streams out
of the total 165 streams provided by 42 liquidity providers (the maximum is 23 and the
minimum is 1). However, traders observe relatively tight spreads already with four or five
streams, and traders with more streams observe only marginal improvements in spread, if
any. In theory, most traders could cut their observed spread by more than a half and
save up to $0.18 basis points per e1 traded with the optimal combination of liquidity
streams; in practice, however, traders may not be able to exploit the improvements
because they are not free to choose just any streams in the aggregator, and if they would
change the streams they observe, the liquidity providers would likely change their quoting
behavior. Nevertheless, the novel empirical results can be used to assess the efficiency of
the aggregator as a trading technology and the liquidity provision in the FX market, in
general.
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(Abstract in Finnish)
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Hyvin toimivat rahoitusmarkkinat ovat yhteiskunnalle monin tavoin hyödylliset. Si-
joittajat, informaation saapuminen ja markkinalikviditeetti puolestaan ovat kaikki avain
asemassa rahoitusmarkkinoilla. Ilman sijoittajia jotka käyvät kauppaa, markkinoita ei
olisi. Uuden informaation saapuminen markkinoille on puolestaan tärkeää, sillä infor-
maatio voi vaikuttaa kaupankäynninkohteiden arvostuksiin ja siten hintoihin. Toisaalta,
jotta hinnat voivat päivittyä heijastamaan uutta informaatiota tehokkaasti, markkinoiden
tulee olla riittävän likvidit: sijoittajilla tulee olla mahdollisuus käydä kauppaa silloin kun
he haluavat ja kaupankäyntikustannusten tulee olla matalat.
Kaikkia kolmea aihetta on tutkittu aiemmin, mutta niiden keskinäisiin suhteisiin ei ole
perehdytty syvällisesti aiemmassa kirjallisuudessa. Tässä väitöskirjassa tavoitteena on
parantaa tietämystämme sijoittajien, informaation saapumisen ja likviditeetin keskinäisistä
suhteista rahoitusmarkkinoiden kontekstissa. Perehtymällä aiemmasta kirjallisuudesta
tunnistettuihin tutkimusaukkoihin, tämä tutkimus pyrkii tarjoaman uutta empiiristä
tietoa, jota voidaan hyödyntää tieteellisessä tutkimuksessa luotettavampien rahoitus-
markkinoita käsittelevien mallien luomiseen; yleisellä tasolla luotu parempi ymmärrys
näistä aiheista voi auttaa parantamaan markkinoiden sääntelyä, pörssien toimintaa ja
sijoitusten hallintaa.
Tämä väitöskirja koostuu kahdesta osasta: yhteenveto-osuudesta ja neljästä tutkimusar-
tikkelista (Artikkelit I – IV). Artikkeli I tutkii logistisella regressiolla sitä, miten Nokian
Facebook julkaisut ja niihin liittyvät aktiviteetit liittyvät sijoittajien päätöksiin ostaa
vai myydä Nokian osaketta. Artikkeli II hyödyntää tapahtumatutkimuksille tyypillistä
rakennetta ja tiheästi poimittua dataa tarjouskirjamarkkinoilta sen tutkimiseen, miten os-
akkeiden tarjouskirjat kehittyvät aikataulutettujen ja ei-aikataulutettujen yritystiedottei-
den julkaisuajankohtien ympärillä. Tähän liittyen, Artikkeli III tutkii regressioanalyysillä
mitkä tekijät vaikuttavat yritystiedotteiden tarjouskirjoihin aiheuttamien likviditeet-
tishokkien suuruuteen. Artikkeli IV puolestaan tutkii uniikkia datasettiä, ja artikkelin
tavoitteena on määrittää kuinka suuri osa kokonaislikviditeetistä yksittäisellä sijoittajalla
on käytössään valuuttamarkkinoilla likviditeettiaggregaattorissa ja kuinka paljon sijoitta-
jan havaitsema osto- ja myyntikurssin erotus voisi pienentyä, jos sijoittaja voisi valita
v
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optimaalisen yhdistelmän likviditeettivirroista sijoittajan nykyisen yhdistelmän sijaan.
Optimaaliset yhdistelmät selvitetään tutkimuksessa geneettistä algoritmia hyödyntäen.
Aiempi tutkimus on selvittänyt, miten uutiset vaikuttavat eri sijoittajaryhmien kau-
pankäyntiin, ja yksi tämän tutkimuksen kontribuutioista on osoittaa, että (mahdol-
lisesti puolueellinen) informaatio, jonka yritys julkaisee sosiaalisessa mediassa vaikut-
taa eri sijoittajaryhmiin eri tavalla. Oletettavasti vähemmän sofistikoituneiden sijoitta-
jien—passiiviset kotitaloudet ja voittoa tavoittelemattomat organisaatiot—päätösten ja
Facebook datan väliltä löydetään yhteys, kun taas sofistikoituneemmat sijoittajat—finassi-
insituutiot—vaikuttavat käyttäytyvän Facebook datasta riippumattomasti.
Yritystiedotteiden puolestaan havaitaan aiheuttavan merkittäviä muutoksia osakkeiden
tarjouskirjoissa, mikä eroaa aiemmasta tutkimuksesta, jossa ei löydetty näyttöä siitä, että
uutiset vaikuttaisivat tarjouskirjojen likviditeettiin. Aikataulutetut yritystiedotteet voivat
nostaa tarjouskirjojen likviditeettiä normaalia tasoa paremmaksi, mikä antaa viitteitä
siitä, että aikatalutettujen tiedotteiden julkaisu voi helpottaa markkinoilla vallitsevaa
informaation asymmetriaa. Ei-aikataulutettujen yritystiedotteiden julkaisun jälkeen tar-
jouskirjojen likviditeetti on sen sijaan melko matala monessa tapauksessa vielä tunti
tiedotteen julkaisun jälkeen. Tiedotteiden aiheuttamat välittömät likviditeettishokit
ovat sitä voimakkaampia, mitä suurempi tarjouskirjojen asymmetria on ennen uutista.
Lisäksi nopea reaktio on vahva reaktio (mitä nopeammin epälikvidisyyshuippu saavute-
taan tiedotteen julkaisemisen jälkeen, sitä suurempi se yleensä on) ja ei-aikataulutettujen
yritystiedotteiden tapauksessa hinnan lasku ennen uutista indikoi suurempaa likvidi-
teettishokkia. Tulokset myös osoittavat, että likviditeetti mitattuna usean tarjouskirjan
hintatason yli käyttäytyy melko eri lailla kuin tavallisesti käytetty likviditeetti mittari, joka
perustuu parhaiden osto-ja myynti hintojen erotukseen. Tämä osoittaa, että likviditeetin
mittaaminen käyttäen tietoa vain parhaista hintatasoista voi johtaa harhaanjohtaviin
päätelmiin.
Tulokset osoittavat myös, että sijoittajilla on käytössään suhteellisen pieni osuus kokonais-
likviditeetistä likviditeettiaggregaattorissa valuuttamarkkinoilla: sijoittajalla on käytössään
keskimäärin 5.4 likviditeettivirtaa (maksimi on 23 ja minimi 1), vaikka aggregaattorin 42
likviditeetin tarjoajaa tarjoavat yhteensä 165 likviditeettivirtaa. Sijoittajat saavuttavat
kuitenkin suhteellisen tiukan eron osto- ja myyntikurssien välillä jo neljällä tai viidellä
likviditeettivirralla, ja sijoittajat joilla on tätä enemmän likviditeettivirtoja käytössään
havaitsevat vain pienen parannuksen osto- ja myyntikurssien välisessä erotuksessa, jos
sitäkään. Teoriassa, suurin osa sijoittajista voisi havaita yli puolet pienemmän osto-
ja myyntikurssien välisen erotuksen ja säästää jopa $0.18 korkopistettä per ostettu tai
myyty euro, mutta käytännössä sijoittajat eivät välttämättä pysty hyödyntämään näitä
parannuksia ja säästöjä täysimääräisesti. Tämä johtuu siitä, että sijoittajat eivät voi
valita likviditeetin tarjoajien tarjoamia likviditeettivirtoja täysin vapaasti, ja toisaalta
siitä, että jos sijoittajat muuttaisivat käytössään olevien likviditeettivirtojen yhdistelmiä,
likviditeetin tarjoajat todennäköisesti myös muuttaisivat tarjoamaansa likviditeettiä.
Tästä huolimatta, esitettyjä uusia empiirisiä havaintoja voidaan käyttää arvioimaan
aggregaattorin tehokkuutta kaupankäyntiteknologiana ja likviditeetin tarjoamista valuut-
tamarkkinoilla yleisesti ottaen.
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1 Introduction
This chapter introduces the reader to the topics and research questions of this dissertation.
The first section gives the general motivation for the topics, whereas the second section
discusses the research gaps and frames the research questions. The last section outlines
the structure of this dissertation and provides short summaries of Articles I – IV.
1.1 Background and motivation
In financial markets, various investors trade financial assets, such as stocks.1 Society
can be argued to benefit from well-functioning financial markets: for example, from
economics perspective, financial markets can improve the allocation of capital within
an economy and facilitate specialization by enabling companies to hedge (i.e. transfer
the risk), leading to more efficient production processes (Harris, 2003; Wurgler, 2000).
According to Harris (2003), the public benefits of having well-functioning markets can be
categorized into two groups: those arising from having markets that produce informative
prices, and those coming from having liquid markets. Accordingly, there are two widely
recognized motives of investors to trade, information and liquidity: informed investors
trade on their private information with the aim to profit, whereas the needs of liquidity
investors to trade emerge from outside the market and are not directly linked to the
future payoffs of the asset (see e.g. Admati and Pfleiderer, 1988; Harris, 2003). This
dissertation is dedicated to the interrelations between these three key aspects of financial
markets—investors, information arrivals, and liquidity—as illustrated in Figure 1.1.
Intuitively, in the core of financial markets are the investors who trade: without them,
there would be no trading and hence no markets. Investors differ in their motives to trade,
their risk profile, the information they have access to, the regulatory constraints they face,
and so on (see e.g. Harris, 2003; Lillo et al., 2015). All these qualities potentially affect
the trading behaviors and the decisions made by investors, and the field of behavioral
finance and theoretical models could “clearly [...] benefit from a more complete picture
of how investors actually behave and how they differ from one another in the way they
react to the same information.” (Grinblatt and Keloharju, 2000, see also Grinblatt and
Keloharju 2001).
Furthermore, information arrivals are important because they affect the information
available for investors, and they potentially influence the valuations of assets, thus
affecting stock prices (Cochrane, 2005; Fama, 1970; Fama et al., 1969). Nowadays,
financial markets are characterized by an almost continuous flow of information from
various sources (Foucault et al., 2016). In addition to official (mandatory) company
announcement releases, social media sites create new opportunities for companies to
1In this dissertation, I use the term “investor” for all market participants trading in financial markets.
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Figure 1.1: The key topics of this dissertation and the positions of Articles I – IV with respect
to the topics.
improve their communication. In fact, as of January 2013, around 45% of S&P1500
companies used Facebook and Twitter to communicate about their businesses (Jung et al.,
2017).
However, in order for stock markets to be efficient in the sense that prices adjust rapidly to
new information (Fama, 1970), the markets need to be sufficiently liquid (see also Chordia
et al., 2008). In fact, liquidity has been widely recognized as an important characteristic
of any well-functioning market (see e.g. Chordia et al., 2001; Harris, 2003; O’Hara, 1995).2
Although defining liquidity poses a challenging task (see e.g. O’Hara, 1995), roughly
speaking, in liquid markets, an investor has the ability to trade when he/she wants at
a low transaction cost (Harris, 2003). Understanding liquidity is important from many
perspectives, as it is directly linked to the corporates cost of capital, and understanding
liquidity dynamics can help in formulating effective hedging and trading strategies and aid
in preventing disruptive events, such as the flash crash in 20103; more generally, a better
understanding of liquidity and trading activity could improve exchange organization,
regulation, and investment management (Amihud and Mendelson, 1991; Chordia et al.,
2001; Cumming et al., 2011; Rosa, 2016)
Generally speaking, investors provide and consume (make and take) liquidity in finan-
cial markets, although how this process is organized depends on the market structure
(Bloomfield et al., 2005; Harris, 2003). In turn, the market structure also affects the way
liquidity can be measured in the markets. In limit order books, which are typical in stock
markets, all investors can choose to make liquidity by submitting a limit order (indicate
that they are willing to trade a certain quantity with a certain price), or take liquidity
by submitting a market order (trade immediately a certain quantity with the best price
available). All the outstanding (unexecuted and uncancelled) limit orders constitute the
limit order book, and buy orders are referred to as bids and sell orders as asks. The data
based on the best bid and ask prices and the respective quantities (bid orders with the
2In this dissertation, the term “liquidity” is used to refer to “market liquidity,” which is not the same
as “funding liquidity” (see e.g. Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2008).
3See e.g. “FINDINGS REGARDING THE MARKET EVENTS OF MAY 6, 2010” by CFTC and
SEC, available at https://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2010/marketevents-report.pdf.
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highest price and ask orders with the lowest price) are referred to as Level I data, and
data on the orders beyond the best price levels are referred to as Level II order book
data (see e.g. Cao et al., 2009). On the other hand, in some market structures, such as in
liquidity aggregators, which are typical in the foreign exchange (FX) market (see Oomen,
2017), there are designated liquidity providers that provide all the liquidity available, and
the traders then only take liquidity.
1.2 Research objectives and research questions
As shown in the previous section, investors, information arrivals, and liquidity are all key
elements in the financial markets and are inevitably linked to one another. However, the
interrelations between them have not been studied in depth in earlier literature. This
dissertation aims to provide empirical evidence that will fill several gaps related to the
interrelations between investors, information arrivals, and liquidity in the context of
financial markets. The overall objective of this dissertation is to:
Enhance the understanding of and contribute to the empirical knowledge related to the
interrelations between investors, information arrivals, and liquidity.
One of the important questions is how information arrivals affect the behavior of investors.
Companies have to communicate information, for example, on their operations and
financial situation through exchange routed company announcements (see NASDAQ
Helsinki Ltd, 2018), but nowadays, they may choose to communicate also via less official
channels, such as social media. In the field of finance, there exists substantial research on
how data from social media affect stock prices (see e.g. Bollen et al., 2011; Chen et al.,
2014; Karabulut, 2013; Nofer and Hinz, 2015; Siganos et al., 2014; You et al., 2017; Zhang
et al., 2011, 2017; Zheludev et al., 2014), but research on how social media affects the
decisions of (individual) investors is scant. Lillo et al. (2015) study how Thomson Reuters
news articles affect the trading behavior of different investor groups, but the effects of
information released via social media on the trading of individual investors are still largely
an unexplored area. Article I aims to fill this gap by answering the following research
question:
RQ I: Does the information that companies release on social media affect investors’
decisions to buy versus sell?
By combining unique investor-level shareholding registration data that include the trading
of all Finnish investors with a data set on Facebook posts and activities on Nokia’s
Facebook wall, Article I examines the extent to which investors’ decisions are driven
by Facebook. In particular, for different investor classes, given that an investor trades,
Article I studies how Facebook data are related to the investor’s decision to increase
versus decrease his/her position. Studying investors from different classes separately is
important because an investor’s access to data sources and his/her sophistication may
affect the extent to which the (potentially biased, see Jung et al., 2017) information
communicated via social media drives this investor’s behavior.
While information arrivals affect the trading decisions of investors, theory and earlier
literature suggest that information arrivals also influence the liquidity provision (see e.g.
Baruch et al., 2017; Graham et al., 2006; Lee et al., 1993; Riordan et al., 2013). On the
other hand, sufficient liquidity is especially important around information arrivals, when
the prices need to adjust to the new information, and, thus, immediacy may be required.
In particular, in limit order markets, liquidity beyond the best levels is important around
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information releases, as informed investors may cause a large, immediate demand for
liquidity over multiple price levels. However, the majority of earlier studies examining
liquidity around information arrivals focus on the bid–ask spread, i.e. the difference
between the best ask and bid prices (Level I data) (see e.g. Graham et al., 2006; Groß-
Klußmann and Hautsch, 2011; Krinsky and Lee, 1996; Lee et al., 1993; Neuhierl et al.,
2013), although some important exceptions exist (see e.g. Gomber et al., 2015; Riordan
et al., 2013). Moreover, scheduled and non-scheduled announcement releases may affect
liquidity differently, so it is important to make a distinction between them (see e.g.
Graham et al., 2006), which most of earlier research does not do. Article II addresses this
gap by answering the following research question:
RQ II: How is order book liquidity, i.e. liquidity beyond the best levels in an order book,
affected by scheduled and non-scheduled company announcement releases?
Furthermore, there are studies (including Article II) showing that information arrivals
may cause liquidity shocks to the markets (Engle et al., 2012; Erenburg and Lasser, 2009;
Riordan et al., 2013; Rosa, 2016, see). However, the question on the different factors
affecting the magnitude of order book liquidity shocks following announcement releases
remains unanswered. As liquidity is especially important around information arrivals, the
research question in Article III is as follows:
RQ III: What factors affect the magnitude of the order book liquidity shocks caused by
scheduled and non-scheduled company announcement releases?
The analysis in Articles II and III utilize high-frequency limit order book data for 75
actively traded stocks on NASDAQ Nordic around official exchange routed company
announcements to study how order book liquidity evolves around scheduled and non-
scheduled information arrivals (Article II), as well as how different variables calculated
from the order book data affect the magnitude of the order book liquidity shocks following
the announcement releases (Article III). Order book liquidity is measured by capturing
the shape of the order book through an estimation of the slopes of the order book curves
(see Deuskar and Johnson, 2011; Härdle et al., 2012; Malo and Pennanen, 2012; Næs
and Skjeltorp, 2006). Article II also compares the evolution of order book liquidity with
the evolution of the spread, as earlier research has shown that liquidity measured using
just top-of-the-book data (i.e. the spread calculated from Level I data) may lead to a
conclusion that is different from that when information from multiple order book levels is
used (see Rosa, 2016; Sensoy, 2016).
In limit order books, which are typical in stock markets, liquidity making and taking are
relatively straightforward: all investors can make and take liquidity, all investors observe
the order book (or a certain part of it, i.e. n best bid and ask price levels)4, and all
investors can trade with one another. By contrast, in liquidity aggregators, which are
typical in FX markets and other over-the-counter (OTC) markets (Oomen, 2017), traders
observe only a subset of liquidity streams quoted in the total aggregator and can trade
only with a limited subset of the liquidity providers. Liquidity in FX markets is needed for
international trade, and it is also highly important because of the market’s huge size and
the crucial role in guaranteeing efficiency and arbitrage conditions in many other markets;
nevertheless, the liquidity there is not understood well enough (Karnaukh et al., 2015;
King et al., 2012; Mancini et al., 2013). In particular, although Oomen (2017) provides a
profound theoretical discussion of liquidity in an aggregator, to my knowledge and the
4Excluding hidden orders, which no one observes (see e.g. Moro et al., 2009).
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knowledge of my co-authors in Article IV, there exists no empirical research on liquidity
aggregators. To address this gap, Article IV explores the following research question:
RQ IV: What is the proportion of liquidity traders observed in a liquidity aggregator,
and how much could a trader’s observed spread be improved by obtaining an optimal
combination of liquidity streams?
The unique data set used in Article IV includes detailed information on all the streamed
quotes for individual liquidity providers and individual traders for EURUSD; such detailed
data are usually not available for academic research.5 One reason for the lack of available
and representative data may be the overall fragmentation of the market (Karnaukh et al.,
2015; Mancini et al., 2013). Furthermore, given its complexity and opaque nature, the
FX market is currently under pressure and is being criticized for its lack of transparency
and its recent scandals.6 Moreover, Gould et al. (2017) write that studying the subset of
liquidity that traders observe in the FX market poses an interesting challenge for future
research. All this makes the insights provided in Article IV unique and highly interesting.
1.3 Dissertation structure and outline of the original articles
This dissertation is divided into two sections: (i) the introductory part with the in-
troduction and summary, and (ii) the original publications (Articles I– IV). There is
also an Appendix section at the end of the dissertation presenting the appendix to this
introductory part (Appendix A) and the online appendices of the original publications
I– III (Appendix B, Appendix C, and Appendix D).
The remainder of this introductory part is structured as follows. Chapter 2 introduces
the reader to the key concepts of this dissertation and some related research. Chapter 3
presents the data sets used in Articles I– IV, and Chapter 4 outlines the methods used.
Chapter 5 summarizes the findings of Articles I– IV. Finally, Chapter 6 discusses and
concludes this dissertation.
Article I studies how investors’ trading decisions are related to Facebook posts and related
activities. Article I utilizes data on Finnish investors’ transactions on Nokia stock from
mid-2010 until the end of 2016. The results of logistic regressions indicate that especially
passive household investors’ and non-profit organizations’ decisions to buy versus sell
are associated with Facebook data. At the same time, arguably more sophisticated
investors—financial and insurance institutions—seem to behave independently from
Facebook activities.
Articles II and III use high-frequency limit order book data for 75 frequently traded stocks
from NASDAQ Nordic over the four-year period of 2006–2009. Exploiting the framework
from event study analysis, Article II explores order book liquidity during a two-hour event
window around scheduled and non-scheduled company announcement releases. Article II
finds significant intra-day changes in order book liquidity around company announcement
arrivals: the announcements are followed by immediate liquidity shocks (within a few
5The data set is highly sensitive, and I have obtained permission to publish the academic results
as long as it is not possible to identify the individual liquidity providers or traders. To guarantee their
anonymity, we are not allowed to publish the name or any other background information of the data
provider.
6See, for example, “Third Barclays Trader Faces U.S. Charges in FX Scandal” (Bloomberg; Jan 17th
2018) and “The global FX rigging scandal” (Reuters; Jan 11th 2017). The concerns were also partially
addressed in the recently published “FX Code of Conduct,” available at https://www.globalfxc.org/do
cs/fx_global.pdf.
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minutes after the announcement release). The order book liquidity is exceptionally low
before scheduled announcement releases, but it improves to an exceptionally good level
after them, indicating that investors react to scheduled announcement releases already at
least an hour before the announcements, and the release of scheduled announcements may
significantly reduce information asymmetries between the investors and adverse selection
costs. By contrast, after non-scheduled announcement releases, the aggregated order book
liquidity is still abnormally low an hour after the announcement release in most cases.
Additionally, the analysis shows that the spread (Level I liquidity measure) behaves quite
differently compared to the order book liquidity (Level II liquidity measure).
Article III focuses on identifying the factors related to the magnitude of the order book
liquidity shocks caused by scheduled and non-scheduled company announcement releases.
The results of linear regression using within-transformation indicate that recent losses
amplify the illiquidity shocks caused by non-scheduled announcements. Additionally, the
faster the maximum illiquidity is reached, the more illiquid the order book becomes (i.e.
a fast reaction is a strong reaction), and the asymmetry observed in the book before an
announcement arrival is positively associated with the magnitude of the illiquidity shock.
Article IV studies liquidity in an FX aggregator with a unique, detailed data set on all
the streamed quotes for individual liquidity providers and individual traders for EURUSD
over a 10-trading day period from 26 September 2016 to 7 October 2016. The results show
that traders observe, on average, 5.4 streams out of the total 165 active streams quoted by
42 liquidity providers, while the minimum is 1 and the maximum is 23. Moreover, traders
obtain a relatively tight spread already with four or five observed liquidity streams; the
use of more streams yields only a marginal benefit, if any. The optimal combinations
of liquidity streams are solved using a genetic algorithm (GA), and the comparisons
show that most of the traders could—at least in theory—reduce the average spread they
observe by more than half with the optimal combination of streams, and a trader could
save up to $0.18 basis points per e1 traded. In practice, however, the traders may not
be able to fully exploit improvements in spreads because they are not completely free
to choose just any liquidity streams quoted by the liquidity providers in the aggregator;
significant changes in the sets of streams that the traders observe could also affect the
quoting behavior of the liquidity providers.
2 Key concepts and related research
This chapter introduces readers to the key concepts of this dissertation and discusses
briefly the related literature. It provides the background for Articles I– IV, partially
complementing the articles, although some of the topics are discussed in greater detail
in the articles. Sections 2.1, 2.2, and 2.4 present the key concepts of this dissertation,
whereas the rest of the sections are dedicated to the interrelations between the concepts.
2.1 Investors in financial markets
In financial markets, investors trade financial instruments, for example stocks, and without
investors, there would be no trades and hence no markets. In this dissertation, the term
“investor” is used for all market participants trading in financial markets. These investors
can be divided into different groups based on their qualities and the reasons why they
trade (Harris, 2003). For example, investors can differ in their risk profile, the size of
their holdings, the information they have access to, and the regulatory constraints they
face (Lillo et al., 2015).
Classifying investors based on their category considers many of the differences between
investors (Lillo et al., 2015). Baltakys et al. (2018); Grinblatt and Keloharju (2000, 2001);
Lillo et al. (2015); Tumminello et al. (2012) use the following investor categories arising
from their data sets: financial and insurance corporations, non-financial corporations,
general governmental organizations, non-profit institutions, households, and foreign
investors. Article I utilizes this categorization for domestic investors. Grinblatt and
Keloharju (2000) argue that institutions (i.e. financial and insurance corporations and
non-financial corporations) are likely to be the most sophisticated domestic investor
groups, as they tend to take larger positions, have more resources to spend on research,
and often view investment as a full-time career. Governmental and non-profit institutions
seem to be less sophisticated than the other institutions but are still more sophisticated
than households, whereas larger households are presumably more sophisticated than the
smaller ones (Grinblatt and Keloharju, 2000, see also Grinblatt and Keloharju, 2001).
Grinblatt and Keloharju (2000) study how past returns are related to investors’ propensity
to buy and sell, and they find that domestic investors, particularly households, tend
to be contrarian traders (selling past winning stocks and buying past losers), whereas
foreign investors exhibit momentum. Consistently, Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001)
show that when trading, sophisticated investor classes place less weight on past returns
when deciding whether to buy or sell, whereas less sophisticated investors (households,
general governmental organizations, and nonprofit institutions) are more likely to sell
rather than buy stocks with large past returns. Lillo et al. (2015) show that investors
in different categories react to exogenous factors (number of news articles and their
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sentiment) and endogenous factors (returns and volatility) differently: households and
non-financial companies are very sensitive to both factors, whereas governmental and non-
profit organizations are only weakly sensitive, and financial institutions are intermediate
between these two cases. Tumminello et al. (2012) cluster investors based on their trading
and find that several clusters show over-expression of a certain investor group, providing
evidence that there is homogeneity between the investors in a category.
However, such detailed data on investor categories are usually not available, and much
research focuses on the trading of individuals or institutions or on the differences between
the two (see e.g. Gompers and Metrick, 2001; Griffin et al., 2003; Kaniel et al., 2008,
2012; Nofsinger and Sias, 1999, and references therein). For example, Griffin et al. (2003)
document a strong contemporaneous positive (negative) relation between institutional
(individual) trading activity and daily stock returns. Kaniel et al. (2008) find that intense
buying by individuals leads to positive excess returns in the following month, and selling
by individuals leads to negative excess returns.
Kaniel et al. (2008) write that “For a variety of reasons, financial economists tend to
view individuals and institutions differently.” Usually, institutions are seen as informed
investors, whereas individuals are perceived as uninformed noise traders with psychological
biases (Kaniel et al., 2008). The division between informed and uninformed investors
is likely to stem from theoretical models (see e.g Admati and Pfleiderer, 1988; Black,
1986; Glosten and Milgrom, 1985; Kyle, 1985). The biases related to individual investors’
behavior include individual investors’ tendency to misinterpret new information (sell
stocks announcing positive news and buy stocks announcing negative news), show poor
stock-picking skills (the stocks that individuals buy underperform those that they sell),
exhibit the disposition effect (sell winners and hold on to losers), and make contrarian
trades (be net buyers (sellers) in a stock as the stock price falls (rises)) (see Linnainmaa,
2010, and references therein). However, Linnainmaa (2010) shows that many of the
documented biases can actually be consequences of individual investors’ tendency to use
limit orders (for more information on limit orders and limit order markets, see Section
2.5).
2.2 Information arrivals
According to Cochrane (2005), all asset pricing theories start from one simple concept:
the price of an asset equals this asset’s expected discounted payoff. The expectation
is conditional on the investor’s (current) information (Cochrane, 2005). Information
arrivals may change investors’ expectations on the future payoffs, and, consequently, the
price changes, i.e. the information arrivals drive the prices. If the markets are efficient,
the new information is reflected in the prices immediately after the information arrival
(Fama, 1970). An early work by Fama et al. (1969) shows that stock prices adjust to
new information, namely, announcements of stock splits. Nowadays, financial markets
are characterized by an almost continuous flow of information: investors rely increasingly
on machine-readable texts, e.g. tweets, Facebook pages, blogs, newswires, economic and
corporate reports, and company websites (Foucault et al., 2016). Thus, there are various
channels through which companies can release information.
Company announcements filed with the stock exchange represent mandatory information
releases. For listed companies, disclosure rules1 regulate the procedures on releasing
1Disclosure rules are based on the Market Abuse Regulation EU 2014/596, available at https:
//eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32014R0596.
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information: in essence, all information that is likely to influence the valuation of a
listed company must be published “as soon as possible in a manner that information
is available in a non-discriminatory way enabling fast access and complete, correct and
timely assessment of the information by the public. The listed company shall provide
the inside information to major media as well as to Financial Supervision Authority and
the Exchange.” (NASDAQ Helsinki Ltd, 2018)2 Articles II and III utilize these company
announcements.
On the other hand, social media sites, such as Facebook and Twitter, create various
opportunities for companies to improve their internal and external communication. As
of January 2013, about 45% of S&P1500 companies utilize Facebook and Twitter to
communicate externally about their business (Jung et al., 2017). Zhou et al. (2015) study
a sample of almost 10,000 companies and report that only about 7% and 3.5% of the
Facebook and Twitter messages that companies post are related to corporate disclosures.
While it is mandatory for the listed companies to release certain information, they can
strategically choose to further disseminate, discuss, and promote the same (and other)
information via social media (Jung et al., 2017). Hence, the information disseminated via
social media may be biased. Article I utilizes Facebook data.
The information arrivals can also be divided into two groups based on whether the timing
of the announcement is known in advance (i.e. scheduled announcement) or if it comes
as a surprise (non-scheduled announcement) (Chae, 2005; Graham et al., 2006; Lei and
Wang, 2014; Zheng, 2018). Graham et al. (2006) argue that making this distinction
is especially important when investigating information processing in financial markets:
otherwise, it is impossible to isolate the effect of the event timing from the effect of the
content. Articles II and III make this distinction. However, following this division mostly
makes sense for official company announcements, as there is no regulation on information
released via social media, and, hence, it would be difficult to argue why investors would
know beforehand the timing of some of the information releases.
2.3 Investors and information arrivals
Graham et al. (2006) provide an excellent discussion of how scheduled and non-scheduled
information arrivals affect the behavior of investors according to theoretic asymmetric
information models. According to them, traditional models (e.g. Glosten and Milgrom,
1985; Kyle, 1985) assume that informed traders may have information about the timing
and content of an upcoming announcement release, whereas uninformed traders may only
know the timing of a scheduled announcement. Before announcement releases, informed
investors aim to profit on their private information, and uninformed investors are reluctant
to trade if they think that the probability of trading with an informed investor is high (i.e.
before scheduled announcements; before non-scheduled announcements, informed trading
may be difficult to detect). Informational asymmetries are assumed to be reduced by the
announcement releases. According to Graham et al. (2006), in contrast to traditional
models, Kim and Verrecchia (1994) assume that informed investors have an advantage
in interpreting public news announcements, especially non-scheduled ones, leading to
increased information asymmetry after the announcement releases.
Lillo et al. (2015) examine the trading and investment decisions of single investors and
how these are affected by Thomson Reuters news articles. They find that governmental
2See also http://business.nasdaq.com/list/Rules-and-Regulations/European-rules/common/in
dex.html#tcm:5044-19496.
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and nonprofit organizations are weakly sensitive to the news, whereas households and
non-financial companies are very sensitive to both the news articles and their sentiment,
and financial institutions are intermediate between these two cases. Griffin et al. (2003)
study the relation between the trading of institutional and individual investors and stock
returns, and they find many interesting patterns; they write that “These patterns could
be driven by institutional and individual investors trading on different information and/or
perceiving past stock return moves differently.” These points highlight why it is interesting
to study the behavior of investors from different categories separately when examining
the effects of information arrivals.
Kaniel et al. (2012) look at the trading of individual investors around earnings announce-
ments and find evidence of informed or skillful trading by individuals (at least on an
aggregated level). Brennan et al. (2018) find evidence of informed trading both before
and after scheduled and non-scheduled company announcement releases. Chae (2005) and
Zheng (2018) find a decreased trading volume before scheduled announcement releases,
which is postulated to be caused by the postponement of trading by uninformed (liquid-
ity) traders, whereas prior to non-scheduled (unexpected) announcements, an increased
trading volume found is associated with increased trading by informed traders. Lei and
Wang (2014) study the trading of informed investors (insiders) around scheduled and
non-scheduled announcements, and they find that the trading volume of informed investors
increases with the amount of trading of uninformed traders before both announcement
types.
While the discussion above shows that there is research on the trading of investors around
some types of information releases, to my knowledge, there exists no such studies on
social media data, particularly with such detailed data as those used by Lillo et al. (2015)
to explore the effects of news. This is perhaps due to the lack of availability of investor
account-level data. In financial market research, data from social media have been used
mainly to predict stock returns (see e.g. Bollen et al., 2011; Chen et al., 2014; Karabulut,
2013; Nofer and Hinz, 2015; Siganos et al., 2014; You et al., 2017; Zhang et al., 2011, 2017;
Zheludev et al., 2014).3 However, the fact that data from social media affect the stock
returns gives an indication that social media could also affect the behavior of investors
(because it affects the prices).
Using survey data, Yang et al. (2017) find evidence that social media, and mass media in
general, influences investors’ trading decisions. Snow and Rasso (2017) argue that less
sophisticated investors potentially benefit the most from disclosures communicated via
social media because the information is essentially “pushed” to them on social media
platforms, which makes this information easier to access, compared with the traditional
practice of “pulling” information, in which investors actively seek information to facilitate
their decision making. In addition, in an experimental setting, Snow and Rasso (2017)
show that less sophisticated investors process the financial information received from
social media differently from information received via a company’s investor relations
website, leading to different judgments about the information.
One reason why news and social media posts may affect particularly the behavior of
household investors (in addition to the information released, which potentially affects
the valuation of the company) is the attention grabbing behavior of households (see
Barber and Odean, 2007). Barber and Odean (2007) argue that when buying stocks,
3See also Bukovina (2016) for an overview of research linking social media data to data from financial
markets.
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investors have literally thousands of possibilities (by contrast, when selling, individual
investors, in particular, mostly consider only stocks they already own, which are typically
only a few). As the search problem for stocks to buy is huge, many investors may
solve this by considering only those stocks that have recently caught their attention. In
line with this thought, Barber and Odean (2007) find that individual investors display
attention-driven buying behavior—for example, they are net buyers on days when stocks
are in news. At the same time, professional (institutional) investors have more time and
resources to monitor continuously a wider range of stocks and are thus less prone to make
attention-driven trades.
2.4 Liquidity
Liquidity is a crucial element of any well-functioning market (see e.g. Chordia et al.,
2001; Harris, 2003; O’Hara, 1995). However, it is not easy to define liquidity, potentially
because of its many dimensions (see e.g. Harris, 2003). In fact, Harris (2003) argues that
liquidity means different things to different people, and while investors and regulators
talk about liquidity all the time, they are rarely clear about what they mean.
In a perfectly liquid market, an investor can buy and sell any amount of shares immediately
at the same price (see e.g. Chacko et al., 2011)—by contrast, in illiquid (real-world) markets,
an investor always loses money if he/she first buys shares and then immediately sells
them (i.e. makes a round-trip transaction, see e.g. Amihud and Mendelson, 1991). In
general, liquid markets have the following characteristics (see e.g. Amihud and Mendelson,
1991; Black, 1971; Harris, 2003; Hasbrouck, 2007; Kyle, 1985; O’Hara, 1995, the terms in
square brackets are from Kyle, 1985):
• The trading costs are low [tightness].
• The trades (including large ones) can be executed (almost) immediately, and the
impact of trade size on the price is small [depth].
• Prices and market liquidity recover fast after large transactions [resiliency].
To put it simply, “liquidity is the ability to trade when you want to trade” (Harris, 2003).4
As defining liquidity is not an easy task, one could guess that measuring it is also not
straightforward. Many liquidity measures capturing the different aspects of liquidity
have been suggested and applied in the literature (see e.g. Aitken and Comerton-Forde,
2003; Gomber et al., 2015; Goyenko et al., 2009; Malo and Pennanen, 2012; Rakowski
and Beardsley, 2008). This study focuses mainly on static measures of liquidity, without
considering the time dimension (resiliency). The most common (static) liquidity measures
are the bid–ask spread, i.e. the difference between the best ask and bid prices, which
measures the transaction cost (for relatively small transactions), and depth, which
4The European Commission defines liquidity in Glossary: Useful terms linked to markets in financial
instruments in the following way: “Liquidity is a complex concept that is used to qualify the markets
and the instruments traded on these markets. It aims at reflecting how easy or difficult it is to buy or
sell an asset, usually without affecting the price significantly. Liquidity is a function of both volume and
volatility. Liquidity is positively correlated to volume and negatively correlated to volatility. A stock is
said to be liquid if an investor can move a high volume in or out of the market without materially moving
the price of that stock. If the stock price moves in response to investment or disinvestments, the stock
becomes more volatile.” (Available at https://ec.europa.eu/info/system/files/glossary_en.pdf.)
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measures the quantity available for trading (see e.g. Harris, 2003). As the market
structure also affects the measurement of liquidity, Section 2.5 discusses the measurement
of liquidity in limit order books, and Section 2.7 discusses the same in liquidity aggregators.
2.5 Limit order books
Nowadays, most of the modern stock exchanges are limit order-based electronic markets
(see e.g. Biais et al., 1995; Bloomfield et al., 2005; Cao et al., 2009; Gould et al., 2013).
In limit order markets, all investors can make and take liquidity by submitting limit and
market orders, respectively. This is in contrast to quote-driven markets, where there
are designated dealers (market makers, liquidity providers) who supply all the liquidity
(Harris, 2003). When an investor submits a limit order, he/she commits to buy (a buy
limit order, bid) or sell (a sell limit order, ask) a certain quantity of shares for a certain
price per share. The limit order is valid until it is executed or until the investor cancels
it. All the outstanding (unexecuted) limit orders form the limit order book. Limit order
execution takes place when another investor submits a market order either to buy or sell
a certain quantity of shares for the best price available. The limit orders in the order
book follow price and time priorities: an incoming market order is first executed against
the limit order with the best price (the highest bid or the lowest ask), and if there exist
many orders with the same price, the priority is given to the oldest limit order.
Figure 2.1 illustrates the working mechanisms of a limit order book: t = 1 is the initial
state of the limit order book, and at t = 2, a market order to buy three shares arrives (i.e.
a trade takes place on the ask side). Next, at time t = 3, a new limit order (to buy) with
price 3.6 and a quantity of 2 is submitted to the order book. Then, at time t = 4, a limit
order (price 3.1 and quantity 2) is cancelled from the bid side. For more information on
limit order books, readers are referred to (Biais et al., 1995; Gould et al., 2013; Harris,
2003) for examples.
From an investor’s perspective, a market order guarantees the execution (given that there
are outstanding limit orders with a total quantity large enough to match the market
order), but the price is uncertain. A limit order, on the other hand, guarantees the price,
but the execution remains uncertain (both the time of the execution and whether the
order will be executed at all). Furthermore, limit orders can also be seen as free options,
and they run a risk of being adversely picked off at an undesirable price if the expected
value of the stock changes (e.g. because of information arrival) (see e.g. O’Hara, 1995).
2.5.1 Measuring order book liquidity
Many empirical studies use top-of-the-book Level I data to measure liquidity, such as the
bid–ask spread and depth at the best price levels (see e.g. Chordia et al., 2008; Graham
et al., 2006; Groß-Klußmann and Hautsch, 2011; Neuhierl et al., 2013, among others).
Hence, one could ask why there is a need to use multi-level order book data (Level II
data) instead of just the bid–ask spread or Level I depth. Scholars already discussed
the problems with measuring liquidity using only the spread in the 1990s, with Lee et al.
(1993) asserting that the spread between the best bid and ask prices is just one dimension
of liquidity and that one should consider both the price dimension—spread—and the
quantity dimension—depth—when studying liquidity. O’Hara (1995) also points out a
problem related to the spread: the spread for large trades may be significantly larger
than that for small trades. According to Rakowski and Beardsley (2008), the shift to
electronic limit order books and the introduction of decimal pricing have reduced the
2.5. Limit order books 13
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Figure 2.1: Example of a sequence of snapshots of a limit order book. The left side of the red
line at zero quantity contains the bids (i.e. bid orders are presented as a negative quantity),
referred to as the bid side of the book, and the right side contains the asks (i.e. positive quantity),
referred to as the ask side. The black dotted lines represent the mid-prices, i.e. the mid-point
between the best bid and ask prices.
overall relevance of liquidity at the inside quotes and steadily increased the importance of
limit orders beyond the inside quotes. In addition, as Degryse et al. (2015) argue, “The
depth beyond the best price levels matters to investors because it reflects the quantity
immediately available for trading and therefore the price of immediacy.” The multi-level
depth is important especially around information arrivals when informed investors require
immediacy.
14 Chapter 2. Key concepts and related research
In order to appropriately measure the order book’s liquidity across multiple price levels,
the measure should capture dimensions with respect to both quantity over multiple levels
(depth) and distances between the price levels (tightness). Estimating the order book
slope by fitting a linear curve to the order book data to measure how price changes as a
function of quantity (Malo and Pennanen, 2012) or how quantity changes as a function
of price (Deuskar and Johnson, 2011; Härdle et al., 2012; Næs and Skjeltorp, 2006) is
a popular approach to achieve this. Technically, Articles II and III follow Malo and
Pennanen (2012).5 One important aspect of the slope is that it can be made invariant for
splits and comparable between different stocks and over time, enabling an aggregated
analysis. Furthermore, one can estimate slopes separately on both bid and ask sides,
enabling the study of the book’s asymmetry.
Some other liquidity measures that incorporate Level II data also exist, such as the
Exchange Liquidity Measure (XLM) that Gomber et al. (2015) use, which is based on the
cost of a round trip. Both order book slope and XLM have two important advantages:
liquidity is measured over multiple price levels, and liquidity can be measured on the
bid side and ask side separately. However, XLM is determined for a specific trade size
and the order book may not always be deep enough for calculating the XLM for a given
order size because the total cumulative depths on the bid and ask sides vary in time.
Especially around information arrivals the order books may be thin, because investors
may be reluctant to keep their orders in the book because of the adverse selection risk.
Because the liquidity measure used in Articles II and III should be available just around
the announcement times, the order book slope is preferred as a multi-level liquidity
measure because it is always possible to calculate it as long as the book is not empty.
One other option would be to follow Engle et al. (2012); Erenburg and Lasser (2009);
Riordan et al. (2013) and consider separately the depth at different price levels in the
book; however, by considering the depth at different levels separately, the number of
variables increases quickly, and the more that it does when asymmetry is also considered.
Moreover, this methodology does not take into account the tightness dimension.
2.6 Information arrivals and (order book) liquidity
The use of multi-level order book data to measure liquidity is important because, as
Gomber et al. (2015) point out, in liquid markets, restoring a small spread after a liquidity
shock can be easy, although the book would remain thin, and, on the other hand, the
depth available at the best levels can collapse momentarily, although the depth available
at other levels would remain high. Especially around news arrivals, (informed) investors
may want to take advantage of stale limit orders, and to do this they require immediacy;
in this case, it is not possible to gradually execute a large block of trades to mitigate price
impact. Consequently, investors may make single large trades or a bunch of simultaneous
smaller trades that walk up the book through many price levels, necessitating the use of
Level II data to capture the real announcement effects. To further motivate this point,
Figure 2.2 plots the order book of Nokia around two scheduled announcement releases.
It demonstrates that around information releases, investors may consume liquidity by
trading with market orders and sweeping over multiple price levels, or they may cancel
their limit orders or simply just not submit limit orders before the release of scheduled
announcements to avoid adverse selection.
5See Malo and Pennanen (2012) and Articles II and III for details on order book slope estimation.
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Figure 2.2: Limit order book around earnings announcements. Snapshots presenting
the 20 best bid and ask levels in Nokia’s limit order book around (scheduled) earnings announce-
ments on 19.10.2006 at 12:01:40 in Panel I and on 19.4.2007 at 12:00:00 in Panel II. In Panel I
(Panel II), sub-figure A (D) shows the situation 10 minutes before the announcement release;
sub-figure B (E), 10 seconds after; and C (F), 10 minutes after the event. The left side of the
red line at zero quantity contains the bids (i.e. bid orders are presented as a negative quantity),
referred to as the bid side of the book, and the right side contains the asks (i.e. positive quantity),
referred to as the ask side. The black dotted lines represent the mid-prices. The corresponding
spreads appear above the sub-figures.
Graham et al. (2006) summarize the predictions of theoretical asymmetric information
models on the market reactions before and after scheduled and non-scheduled information
releases. According to them, traditional models (Glosten and Milgrom, 1985; Kyle,
1985) predict that the liquidity is low before scheduled announcement releases, and it
reverts back to normal either quickly or gradually after the release. Before non-scheduled
announcement releases, the liquidity is at a normal level (given that no informed trading
is detected), and after the announcement, the liquidity is low before it returns to normal
(unless the information processing is immediate).
Not too many studies have used Level II data to examine how information releases affect
stocks’ order book liquidity, but there are some important exceptions. Gomber et al.
(2015) study Bloomberg ticker news and do not find a clear effect on order book liquidity;
they write that this is perhaps because Bloomberg may not always be the first channel
through which new information is distributed and the information content of the news
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may be limited. Riordan et al. (2013) study the impact of Thomson Reuters newswire
messages on intra-day price discovery, liquidity, and trading intensity and use depth at
multiple price levels (i.e. Level II data) as one liquidity proxy. They categorize the news
as positive, negative, and neutral according to the tone of the news and find evidence of
asymmetric reactions to the news. Riordan et al. (2013) find that liquidity measured by
the spread increases around positive and neutral messages, whereas it decreases around
negative messages; the depth, however, consistently increases around all types of news.
Baruch et al. (2017) study how informed investors provide liquidity before positive and
negative non-scheduled company announcements and show that when short selling is
costly, when the magnitude of the news is small, or when the investor base is not broad,
informed sellers do not expect competition and hence use limit orders before negative
events, but in all other cases (positive announcements; high competition and negative
announcements) informed traders use market orders prior to announcement releases.
Apart from these studies, Erenburg and Lasser (2009), Engle et al. (2012), and Rosa
(2016) use Level II data with macro announcements and with data from the equity-index-
linked securities market, the U.S. Treasury market, and futures market, respectively. All
three studies use depth at multiple price levels, i.e. Level II information. Erenburg and
Lasser (2009) observe that the bid–ask spread is higher than normal from around a
minute before the announcement until three to four minutes after the announcement,
and the depth beyond the best levels decreases within four minutes before and increases
to the original levels within ten minutes after the release of announcements published
during market hours. Erenburg and Lasser (2009) do not observe a significant decrease
in depth at the best levels. Engle et al. (2012) find that the depths on multiple levels
decline significantly within five minutes before the announcements, but they recover fast
after the announcements. Rosa (2016) find that the depth beyond the best levels is
abnormally low during the whole announcement day, hitting the intra-day low right before
the announcement, whereas the spread increases in the minutes before the announcement
release but returns to normal right after the announcement.
The empirical literature on liquidity around scheduled announcements using Level I
data includes Graham et al. (2006); Krinsky and Lee (1996); Lee et al. (1993), among
others. Most of the findings in the literature are in line with the predictions of traditional
asymmetric information models concerning liquidity around scheduled announcements—in
other words, before the release of scheduled announcements, the liquidity reduces (as the
probability of informed trading increases), and after the announcements, the liquidity
reverts back to normal either quickly or gradually (see Graham et al., 2006, Table 1).
In their empirical analysis, Graham et al. (2006) find wider spreads and lower depths after
the release of non-scheduled news, indicating a transition period during which information
is processed and incorporated into prices. Groß-Klußmann and Hautsch (2011) use news
data from the Reuters NewsScope Sentiment Engine and exclude earnings announcements
from their sample. Using data sampled every 20 seconds, they find that a high-frequency
trading activity reacts significantly to company-specific news in a limit order market.
They also conclude that the bid–ask spreads increase around the announcement times,
but the depth at the best levels is not necessarily affected by the release. In their daily
level analysis, Neuhierl et al. (2013) study different kinds of company releases and find
that the bid–ask spread decreases after the announcement release for almost all news
categories.
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2.7 The FX market and liquidity aggregators
The FX market, in which investors buy and sell (i.e. exchange) currencies, is among
the largest financial markets in the world, with an average daily traded volume of over
$5 trillion (Bank for International Settlements, 2016). Currencies are traded on OTC
markets, meaning that there is no formal exchange (see Harris, 2003; Hull, 2006; King
et al., 2012). The FX market shows some unique characteristics because when compared
with stock markets, the FX market has a high degree of decentralization, and compared
with other OTC markets, it is extremely liquid with a high degree of electronic trading
and a complex ecosystem of both bilateral and multilateral electronic trading platforms
(Karnaukh et al., 2015; King et al., 2012; Mancini et al., 2013). Currently, FX markets are
evolving rapidly in response to new trading technologies (King et al., 2013), and recent
regulatory requirements, such as MiFID II6, are expected to further push FX trading on
platforms.
A typical modern trading technology used in the FX market is a liquidity aggregator
(Oomen, 2017). An aggregator is an electronic trading tool that connects liquidity seekers
(traders) with liquidity providers. The idea is to facilitate best-price execution: traders
receive continuous streams of bid and ask quotes from selected (predefined) liquidity
providers and can choose to trade with the best price. The logic of an aggregator is
between the traditional RFQ protocol, in which a trader actively sends out requests for
quotes for a number of liquidity providers asking prices for a transaction with a given
quantity for a given currency pair (e.g. 1 Mio EURUSD), and a fully transparent all-to-all
limit order book-style trading.
One of the key metrics in an aggregator is (a trader’s) observed inside spread (Oomen,
2017). The observed inside spread is the difference between the best bid and ask prices
that a trader observes at a specific moment (Oomen, 2017). An inside spread, as spread
in general, is a measure of liquidity measuring the transaction costs. Table 2.1 shows
a snapshot of what an investor with four streams in his/her aggregator setting could
observe at a specific moment.
An important question for a trader is to determine how many streams and which streams
to include in his/her aggregator setting because this also affects directly the trader’s
observed inside spread. As the liquidity provision in FX markets is highly bespoke and as
it can be assumed that liquidity providers’ behavior is fairly heterogeneous, the problem
is highly non-trivial (see also Oomen, 2017). Liquidity providers usually provide different
streams for certain traders (or subsets of traders), and, thus, while traders can choose
with which liquidity providers they trade, they are not free to choose just any streams.
Additionally, the selection of liquidity providers with whom a trader trades is further
complicated by the fact that given the OTC nature of FX markets, two parties trading
need a bilateral trading agreement and sufficient bilateral credit in order to trade (see
also Gould et al., 2017).
Oomen (2017) provides a thorough discussion of liquidity aggregators and develops a
theoretical model for liquidity dynamics in an aggregator. However, to my knowledge,
there exists no prior research studying an aggregator empirically (which is the focus of
Article IV). Other research focusing on liquidity in FX markets (but not in liquidity
aggregators) includes those of Banti et al. (2012); Danielsson and Payne (2012); Gould
et al. (2017); Karnaukh et al. (2015); Mancini et al. (2013); Payne (2003).
6See https://www.esma.europa.eu/policy-rules/mifid-ii-and-mifir.
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Table 2.1: Snapshot of the most recent quotes observed by a trader with four
streams (A, B, C, D). Each stream can have an arbitrary number of price and quantity pairs
for both the bid and ask sides. The best bid and ask prices are highlighted with bold, and the
trader’s observed inside spread is calculated based on these: in this case, the observed inside
spread equals 1.12545− 1.12542 = 0.00003 = 0.3 basis points (bp) (This table is from Article
IV).
Bid quotes Ask quotes
Stream price quantity [M] price quantity [M]
A 1.12513 1 1.12587 1
A 1.12512 2 1.12588 2
B 1.12536 0.5 1.12545 0.5
B 1.12535 1 1.12546 1
B 1.12533 3 1.12549 3
C 1.12536 0.5 1.12547 0.5
C 1.12534 1 1.12550 1
D 1.12542 1 1.12549 1
D 1.12539 2 1.12551 2
D 1.12536 3 1.12557 3
D 1.12532 5 — —
3 Data
This chapter introduces the dataset used in Articles I– IV. Table 3.1 provides a short
overview of the data sets used. Article I combines the shareholding registration record
data described in Section 3.1 and the data collected from Nokia’s Facebook page, described
in Section 3.2. Articles II and III utilize stock limit order book data (Section 3.3) and
data on company announcement releases (Section 3.4). Paper IV uses data from an FX
liquidity aggregator, described in Section 3.5. In addition to these main data sets, some of
the articles use supporting data sets, e.g. for the control variables, and these are described
in the articles. Section 3.6 describes the processing of the data.
Table 3.1: Data sets used in Articles I – IV.
Data set Time period Asset(s) Market Article
Shareholding registration
records
6/2010–12/2016 Nokia (stock) NASDAQ Helsinki I
Facebook 6/2010–12/2016 Nokia — I
Limit order book 1/2006–12/2010 75 stocks NASDAQ Nordic II, III
Company announcements 1/2006–12/2010 75 stocks NASDAQ Nordic II, III
FX aggregator 26.9.2016–7.10.2016 EURUSD FX market IV
3.1 Shareholding registration record data
Article I uses shareholding registration record data including all Finnish household and
institutional investors from June 7, 2010 to the end of 2016, obtained from Euroclear Ltd.1
The data set covers all the daily changes in over 280,000 Finnish investors’ shareholdings
in Nokia stock. Each record in the data contains information about the type, registration
date, and volume related to the change in holdings, among other attributes. It also
contains meta-data about the investor. In the first part of the analysis, Article I uses
investors’ sector codes to divide the investors into the following five groups: non-financial
corporations, financial and insurance corporations, general governmental organizations,
nonprofit institutions, and households (the categorization arises from the data).2 In
addition, to take a closer look at the trading of households, household investors are
divided into activity groups based on their trading during the past two months.
1Data starting from April 12, 2010 are used to determine the activity levels of different investors.
2Grinblatt and Keloharju (2000, 2001); Lillo et al. (2015); Tumminello et al. (2012) use the same
categories, with the exception that they also include the group of foreign investors. We exclude foreign
investors from our analysis because a large percentage of them choose to use nominee registration (see
also Grinblatt and Keloharju, 2000; Lillo et al., 2015), and for these investors, we can only observe
aggregate behavior and cannot distinguish between unique traders.
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Baltakys et al. (2018); Grinblatt and Keloharju (2000, 2001); Lillo et al. (2015); Tumminello
et al. (2012) use the data sets from the same source, and they provide detailed descriptions
of the data. However, one should note that they use data from before 2009, when all
transactions were reported separately, while after moving to Central Counterparty Clearing
in late 2009, the Euroclear research data set contains only aggregated daily trades without
specifying the actual trading dates: instead, a registration date is associated with every
record.
Thus, the data set reports a registration date for each change in shareholdings, which is not
the same as the actual trading date. To analyze the contemporaneous relationship between
investors’ trading activities and the activities on Nokia’s Facebook page, the trading
dates are reverse engineered from the registration dates. The official T+3 settlement
convention is used for shareholdings registered before and on October 8, 2014, and T+2
is used afterwards (see Euroclear, 2014). Using the derived trading dates, transactions
are aggregated on a weekly basis. Weekly aggregation will reduce the possible noise of
inaccurate trading date derivation.
3.2 Facebook data
The Facebook data include all posts and related comments, likes, and shares from Nokia’s
Facebook wall3 between June 5, 2010 and December 31, 2016. The data were collected
using the Social Data Analytics Tool (SODATO) (see Hussain and Vatrapu, 2014a,b;
Hussain et al., 2014). Aggregated at the daily level, the data show how many posts Nokia
made on its Facebook wall on a given day, as well as how many comments, likes, and
shares these posts received. Note that comments, likes, and shares are always related to
a specific post—in other words, the post is the main action. Therefore, the numbers of
comments, likes, and shares are assigned to the date of the original post—that is, not
the date when the actual comment, like, or share was made. In effect, the numbers of
comments, likes, and shares are indicative of the importance of the post released on a
particular day in the data.
The daily Facebook data are aggregated to weekly by summing the numbers of posts,
comments, likes, and shares during a week. In total, the sample comprises 342 weekly
observations for posts, comments, likes, and shares. The week is taken to begin on
Saturday and end on Friday because trading does not occur on weekends. This way,
the Facebook activity on weekends is related to the week in which it can actually affect
investors’ trading decisions.
3.3 Limit order book data
The Level II limit order book data in Articles II and III are from NASDAQ OMX Nordic,
which are continuous limit order-based markets.4 The limit order book data consist of
3https://www.facebook.com/nokia.
4We use data from Nordic markets instead of US markets (the most liquid in the world) because the
former are less fragmented compared with the latter. In the US, fragmentation is clearly an important
feature of equity markets (O’Hara and Ye, 2011); the limit orders for a given asset are spread between
several exchanges, thus posing a problem for empirical research—in particular, matching rules and
transaction costs complicate the comparisons between different limit order books for the same asset
(Gould et al., 2013). Furthermore, as Butt and Virk (2015) argue, another advantage of using data from
less liquid Nordic markets is that “it is more appropriate to test liquidity-related models in markets that
are sufficiently illiquid to diagnose the level and strength of bearing [...] risks”.
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snapshots of the limit order books representing quotes on the 20 best bid and ask price
levels, and the data are sampled every 10 seconds. Articles II and III use the Level II
order book data from the beginning of 2006 until the end of 2010.
The data sample consists of 75 frequently traded stocks from the Helsinki, Stockholm, and
Copenhagen Stock Exchanges. The stocks included have been involved in OMX Helsinki
25, OMX Stockholm 30, or OMX Copenhagen 20 stock indexes at some point. Out of
the total 75 stocks, 27 are traded in Helsinki, 28 in Stockholm, and 20 in Copenhagen
Stock Exchange. The list of stocks included is available in Appendix A.
3.4 Company announcements
The news data used in Articles II and III come from NASDAQ OMX Nordic’s website.5
The announcements included are from the beginning of 2006 until the end of 2010, and
the respective companies filed them with NASDAQ OMX. The announcement times are
reported at one second precision, but they are rounded to the nearest 10 seconds because
the order book data are sampled every 10 seconds.
Articles II and III do not restrict the study to any specific news class, such as earnings
announcements, as many other studies do. Rather, the announcements are re-categorized
into two specific groups: scheduled and non-scheduled announcements. An announcement
is classified as scheduled if the exact publishing date is known to the public beforehand.
This happens if the date is given in advance in earlier stock exchange releases (e.g. in the
financial calendar). For some of the scheduled announcements, the exact (intra-day) time
of the announcement is known beforehand, but these announcements are not analyzed
separately because distinguishing between the two cases reliably is not always possible.
An announcement is classified as non-scheduled if one may assume that external stake-
holders do not know that the announcement is going to be released or when it will be
released. In particular, a release is considered non-scheduled if it is irregular, its publish-
ing schedule is not given and cannot be reliably estimated, or the release is obviously
unexpected. Announcements whose publishing timespan is given non-specifically in earlier
stock exchange releases or that are somewhat regular by nature, such as proposals to
annual general meetings by the board or nomination committee, are excluded from the
sample to be on the safe side. Most of the excluded announcements are notices to convene
annual general meetings, notices of the publication of annual reports or summaries, and
invitations to press conferences related to publishing financial reports.
The final sample includes 408 (329) scheduled announcements and 2,629 (2,102) non-
scheduled announcements with 30 (60)-minute pre- and post-event windows. Just over
35% of the announcements originate from NASDAQ OMX Helsinki, around 45% are from
NASDAQ OMX Stockholm, and a bit under 20% come from NASDAQ OMX Copenhagen.
In the final sample, over 70% of the scheduled announcements are financial announcements.
Appendix A gives the number of announcements per company and additional information
on filtering the news included in the study.
5http://www.nasdaqomxnordic.com/news/companynews, see this page also for detailed information.
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3.5 FX aggregator data
Paper IV analyzes quote data for EURUSD from an FX liquidity aggregator.6 The sample
period covers 10 trading days from September 26, 2016 to October 7, 2016. The data
set includes information on all quote updates for all liquidity streams by the liquidity
providers operating in the aggregator: there are, on average, more than 30 million quote
updates per day. Additionally, the data set includes information on all transactions in
the aggregator, including information on both counterparties: (anonymised) trader ID
and stream ID. Constructing a snapshot of the quotes that a specific trader observes at
any point in time (a trader’s “personal order book”) is possible using this information.
Article IV uses information on the best bid and ask prices quoted by each liquidity stream,
sampled every minute at 6:00–16:00.7 Additionally, for each trader in the aggregator,
the trader’s observed inside spread is determined every minute by using the information
on the liquidity streams that the trader observes and the best bid and ask prices quoted
by these streams. The set of streams a trader observes is approximated with the set of
streams that the trader has traded with; in reality, therefore, the number of observed
streams may be higher, as there may be streams from which a trader receives quotes but
with which he/she did not trade during our sample period.
3.6 Data processing
A substantial proportion of the time I used in conducting the research related to this
dissertation project was spent on processing the data. For Article I, my co-authors
provided me with the weekly observations for the shareholding registration data and
the daily observations for the Facebook data. The shareholding registration data were
created by filtering and aggregating the numbers of investors changing their positions.
The Facebook data were obtained by scraping all the posts, comments, likes, and shares
from Nokia’s Facebook wall and transforming the data into tabular format by summing
the daily numbers of the Facebook activities (using SODATO, see Hussain and Vatrapu,
2014a,b; Hussain et al., 2014). Then, I aggregated the Facebook data to the weekly level
and calculated the supporting data for the control variables. Finally, I converted and
combined the data sets to the format required by the analysis.
I already calculated the order book liquidity measure from the limit order book data as a
part of my Master’s thesis research (see Salo, 2014). First , the order book state data
were sampled every 10 seconds, and second, the slopes for the bid and ask sides were
calculated using linear regression. This was a huge task, as the sampling frequency was
high, the sample period was four years long, and there were 75 stocks included in the
study. In addition, for Articles II and III, I calculated various other measures needed for
the analysis. The company announcement data for Articles II and III were scraped from
NASDAQ Nordic’s webpage by my co-author. The announcements were sorted out into
scheduled and non-scheduled ones by a research assistant according to my instructions
and under my close supervision. Then, I combined the data sets and converted the data
to a suitable format for running the analysis.
For Article IV, I handled the data in collaboration with big xyt AG. In particular, the
data provider gave the data to my co-author at big xyt AG, and they imported the data
6We are not allowed to disclose any detailed information on the data provider.
7The analysis is restricted to data from 6:00–16:00 because around 90% of the trading (measured
both by the traded volume and the number of trades) takes place during these hours.
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to their database. Then, I checked and confirmed the data quality and wrote the codes
to access the data before transforming them into a suitable format for calculating the
variables needed. Next, I wrote the codes to extract and calculate the variables for the
actual analysis. During this process, I also received occasional support from big xyt AG
in executing the codes as efficiently as possible. I likewise had many discussions with the
company providing the data to ensure that I understand the data correctly.

4 Methods
This chapter describes the research methods used in Articles I– IV. Articles I and III
use regression analysis: Article I uses logistic regression, and Article III utilizes linear
regression, both discussed in Section 4.1. Article II utilizes the framework from the event
analysis method, presented in Section 4.2. Article IV exploits a GA, described in Section
4.3, to solve an optimization problem.
4.1 Regression analysis
Multiple linear regression analysis is a general statistical technique used to study the rela-
tionship between a dependent (explained) variable and several independent (explanatory)
variables (Greene, 2012; Hair et al., 2010). Regression analysis can be used to study a
wide variety of research problems (Hair et al., 2010), and it is widely applied in finance
literature (see e.g. Degryse et al., 2015; Graham et al., 2006; Grinblatt and Keloharju,
2001; Kaniel et al., 2008).
In Article III, linear regression is used to investigate the factors related to the magnitude
of the illiquidity shock following announcement releases. The data are pooled on a
cross-section of stocks. To remove the stock-level effects, within-transformation (also
called fixed effects transformation) is used (see Baltagi, 2013). In within-transformation,
each variable is demeaned by subtracting its within-individual average over time (Baltagi,
2013).1
In Article I, the dependent variable is binary: there are two possible outcomes, either an
investor (who changed his/her holdings on Nokia stock) increased or decreased his/her
holdings. The logistic regression model is the most frequently used regression model for
this kind of discrete data (Hosmer Jr et al., 2013), and, hence, it is applied in Article I.
Logistic regression utilizes the logit link function, but two other common choices when
working with binary data exist, which are the probit and complementary log-log link
functions (Faraway, 2005). Logit link is preferred in Article I because it provides a simple
interpretation of the regression results with odds-ratios (see e.g. Faraway, 2005).
4.2 Event study
In finance research, event study analysis is used to measure the effect of some firm-
specific or economy-wide event on stock returns (see e.g. Campbell et al., 1997; Kothari
1Additionally, for the data in Article III, random effects models are fitted and compared with the
corresponding fixed-effect models by using the Hausman test (see e.g. Baltagi, 2013). As the test indicates
that in some cases (with non-scheduled announcements), the estimated parameters may be biased, Article
III reports the results using within-transformation to be on the safe side. However, the results seem
consistent with those obtained using random effects models (not reported in Article III).
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and Warner, 2007). The method is widely applied, Kothari and Warner (2007) report
that between the years 1974 and 2000, there were 565 event studies published in five
leading finance journals. For example, researchers have studied mergers and acquisitions
(see e.g. Mentz and Schiereck, 2008; Moeller and Schlingemann, 2005), as well as layoff
announcements (see e.g. Chalos and Chen, 2002; Velásquez et al., 2018). The basic idea is
to determine the effect of an event on returns by comparing the observations in an event
window (potentially affected by the event) with the observations in an estimation window
(assumed to represent normal times without the event) (see, e.g. Campbell et al., 1997):
Figure 4.1 illustrates this. When aggregating over the events, the analysis shows whether
the event leads to abnormal returns, i.e. whether the returns in the event windows are
substantially higher or lower than those in the estimation windows.
time
Event window
Event
Figure 4.1: Timeline of an event study (adapted from Campbell et al., 1997)
However, Article II focuses on the effect of announcement releases on order book liquidity
and not on the effect on returns as traditional event studies. Nevertheless, event study
methodology provides a natural framework for the study, as order book liquidity around
announcement releases (i.e. in the event window) is compared with normal order book
liquidity (i.e. order book liquidity in the estimation window). Furthermore, Gomber
et al. (2015) utilize the event study approach to examine liquidity. Another difference
when compared with more traditional event studies is that Article II uses high-frequency
intra-day data, whereas event studies often utilize daily-level data (see e.g. Chalos and
Chen, 2002; Mentz and Schiereck, 2008; Moeller and Schlingemann, 2005, and discussion
in Velásquez et al., 2018).
4.3 GA for optimization
The problem in Article IV involves selecting the set of liquidity streams that minimizes
the trader’s average observed inside spread, given the number of liquidity streams in the
trader’s aggregator setting. This optimization problem is combinatorial and non-linear,
and solving it exactly using brute force, i.e. computing all the possible solutions and
choosing the best one, is not feasible. A GA is an optimization method that can be
applied to a variety of problems, including discrete combinatorial problems (Sivanandam
and Deepa, 2008). Hence, it is a natural choice for solving the complex optimization
problem in Article IV.
A GA is a metaheuristic optimization method2 inspired by natural selection and survival
of the fittest (see Holland, 1992). It is the most popular technique in a broader category of
2A deterministic algorithm finds an exact solution to a problem, but in practice, many problems are
too complex to be solved exactly within a reasonable computing time; a (meta)heuristic method, on the
other hand, provides a sufficiently good solution within a reasonable computing time (Schlottmann and
Seese, 2004). Because a GA is a metaheuristic method, there is no guarantee that the global optimum is
reached, but the analysis in Article IV shows that the best combinations found are indeed sufficiently
good for the purposes of the analysis.
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evolutionary computation methods (Sivanandam and Deepa, 2008). Nowadays, GAs are
used to solve many optimization problems because they are easy to apply, and they are
robust in finding good solutions to difficult problems (Contreras-Bolton and Parada, 2015;
Sivanandam and Deepa, 2008). In the field of economics and finance, GAs have been
used to solve problems related, for example, to portfolio selection and risk management
(see e.g. Schlottmann and Seese, 2004, and references therein).
The basic idea of GA is intuitive—Figure 4.2 describes this. At the beginning, an initial
population is generated as a random sample of possible solutions, and a fitness value
is calculated for each individual solution in the population. Then, a new population is
generated through crossover (combining two parent solutions; the higher fitness value
makes an individual more likely to be a parent) and mutation (applying a random change
in an individual solution). Next, a fitness value is calculated for each individual in the
new population. Then, the situation is checked against predefined stopping criteria, for
example, if the average improvement in the best fitness value is less than a given limit
or a maximum number of generations or a time limit is reached. If at least one of the
stopping criteria is satisfied, the algorithm halts; otherwise a new generation is created
(for more information, see e.g. Sivanandam and Deepa, 2008).
start
create initial population 
and calculate a fitness 
value for each individual
calculate a fitness value 
for each individual
generate a new 
population through 
crossover and mutation 
(guaranteeing survival of 
the best individuals)
Is some stopping 
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stop
YES
NO
Figure 4.2: Flowchart of a genetic algorithm (adapted from Sivanandam and Deepa, 2008).

5 Findings
This chapter summarizes the findings of Articles I– IV. In addition, Section 5.5 recaps
the research questions of this dissertation and highlights the answers that Articles I – IV
find. More detailed findings can be found in the articles attached to this dissertation.
5.1 Facebook drives behavior of passive households in stock
markets
Siikanen et al. (2018a) (Article I of this thesis) examine the relation between investors’
decisions and Facebook data. In particular, given that an investor trades, Siikanen et al.
(2018a) study whether Facebook data are related to an investor’s decision to increase or
decrease his/her position on Nokia stock. In the first part of the analysis, investors are
divided into the following five categories: companies, financial (and insurance) institutions,
governmental organizations, non-profit organizations, and households. In the second part,
households are divided into four categories based on their trading activity.
Siikanen et al. (2018a) give the first empirical evidence that Facebook activities affect the
trading of different investors differently. The analysis shows a clear association between
Facebook data and the decisions of (especially passive) household investors and non-profit
organizations. By contrast, there is clearly no association between the decisions of financial
institutions and Facebook data. Given that finance and insurance institutions can be
viewed as the most sophisticated domestic investor group (see Grinblatt and Keloharju,
2000, and the discussion in Section 2.1), the findings indicate that more sophisticated
investors are more independent of Facebook activities, whereas less sophisticated investors
may rely more on the information communicated via Facebook. Assuming that an
investor’s activeness is related to his/her sophistication, the findings on household activity
groups support this result (Grinblatt and Keloharju, 2000, show that larger household
investors are more sophisticated than smaller ones).
Facebook is not a regulated information channel, and, hence, companies are likely to
strategically select the information disseminated via this platform (Jung et al., 2017).
Thus, the findings of Siikanen et al. (2018a) suggest that the decisions of less sophisticated
investors may be driven by biased information. In line with this view, Ammann and
Schaub (2017) find that postings on a social trading platform, which do not contain
value-relevant information, affect the trading decisions of unsophisticated investors.
5.2 Limit order books and liquidity around scheduled and
non-scheduled announcements
Siikanen et al. (2017a) (Article II in this thesis) studies the dynamics of order book
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liquidity around scheduled and non-scheduled company announcement releases. The
aggregated results depict significant changes in order book liquidity during a two-hour
event window around a company announcement arrival. The announcements are followed
by an immediate liquidity shock (within a few minutes after the announcement release).
Before scheduled announcement releases, the order book liquidity is abnormally low on
both bid and ask sides already an hour before the announcement release. This indicates
that the order books (investors) adjust to the scheduled announcement releases already (at
least) an hour before the release: many investors may either cancel their orders or choose
not to submit new limit orders. Therefore, informed investors have limited possibilities
of taking advantage of stale limit orders prior to scheduled information releases. After
scheduled announcement releases, the aggregated order book liquidity recovers to an
exceptionally good level, which may indicate that the release of scheduled announcements
reduces information asymmetries and adverse selection costs significantly. The finding on
reduced liquidity prior to scheduled announcement releases is in line with the predictions
of the traditional asymmetric information models of liquidity (see Table 1 in Graham
et al., 2006, and the discussion in Section 2.6); however, the models predict that the
liquidity returns back to normal after the announcement release, whereas the analysis of
Siikanen et al. (2017a) indicates that liquidity can revert to an exceptionally good level.
Additionally, the results show some statistically significant pre-reactions to non-scheduled
announcement releases, especially on the ask side, although the pre-reactions are clearly
weaker than those for scheduled announcements. According to traditional models, these
pre-reactions can indicate information leakage (see Graham et al., 2006). In contrast to
that after scheduled announcement releases, the order book liquidity is still abnormally
low an hour after the non-scheduled announcement releases in most of the cases, indicating
that it takes a relatively long time for the markets to adjust to unanticipated information
arrivals (see Graham et al., 2006).
Additionally, the analysis in Siikanen et al. (2017a) shows that the order book liquidity
(Level II liquidity measure) behaves quite differently around company announcement
releases when compared to the spread (Level I liquidity measure). Furthermore, the
analysis of order book asymmetry indicates that the news-momentum (news-contrarian)
trading strategy through market orders is relatively expensive (inexpensive) after non-
scheduled announcements, whereas scheduled announcements decrease the transaction
costs for both large buy and sell trades: the book remains symmetric, meaning that after
scheduled company announcements, both news-contrarian and news-momentum trading
strategies are symmetrically inexpensive.
5.3 What drives the sensitivity of limit order books to
company announcements?
Siikanen et al. (2017b) (Article III in this thesis) analyze the factors affecting the
magnitude of the illiquidity shocks caused by scheduled and non-scheduled announcement
releases. In particular, the effects of several variables related to pre-reactions in the order
book, the sign (positiveness/negativeness) of the announcement releases, and the market’s
reaction times are studied.
The results show that recent losses amplify the illiquidity shocks following non-scheduled
announcement releases. This seems consistent with the results of Hameed et al. (2010),
who document that negative market returns decrease liquidity. At the same time, there is
no such association with scheduled announcements; therefore, this result may help clarify
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investors’ reactions to the arrival of unexpected news: recent losses can make investors’
liquidity provision more sensitive to surprising news arrivals.
Moreover, the results show that a fast reaction is a strong reaction: the faster the limit
order book illiquidity reaches its maximum after both scheduled and non-scheduled
announcement releases, the more illiquid the order book becomes. This could indicate
that if there is no immediate illiquidity shock following the announcement, it is likely that
there is no (strong) liquidity shock. Siikanen et al. (2017b) also provide evidence that
asymmetry between the bid and ask sides of an order book before announcement releases
is positively associated with the magnitude of illiquidity shocks, especially for bid side
liquidity. This seems to be in line with the finding of Chordia et al. (2002) that order
imbalances in either direction reduce the liquidity of the aggregate market. Additionally,
positive announcement releases cause larger illiquidity shocks on the ask side and smaller
shocks on the bid side and vice versa for negative announcements. This seems reasonable
because informed investors may buy (sell) shares by picking off stale sell (buy) limit
orders just after the arrival of new positive (negative) information.
5.4 Liquidity in the FX market
Siikanen et al. (2018b) (Article IV in this thesis) provides empirical evidence of the
liquidity observable by individual investors in an FX liquidity aggregator. The analysis
shows that investors observe, on average, 5.4 streams out of the total 165 active streams
quoted by the 42 liquidity providers in the aggregator (the maximum is 23 and the
minimum is 1). Additionally, investors observe relatively tight inside spreads already with
four or five streams in their aggregator setting, and having more streams leads to just
marginal benefits, if any.
Given the number of streams in an investor’s aggregator setting, an optimal combination
of streams is determined to minimize the investor’s observed inside spread. Comparisons
of the observed spreads with the optimal ones show that most of the investors could
cut their observed spread in less than half while keeping the number of streams the
same, given that they could obtain the optimal combination of streams. Moreover, if
investors could obtain the optimal combination of streams, they would save $0.13–$0.18
basis points per e1 traded. However, fully exploiting the cost savings and reductions in
observed spreads may not be possible for traders because they are not free to choose just
any streams quoted by the liquidity providers, and changes in the traders’ aggregator
settings would likely change the quoting behaviors of the liquidity providers.
Finally, Siikanen et al. (2018b) calibrate the model by (Oomen, 2017) to the empirical
data. The analysis shows that although the model is studied under a quite simplistic
assumption of homogeneous liquidity providers, the model can be accurately fitted to
real-world data, and, hence, it can be used to describe the liquidity in aggregators.
5.5 Summary of the findings and review of the research
questions
RQ I of this dissertation asks whether the information that companies release on social
media affects the trading decisions of investors. To answer this question, Article I studied
data collected from Nokia’s Facebook wall, combined with data on the holdings of all
Finnish investors on Nokia stock, and conclude that there is an association between
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the Facebook data and the buy versus sell decisions of some investors, but not all. In
particular, the decisions of arguably less sophisticated investors—passive households and
non-profit institutions—are associated with Facebook data, whereas more sophisticated
investors—financial institutions—seem to behave independently of the Facebook data.
RQ II concerns how liquidity in limit order books evolves around scheduled and non-
scheduled company announcement releases. Article II answers this question by studying
the limit order books of 75 stocks from NASDAQ Nordic around scheduled and non-
scheduled company announcement releases. The order book liquidity is abnormally low
before scheduled announcement releases, and it is somewhat lower than normal before non-
scheduled announcements. Both announcement types are followed by immediate illiquidity
shocks. After scheduled announcement releases, the aggregated liquidity recovers to an
abnormally high level, whereas the liquidity after non-scheduled announcements remains
relatively low at least an hour after the announcement release in most cases.
RQ III explores the factors that affect the magnitude of order book liquidity shocks
caused by scheduled and non-scheduled announcements. Using the same data as those
in Article II, Article III finds that recent losses amplify the shocks after non-scheduled
announcements, a larger asymmetry right before the announcements leads to larger shocks,
and a fast reaction is a strong reaction.
RQ IV focuses on liquidity in aggregators, exploring the proportion of liquidity observed
by investors and how much the spreads could be improved by selecting the liquidity
streams optimally. By using a unique data set from an FX aggregator, Article IV finds
that investors observe, on average, 5.4 streams out of the total 165 streams, and that
most of the investors could cut their observed spread by more than half with the same
number of streams they currently observe, given that they would be able to observe the
optimal combination of streams.
6 Conclusion
This chapter provides the concluding remarks for this dissertation. First, the contribution
of the dissertation is discussed, and, second, the reliability and validity of the research
are assessed. Finally, some limitations and suggestions for future research are presented.
6.1 Contribution
This dissertation contributes to the empirical literature on financial markets related
to three key elements of these markets: investors, information arrivals, and liquidity.
Combined, Articles I– IV address several research gaps on the interrelations of these
topics. A better understanding of these topics can help researchers develop more reliable
and robust models related to the market’s micro structure and investor behavior; on a
more general level, exchange organizations, regulations, and investment management can
all be benefitted by this better understanding (see Amihud and Mendelson, 1991; Chordia
et al., 2001; Grinblatt and Keloharju, 2000, 2001; O’Hara, 1995). Additionally, the new
empirical findings could aid researchers in planning new empirical studies by indicating
aspects that should be considered, for instance, highlighting the importance of separating
investors into categories, making the distinction between scheduled and non-scheduled
announcement releases, and measuring liquidity also deeper in the order book.
While Lillo et al. (2015) study how Reuters news articles affect the trading decisions of
different types of investors, Article I contributes by providing the first evidence that the
information companies release on social media affects the behavior of different investors
in stock markets differently. In particular, the findings indicate that the decisions of
passive household investors and non-profit institutions to buy versus sell are associated
with Facebook data, whereas the behavior of more sophisticated investors—financial
institutions—seems to be independent of Facebook data. One implication of the result
could be as follows: as information communicated via social media affects the behavior
of certain investors, companies should be careful in releasing information on social
media, especially because there is no detailed research yet on how social media activities
affect trading behavior. On the other hand, as Jung et al. (2017) show that companies
disseminate information on social media strategically, such information may be biased,
and, thus, less sophisticated investors should be cautious when relying on this information
in investment decision making.
Article II contributes by using data on scheduled and non-scheduled first-hand official
company announcements and by finding clear effects of announcement releases on limit
order book liquidity in stock markets. This is a novel finding given its strong contrast
to that in the work of Gomber et al. (2015), who find no evidence that Bloomberg
ticker news would cause liquidity shocks to order books. The findings provide evidence
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related to the asymmetric information models of liquidity (see Graham et al., 2006):
scheduled announcement releases seem to resolve the asymmetric information problem
(the order book liquidity is abnormally high an hour after scheduled announcement
releases), but an hour after non-scheduled announcement releases, in many cases, the
liquidity remains relatively low, indicating relatively long information processing times.
As liquidity measurement is also an important topic from the regulatory perspective
(Amihud and Mendelson, 1991; Chordia et al., 2001; Cumming et al., 2011)1, the evidence
shown in Article II that liquidity measured over multiple price levels (liquidity for larger
transactions) may differ from top-of-the-book liquidity (liquidity for relatively small
trades) is valuable.
The contribution of Article III is the identification of the factors that magnify the liquidity
shocks following scheduled and non-scheduled announcement releases. Article II and
some other studies (Engle et al., 2012; Erenburg and Lasser, 2009; Riordan et al., 2013;
Rosa, 2016) show that announcement releases may cause liquidity shocks to the markets,
but the factors affecting the magnitude of the liquidity shocks related to information
arrivals in stocks markets have not been studied in depth. A better understanding of
these factors may help liquidity traders avoid trading during periods of low liquidity
and could potentially help exchange operators and regulators plan policies to prevent
disruptions in order book liquidity.
The novelty of Article IV is its use of a unique and detailed data set and the insights derived
from it. Although Oomen (2017) provides a thorough discussion liquidity aggregators
and develops a model for liquidity provision in an aggregator, to my and my co-authors’
knowledge, Article IV is the first study to provide empirical evidence of liquidity in an FX
aggregator. As FX market liquidity is important from many perspectives, for instance,
it is needed for international trade and it is crucial in guaranteeing the efficiency of
other markets, too (Karnaukh et al., 2015; King et al., 2012; Mancini et al., 2013), the
empirical evidence that Article IV provides is valuable for all researchers, practitioners,
and regulators. Article IV also contributes to the literature by answering the call of Gould
et al. (2017) for literature studying the subset of liquidity that individual traders observe
in the FX market. In particular, the findings imply that traders in aggregators could try
to improve the observed spread by changing the aggregator setting, and regulators could
perhaps consider the optimality and efficiency of this kind of trading technology (see also
Black, 1971).
6.2 Reliability and validity of the research
Assessing the reliability and the validity of a study is important in estimating the rigor
of the research process and the trustworthiness of the findings. Reliability relates to
consistency, in a sense that it asks whether we did things correctly; validity, on the other
hand, relates to that we did correct things, in the first place, to answer the research
questions (see e.g. Heale and Twycross, 2015; Roberts et al., 2006).
For the research to be reliable and valid, the data used must be of high quality. In this
dissertation, the data quality is ensured by obtaining the data from official sources. For
Article I, the shareholding registration data are acquired from Euroclear Ltd.; the data
should be highly reliable, as electronic records represent official certificates of ownership
(see Grinblatt and Keloharju, 2000). For Articles II and III, the limit order book data are
1For the MiFID II perspective, see e.g. https://www.emissions-euets.com/internal-electricity
-market-glossary/805-liquidity.
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acquired directly from NASDAQ Nordic, and the liquidity aggregator data used in Article
IV are obtained directly from the market place operator. All data handling processes are
done carefully to ensure and maintain the high quality of the data.
Furthermore, this research is conducted using widely established statistical methods.
Regarding the reliability of the results, multiple robustness checks are run to ensure that
the results are not sensitive to small modifications in the test settings. Articles II and
III repeat the analysis using both 30- and 60-minute pre- and post-event windows, and
Article III additionally runs the analysis for mean values instead of medians. Article II
uses both statistical and visual analytics to study the behavior of order book liquidity.
The additional analysis in Article I on households’ activity groups can also be viewed
as a robustness check—on the other hand, analyzing the numbers of comments, likes,
and shares that the posts receive, in addition to the plain numbers of posts, serves as a
robustness check, too. Moreover, in Article IV, the GA is run 10 times for each aggregator
setting with different numbers of liquidity streams to ensure that the results do not rely
on the result of just one optimization run.
Furthermore, Articles I – III are published in high-quality journals, further confirming the
validity of the research: the articles have been peer reviewed and revised before their
publication. The measures used in the articles have also been selected carefully after
consultation of prior literature to ensure that they measure the subjects of interest.
6.3 Limitations and suggestions for future research
Many of the limitations of this research are related to the data. Article I studies only one
company, Nokia, and this may pose a clientele bias: investors interested in Nokia may
generally be more social media and technology savvy, so they likely follow Facebook. It is
unclear if the results are generalizable to other companies and other markets. In future
research, it would be interesting to include more companies from different industries
in the analysis. However, extending such a detailed analysis to other markets may be
complicated, as detailed data are not available for most of the markets. In addition,
extending the analysis to the semantics of the posts and comments, in addition to the
numbers, could shed more light on the question of how information communicated via
social media affects the decisions of different investors.
For Articles II and III, the sample time period overlaps with the financial crisis of 2008,
and this may have had an impact on the results, although Chordia et al. (2001) argue that
while liquidity levels may vary with market trends, the day-to-day changes in liquidity are
probably the same in most environments. Furthermore, the proportion of (high-frequency)
algo trading started to rise in NASDAQ Nordic around 2010 (NASDAQ OMX, 2011),
and it would be interesting to see if this has changed the liquidity dynamics around
information arrivals. Another limitation is that Articles II and III utilize multi-level
order book state data but not the complete order flow data (ITCH feed), which would
allow a detailed analysis of trades, order submissions, and cancellations. Future research
using ITCH feed data could give a more complete picture of liquidity making and taking
around the announcement releases and provide evidence of what causes the changes in
order books around the announcement releases (trades, cancellations, or low limit order
submission rates).
The results in Article II show that the spread may behave quite differently from the order
book liquidity over multiple price levels; correspondingly, the order book liquidity over 20
price levels (which is used in Articles II and III) may differ from the order book liquidity
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over, for example, 5 or 10 order book levels. Future research could study how the number
of order book levels studied affects the results. Furthermore, Articles II and III focus
on the liquid stocks of relatively large companies, and the results for less liquid stocks
and smaller companies may differ substantially, for example, because of analyst coverage
(see e.g. Irvine, 2003). Additionally, RQ3 seeks to determine the factors that affect the
magnitude of order book liquidity shocks, but Article III focuses on studying only a
limited set of variables calculated from order book data; naturally, there are probably
many other factors affecting the magnitude of liquidity shocks. Another related research
topic would be to examine the factors affecting the time it takes for the order book to
return to the normal levels, i.e. the factors related to the resiliency of the order books.
As for Article IV, the sample period is relatively short and covers only one currency
pair. After these initial efforts, more research covering longer time periods and other
currency pairs is definitely needed to enhance the understanding of liquidity provision in
aggregators, although the availability of data may hinder the work of researchers pursuing
this. Comparisons of liquidity in different market places (as the characteristics of traders
and liquidity providers may have an effect) and with different trading technologies are
also needed to understand liquidity in FX markets and to ensure efficient trading and
regulation that supports it.
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Recent studies using data on social media and stock markets have mainly focused on predicting
stock returns. Instead of predicting stock price movements, we examine the relation between
Facebook data and investors’ decision making in stock markets with a unique data on investors’
transactions on Nokia. We ﬁnd that the decisions to buy versus sell are associated with Facebook
data especially for passive households and for nonproﬁt organizations. At the same time, it seems
that more sophisticated investors—ﬁnancial and insurance institutions—are behaving in-
dependently from Facebook activities.
1. Introduction
Social media sites, such as Facebook and Twitter, create various opportunities for companies to improve their internal and
external communications and to collaborate and communicate with their customers, partners, and other stakeholders, such as in-
vestors. Given the importance of social media in external communications, it is not surprising that social media data have been used
recently to predict real-world outcomes (see e.g. Asur and Huberman, 2010). In the ﬁnancial market research, numerous scholars
have used Facebook data (Karabulut, 2013; Siganos et al., 2014; Bukovina et al., 2015) and data from other social media sites (Bollen
et al., 2011; Zhang et al., 2011; Zheludev et al., 2014; Chen et al., 2014; Nofer and Hinz, 2015; Zhang et al., 2017; You et al., 2017).1
The primary aim of such research has been to predict market-wide stock movements, yet there is scant research on how social media
data relate to the behavior of individual investors, perhaps because of the lack of availability of investor account level data.
In this paper, we examine the extent to which investors’ trading decisions are driven by Facebook posts and activity. To this end,
we use a unique investor-level shareholding registration data set that includes the trading of all Finnish investors over multiple years.
In particular, given that an investor trades, we study how Facebook data relate to investors’ decisions to increase or decrease their
positions. This question is addressed for diﬀerent investor groups, including ﬁnancial institutions, nonproﬁt organizations, and
households, and their trades in Nokia stock. As Nokia was one of the most liquid stocks on the Finnish stock market, this unique data
has been studied in several articles,2 and here we combine it with social media data. Paper by Lillo et al. (2015) is the most closely
related study to ours. It also investigates the trading behavior of diﬀerent investor groups with Nokia stock, but with Thomson
Reuters news articles—which are not social media data per se.
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Currently, Facebook is clearly the most widely used social media platform, with 2.2 billion monthly active users worldwide
(Statista, 2018). As of January 2013, social media sites such as Facebook and Twitter are used by about 45% of S&P1500 ﬁrms to
communicate externally formal and informal information about their business (Jung et al., 2017). Speciﬁcally, companies com-
municate both corporate disclosures and other information via social media (Zhou et al., 2014). Yang et al. (2017) show that social
media, and mass media in general, inﬂuences investor’s trading decisions. Snow and Rasso (2017) argue that less sophisticated
investors potentially beneﬁt most from disclosures communicated via social media, because, on social media platforms, the in-
formation is essentially “pushed” to them, which makes this information easier to access. In addition, Snow and Rasso (2017) show
that less sophisticated investors process ﬁnancial information received from social media diﬀerently from information received via
company’s investor relations website.
It is important to remember that typically companies use oﬃcial exchange-routed company announcements as a primary com-
munication channel (see e.g. Jung et al., 2017), followed by other channels, including newspapers and social media.3 Additionally,
communicating information via social media is voluntary, while some company announcement releases are mandatory. Furthermore,
Jung et al. (2017) show that companies disseminate strategically, i.e. companies are less likely to disseminate information in Twitter
when the news is bad. In this regard, we wish to determine how the investment decisions of, for example, less sophisticated and
professional investors, among other investor groups, correlate with potentially biased Facebook information. We note that the re-
lationship between Facebook data and trading can also be related to the attention grabbing behavior of investors, especially
households (see Barber and Odean, 2007).
2. Data
2.1. Shareholding registration record data
To identify the trading of diﬀerent investor categories, we use shareholding registration record data including all domestic
investors from June 7, 2010 to the end of 2016, obtained from Euroclear Ltd.4 Each record in the data contains detailed information
about the investor and the change in his/her holdings. During our analysis period, 282,269 distinct Finnish investors traded Nokia
stock. We divide them into ﬁve groups according to their sector codes: nonﬁnancial corporations, ﬁnancial and insurance cor-
porations, general governmental organizations, nonproﬁt organizations, and households. Household investors are further divided
into four investor activity groups. Investor’s activity group is deﬁned based on the number of days the investor traded during the past
eight weeks, including the analyzed week. If the number of active days in the past 8 weeks is equal to 1, the investor is considered
inactive; if it is between 2 and 5, the investor is passive; 6–20 means moderate; and 21–40 means active. Notably, this is a dynamic
group, as one investor might appear in several groups throughout the analysis period.
For the purposes of our analysis, we calculate the number of investors in each group who changed their holdings during a week
and the number of investors who increased their holdings (bought more than sold) during that week. Table 1 gives the descriptive
statistics of the investor groups and their weekly trading in our data sample. We see that ﬁnancial and governmental institutions are
on average most active sector groups, where as households and nonproﬁt organizations are least active.
2.2. Facebook data
We collect daily numbers of posts and related comments, likes, and shares from Nokia’s Facebook wall5 between June 2010 and
December 2016 using the Social Data Analytics Tool (SODATO) (see Hussain et al., 2014; Hussain and Vatrapu, 2014a, 2014b). The
comments, likes, and shares are always related to a speciﬁc post, i.e. the post is the main action. Therefore, we assign the numbers of
comments, likes, and shares to the date of the original post—that is, not the date when the actual comment, like, or share was made.
In eﬀect, the numbers of comments, likes, and shares quantify the attention the posts released on a particular day received.
We aggregate the daily Facebook data to weekly by summing the numbers of posts, comments, likes, and shares during a week.
We take the week beginning on Saturday and ending on Friday, since trading does not occur on weekends. This way, we relate the
Facebook activity on weekends to the week in which they can actually aﬀect investors’ trading decisions. In total, our sample
comprises of 342 weekly observations for posts, comments, likes, and shares. Table 2 gives descriptive statistics of these time series.
We can see that on average, there is more than one post made per day, and calculate that one post got on average 274 comments,
4379 likes, and 7 shares.
3 See Siikanen et al. (2017b,a), and references therein, for eﬀects of company announcements in stock markets.
4 Grinblatt and Keloharju (2000, 2001); Tumminello et al. (2012); Lillo et al. (2015) and Baltakys et al. (2018) use data sets from the same source, and provide
descriptions of the data. However, they use data from before 2009, when all transactions were reported separately with exact trading dates. After moving to Central
Counterparty Clearing in late 2009, the Euroclear research data set contains only aggregated daily trades without specifying the actual trading dates—instead a registration
date is reported for each record. Thus, we reverse engineer the trading dates from the registration dates. We use the oﬃcial T+3 settlement convention for data before
and on October 8, 2014 and T+ 2 afterwards (see Euroclear, 2014). Using the derived trading dates, we aggregate transactions on a weekly basis, and this reduced the
possible noise of inaccurate trading date derivation.
5 https://www.facebook.com/nokia.
M. Siikanen et al. Finance Research Letters xxx (xxxx) xxx–xxx
2
2.3. Company announcement data
The announcement data is collected from NASDAQ OMX Nordic’s website.6 The data set includes all the announcements that
Nokia ﬁled with Nasdaq between June 2010 and December 2016. Altogether, we have 507 company announcements in the sample.
We aggregate the announcement data into weekly by summing the number of announcements from Saturday to Friday, i.e. in similar
way as the Facebook data. In the regressions, we use a dummy variable to indicate whether there was at least one announcement
release during a week. Our sample includes 187 weeks with at least one announcement release (out of total 342 weeks).
2.4. Weekly return data
The daily adjusted closing price data used to calculate the returns is collected from NASDAQ OMX Nordic’s website.7 For each
week, we calculate the log return as = −P PRet ln[ / ],t t t 1 where Pt is the closing price from the last trading day on the week (usually
Friday), and −Pt 1 is the closing price from last trading day on the previous week −t 1 (usually previous week’s Friday). The average
weekly return for Nokia during the sample period was −0.16%.
3. Framework of the empirical analysis
Our analysis is based on logistic regressions to explain how Facebook activity relates to an increase versus a decrease in Nokia
shares in investors’ portfolios.8 To identify the groups of investors whose trading behavior is related to Facebook data, we run
separate regressions for each investor group with each Facebook variable.
Table 1
Descriptive statistics on investor groups. N gives the total number of investors per group. Mean, median and standard deviation (st.Dev) relate to
the weekly observations on numbers of investors in each group that changed their net holdings during a week. In Panel B, household investors are
categorized into activeness groups on the basis of their trading in the past eight weeks (40 trading days).
Panel A: Investor categories
Sector N Mean (%of all) Median st.Dev
Companies 12,213 271 (2.2%) 230 166
Financial 427 28 (6.6%) 27 9
Governmental 89 7 (7.9%) 7 4
Nonproﬁt 1177 18 (1.5%) 16 12
Households 268,363 4640 (1.7%) 3694 3179
Total 282,269
Panel B: Activity groups of household investors
Activeness; # of active days N Mean (%of all) Median st.Dev
Active; (20, 40] 1228 54 (4.4%) 51 22
Moderate; (5, 20] 16,019 502 (3.1%) 450 227
Passive; (1, 5] 120,906 1856 (1.5%) 1402 1422
Inactive; 1 264,942 2228 (0.8%) 1670 1897
Table 2
Descriptive statistics on Facebook data. N gives the total number of each Facebook activity in our sample. Mean, median and standard deviation
(st.Dev) relate to the weekly observations on numbers of each Facebook activity.
Activity N Mean Median st.Dev
Post 2906 8 8 6
Comment 797,586 2332 1585 2808
Like 12,725,171 37,208 11,977 43,500
Share 919,380 2688 461 4525
6 http://www.nasdaqomxnordic.com/news/companynews, see the page also for detailed information.
7 http://www.nasdaqomxnordic.com/shares/microsite?Instrument=HEX24311.
8 Another option would be (instead of restricting the analysis to a binary outcome) to use linear regressions with continuous dependent variable (i.e. how much an
investor changed the position). However, in order to use continuous dependent variable, proportional changes in investors’ positions would have to be calculated,
which, in turn, requires information on investors’ holdings. In contrast to changes in holdings, the levels of holdings, however, were not accurately available. The use
of “changes in holdings” as a non-proportional variable is problematic, because investors are trading by very diﬀerent amounts of shares. These problems are addressed
by using logistic regression.
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The dependent variable in our regressions is a dummy variable with value 1 if an investor increased his/her holdings in Nokia
stock during a given week (bought more than sold) and 0 if the investor decreased the holdings (Dtincreased). In a given week, only
investors whose net position for Nokia changed are included. The explanatory variable of main interest is the number of posts,
comments, likes, or shares depending on the regression (FB). We control for company announcement releases with company an-
nouncement dummy (NEWSt), which is 1 if there was an announcement released during week t and 0 otherwise. Additionally, we use
the number of investors in the group who increased their holdings during the previous week scaled by the total number of investors
who changed their holdings during the previous week. This is depicted as follows:
∑=−
− =
−
−
n
DscD 1t
t i
n
i t1
increased
1 1
, 1
increased
t 1
where −nt 1 is the number of investors who changed (increased or decreased) their holdings in Nokia during week −t 1. We also add
control variables for the return on present week (Rett) and the previous week (Ret −t 1). Lastly, we include monthly (Mt) and yearly (Yt)
dummy variables. The monthly dummies control for the potential yearly seasonality in the trading (for example, realizing the losses
in December for tax purposes, see e.g. Grinblatt and Keloharju, 2001), and the yearly dummies accommodate the analysis for example
to possible changes due to the abandonment of Nokia’s mobile business (in 2014, Nokia’s mobile business was acquired by Microsoft,
changing the focus of the company to a telecommunications infrastructure business). To summarize, the regressions we run are of the
following form:
∑ ∑
= + + +
+ + + +
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−
=
+
=
+
g D α α α α
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5 6 1
1
11
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17
(1)
where g is the logit function.
4. Results
Panel A in Table 3 shows that for households and nonproﬁt institutions, all the regression estimates are statistically signiﬁcant.
The results indicate that the decisions of investors in these groups to buy vs. sell have a clear association with the Facebook data. For
nonproﬁt institutions, the economic signiﬁcance is relatively high: the odds of a nonproﬁt institution buying rather than selling range
from 1.111 to 1.212 when the amount of Facebook activity increases by one standard deviation. For ﬁnancial institutions, Panel A in
Table 3 shows no association between the buy vs. sell decisions and the Facebook data. The results for companies and governmental
institutions are something between those of ﬁnancial institutions and households and nonproﬁt institutions, as half or less of the
estimates are statistically signiﬁcant.
To take a closer look at the eﬀect of Facebook on the trading of households, Panel B in Table 3 presents the estimated regression
results for individual investors in diﬀerent activity groups. We observe that, in general, the more active a household is, the weaker is
the association between Facebook data and buying/selling behavior. The odds ratios for passive and inactive investors are more
modest than those of nonproﬁt institutions, though for posts they are still relatively high (1.088 and 1.072). For brevity, we do not
report the regression estimates for interception and control variables here, but they are available in Online appendix. In general, most
of the estimates for control variables are statistically signiﬁcant.
Grinblatt and Keloharju (2000) argue that, roughly speaking, ﬁnance and insurance institutions, as well as companies, can be
viewed as the most sophisticated investor groups, as they generally take larger positions, have more resources to spend on research,
and in many cases view investment as full-time career. In light of this, our ﬁndings indicate that more sophisticated investors are
more independent of Facebook activities, as there is clearly no association between Facebook activities and decisions of ﬁnancial
institutions. Assuming that an investor’s activeness is related to his/her sophistication, our ﬁndings on household activity groups
supports the result that more sophisticated investors behave more independently of Facebook data.
Facebook can be seen as a secondary information channel compared to ﬁrst-hand oﬃcial company announcements published on
the exchange, and companies are likely to strategically select information disseminated in Facebook (Jung et al., 2017). Nonproﬁt
organizations and households, as arguably less sophisticated investors (Grinblatt and Keloharju, 2000), may allow their trading
decision to be aﬀected by Facebook posts and activity, especially if they have no access to professional data sources. In line with this
view, Ammann and Schaub (2017) ﬁnd that the trading decisions of unsophisticated investors are aﬀected by postings that do not
contain value-relevant information on a social trading platform.
As our question is if the decisions of diﬀerent investors are associated with the Facebook data, we are mostly interested in whether
the regression estimates for the Facebook variables are statistically and economically signiﬁcant, while the signs of the coeﬃcients
are not in the main focus.9 However, a couple of words about the signs of the estimates in Table 3. In Panel A, the signs for posts,
comments, and likes are consistently positive, except comments for households. The signs for shares are both positive (governmental
and nonproﬁt) and negative (companies, ﬁnancial, households), though not all of them are statistically signiﬁcant, which can explain
9 The number of data points in the regression analysis is 332–341, which does not automatically lead to signiﬁcant estimates as very large data samples do.
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the variation. Panel B with activity groups reports positive estimates for posts, but there is more variation for comments, likes, and
shares as passive and inactive investors have negative estimates. Looking deeper into the reasons of these ﬁndings is out of the scope
of this paper and left for the future research, as it would require semantic analysis.10
5. Summary and conclusion
This paper gives the ﬁrst empirical evidence that Facebook activities aﬀect the trading of diﬀerent investors diﬀerently. We
provide evidence that the decisions of arguably less sophisticated investors—that is, households and nonproﬁt organizations—to
increase or decrease shareholdings are clearly associated with Facebook data. At the same time, the decisions of ﬁnancial institutions,
which are likely to be among the most sophisticated investors in the market, are not associated with Facebook activity. Moreover, less
active households’ decisions are related to Facebook, while the decisions of more active ones are not, which gives additional evidence
that the less sophisticated the investor, the more closely related the behavior is to Facebook. Given that Facebook is not a regulated
information channel compared to ﬁrst-hand oﬃcial exchange releases, companies are likely to strategically select what information
to disseminate in Facebook (Jung et al., 2017). This suggests that less sophisticated investors, who may not have access to profes-
sional sources for ﬁnancial data and news, may be driven by biased information.
In the future research we are planning to do sentimental analysis on the posts and comments to give a more comprehensive
Table 3
Regression estimates: Trading of investor groups and Facebook data. The estimates related to Facebook variables of logistic regressions
described in Section 3 (Eq. (1)) for all the investor categories. The dependent variable is a dummy variable getting value of 1 if an investor increased
his/her holdings during the week, and 0 if the investor decreased the holdings. In addition to the Facebook related variables (for which we report the
estimates here), we control for company announcement releases, number of investors who changed their position during previous week (scaled),
current and previous weeks returns, and in addition we have monthly and yearly dummies. The regression estimates for control variables (omitted
here) are available in Online appendix. In Panel B, household investors are categorized into activeness groups on the basis of their trading in the past
eight weeks (40 trading days). Number of observations (weeks in the analysis) is 341 for all the other regressions, except 332 for group govern-
mental. p-values are given in parentheses (), and odds ratios (ORs) are given in curly brackets {}. ORs are calculated on the basis of one standard
deviation change in the explanatory variable.
Panel A: Investor categories
Posts Comments Likes Shares
Companies 0.011*** 5.55E−06 7.61E−07** −6.40E−07
(3.71E−12) (0.098) (6.44E−03) (0.775)
{1.064} {1.016} {1.034} {0.997}
Financial 5.92E−03 1.25E−05 9.42E−07 −1.94E−06
(0.185) (0.197) (0.226) (0.758)
{1.034} {1.036} {1.042} {0.991}
Governmental 0.015 5.45E−05** 2.62E−06 2.19E−05
(0.091) (7.20E−03) (0.112) (0.087)
{1.086} {1.165} {1.121} {1.104}
Nonproﬁt 0.033*** 3.76E−05** 4.43E−06*** 3.03E−05**
(2.27E−07) (4.79E−03) (2.23E−04) (1.84E−03)
{1.203} {1.111} {1.212} {1.147}
Households 0.011*** −4.46E−06*** 1.92E−07** −9.04E−06***
(5.74E−83) (7.64E−07) (6.89E−03) (1.23E−41)
{1.064} {0.988} {1.008} {0.960}
Panel B: Activity groups of household investors
Active 2.41E−04 −5.82E−06 −9.74E−07 −1.36E−05**
(0.942) (0.386) (0.065) (1.32E−03)
{1.001} {0.984} {0.959} {0.940}
Moderate 1.85E−03 4.11E−06 2.67E−07 −1.71E−06
(0.083) (0.071) (0.140) (0.225)
{1.011} {1.012} {1.012} {0.992}
Passive 0.012*** −9.33E−06*** −7.33E−07*** −1.60E−05***
(8.55E−55) (2.37E−10) (4.53E−10) (1.73E−49)
{1.072} {0.974} {0.969} {0.930}
Inactive 0.015*** 1.01E−05*** 1.84E−06*** 1.09E−07
(5.12E−67) (5.19E−12) (1.24E−42) (0.911)
{1.088} {1.029} {1.083} {1.000}
***p<0.001; **p<0.01; *p<0.05
10 Additionally, one could consider if observed associations can represent a reverse causality so that investors are not reacting to social media posts but companies
are posting on Facebook in response to changes in investment behavior. However, the reverse causality seems unlikely, because the information about numbers of
traders changing their position is not public.
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picture of the reactions of diﬀerent investors to Facebook activities. Concentrating only on Nokia may introduce some investor
clientele bias, since the investors interested in Nokia may in general be more social media and technology savvy and follow the posts
because of their inclination towards technology. At this point, we were only able to collect the data for Nokia, but in the future
research we are planning to extend the sample to a wider variety of stocks.
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a b s t r a c t 
Information arrivals may drive investors to require immediacy, generating sudden liquidity 
demand across multiple price levels in limit order books. We document signiﬁcant intra- 
day changes in stock limit order book characteristics and liquidity beyond the best levels 
around scheduled and non-scheduled company announcements. At aggregated level, liq- 
uidity beyond the best levels behaves quite differently from the bid–ask spread around 
scheduled announcements. Moreover, scheduled announcements improve multi-level liq- 
uidity to an exceptionally good level. We also provide evidence for pre-reactions in order 
books before non-scheduled announcements, which suggest the possibility of information 
leakage. 
© 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. 
1. Introduction 
Multi-level high-frequency data from stock order book markets has allowed researchers to empirically examine order 
book characteristics and dynamics (see e.g. Erenburg and Lasser, 2009; Engle et al., 2012; Deuskar and Johnson, 2011; Malo 
and Pennanen, 2012; Härdle et al., 2012; Gomber et al., 2015; Sensoy, 2016 ). As Degryse et al. (2015) argue, data beyond 
the best levels is intriguing, because it matters to investors as it reﬂects the quantity immediately available for trading and 
therefore the price of immediacy. It is especially important around information arrivals when informed investors may require 
immediacy and walk through the limit order book, taking advantage of stale limit orders, thus causing a large, immediate 
demand for liquidity on multiple levels. 
Despite its importance, we know surprisingly little about how order book characteristics and liquidity available across 
multiple levels evolve around new information releases. In this paper, we aim to ﬁll this gap with an extensive high- 
frequency multi-level order book data for 75 frequently traded and liquid stocks on Nasdaq Nordic markets (Helsinki, Stock- 
holm, and Copenhagen) around ﬁrst-hand stock exchange company announcements. We make the important distinction 
between scheduled and non-scheduled announcements, justiﬁed in Graham et al. (2006) . Methodologically we follow ( Malo 
and Pennanen, 2012; Deuskar and Johnson, 2011; Härdle et al., 2012 ) to capture the shape of the order book by estimating 
the slopes of the order book curves. The order book slopes can be used not only to characterize the order book but also 
to measure the order book liquidity across multiple order book levels ( Malo and Pennanen, 2012 ). Our research question 
concerns how the order book characteristics and liquidity measured by order book slope across multiple levels (hereafter 
∗ Corresponding author. 
E-mail addresses: milla.siikanen@tut.ﬁ (M. Siikanen), juho.kanniainen@tut.ﬁ (J. Kanniainen), jaakko.s.valli@gmail.com (J. Valli). 
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referred to as “order book liquidity”) reacts to scheduled and non-scheduled announcements, with an emphasis on compar- 
ison to the conventional spread between the best bid and ask levels. 
Our research differs from the earlier studies in many important ways. In contrast to papers analysing liquidity around 
announcement releases with data on best levels only (see, e.g. Lee et al., 1993; Graham et al., 2006; Gross-Klussmann and 
Hautsch, 2011; Neuhierl et al., 2013 ), we use multi-level data. To our knowledge, not too many papers have employed multi- 
level data to study the effects of information releases on stocks’ order book liquidity, but some important exceptions exist. 
Gomber et al. (2015) ﬁnd in their study that the information content of Bloomberg ticker news is rather limited, causing 
no shocks to the order books, perhaps because Bloomberg is not always the ﬁrst channel through which new information 
is distributed. We, however, document clear effects, especially with scheduled company announcements. The difference be- 
tween our paper and theirs lies mainly in the type and source of the information. Additionally, Sensoy (2016) examines 
the impact of speciﬁc macro-announcements on liquidity commonality in Turkey. Though he addresses a different question 
than we do in this paper, his ﬁndings are in line with ours; order book liquidity is signiﬁcantly affected beyond the best 
price quotes and it can be misleading to use only top-of-the-book data. Our research also relates to the study of Riordan 
et al. (2013) , who explore the impact of Thomson Reuters newswire messages on intra-day price discovery, liquidity and 
trading intensity using depth at multiple price levels as one liquidity proxy. In addition to differences in methodologies 
and data, they do not divide the news into scheduled and non-scheduled ones. Apart from these studies, Erenburg and 
Lasser (2009) and Engle et al. (2012) combine multi-level data with macro announcements, but with data from the equity- 
index-linked securities market and the U.S. Treasury market, whereas our study focuses on equity markets with company 
announcements. Overall, in comparison to existing papers that use multi-level order book data, this research uses excep- 
tionally extensive and frequently sampled data sets, examines impacts of stock exchange company announcements (instead 
of macro-announcements, ticker news, or newswire messages), and additionally, makes the important distinction between 
scheduled and non-scheduled announcements. Importantly, by these settings we provide novel results on pre- and post 
reactions in order books. 1 
This paper is constructed as follows. First, Section 2 introduces the order book parametrisation used in this study. 
Section 3 describes the data sets. Then, Section 4 demonstrates the framework of our empirical analsys, Section 5 reports 
the results and, ﬁnally, Section 6 summarizes and concludes the paper. 
2. Order book parametrisation 
An appropriate approach to characterize the order book and to measure the book’s liquidity across multiple price levels 
should capture aspects with respect to both quantity (depth) over multiple levels and distances between the price levels. 
A popular approach is to estimate order book slope, which is obtained by ﬁtting a linear curve to the order book data to 
measure how quantity changes as a function of price ( Deuskar and Johnson, 2011; Härdle et al., 2012 ) or inversely, how 
price changes as a function of quantity ( Malo and Pennanen, 2012 ). In this paper we technically follow ( Malo and Pennanen, 
2012 ). Importantly, the slope can be made invariant for splits and comparable between different stocks and over time, which 
enables an aggregated analysis. 2 In this paper, order book slope is called Order Book Illiquidity (OBI) as it measures liquidity 
across multiple price levels. 
By interpreting buy orders as sell orders of negative quantity (see Malo and Pennanen, 2012 ), we can describe the state 
of a limit order book with marginal price curve s ( x ), which is a piecewise constant and non-decreasing function of order 
quantity. We use a simple monetary measure r ( h ), introduced by Malo and Pennanen (2012) , 
r(h ) := ln (s (h/ ¯s )) − ln ( ¯s ) , 
where s¯ refers to mid-price, and h = s¯ x is the mark-to-market value of a market order of x shares—i.e. the value of the 
market order if we were to pay the mid-price for all the x shares. Hence, r ( h ) gives the log change in the marginal price 
s (x ) = s (h/ ¯s ) relative to the mid-price s¯ , as a function of h , the mark-to-market value of an order of x shares. Therefore, 
given that one buys stocks with a certain amount of money h, r ( h ), also called the relative price impact curve, reveals how 
large a price impact (in monetary units) the trade has per share bought. The shape of a limit order book can be captured 
with a linear approximation of the relative price impact curve, which is of the form r(h ) = OBI · h . Here OBI is positive and 
is considered to measure order book liquidity (see Malo and Pennanen, 2012 ). Obviously, the smaller the value of OBI, the 
1 Siikanen et al. (2016) takes a step further and studies the factors affecting the sensitivity of order book liquidity to scheduled and non-scheduled 
company announcements. They also use the same datasets as we use in this study. 
2 Some other liquidity measures exist that incorporate multi-level data, too, such as the Exchange Liquidity Measure (XLM), which is based on cost of 
round-trip (see Gomber et al., 2015; Sensoy, 2016 ). However, an issue arises with XLM in our research, because it is determined for a speciﬁc trade size, 
yet the total multi-level depths on the bid and ask sides vary in time and consequently, the order book is not always deep enough to allow us to calculate 
XLM for a given order size. This is an issue especially just before announcements, when informed investors may cancel existing orders or choose not to 
submit new ones to avoid adverse selection, and also right after the announcements, when informed investors may take advantage of stale limit orders, 
both resulting in thin order book. Because the measure should be available especially around announcement times in this paper, we prefer to use order 
book slope as a multi-level measure—it is always possible to calculate as long as the order book is not totally empty. Additionally, Riordan et al. (2013); 
Engle et al. (2012) ), and Erenburg and Lasser (2009) consider the depth on different price levels in the book in addition to the bid–ask spread. However, by 
this methodology the number of variables increases quickly when considering the depth at different levels separately, and the other dimension, distance 
between the price levels, is not taken into account. 
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more liquid the stock is. OBI is an ex-ante liquidity measure and captures information from multiple price levels in the limit 
order book. Whereas OBI measures the costs arising from order book illiquidity especially for large trades or a large bunch 
of simultaneous small trades sweeping over many price levels, spread measures the liquidity and costs of trading for small 
transactions that take place only at the best quotes. For visual illustration of the measure, see ( Malo and Pennanen, 2012 ). 
To eliminate the effects of the pre- and post-trading sessions, we follow Malo and Pennanen (2012) and exclude the 
ﬁrst and last trading hours from the data. Moreover, we exclude an additional half-hour from the end of the trading day 
for stocks traded on OMX Helsinki and OMX Stockholm in order to get the same length of the daily periods with OMX 
Copenhagen. In addition, we de-seasonalise the observations of OBI, asymmetry of the two sides of the book, and relative 
spread. The de-seasonalisation is done by ﬁrst estimating an average value for each 10-second observation moment from 
the estimation window for each event. We then de-seasonalise all the observations of each variable in the estimation and 
event windows by subtracting the average value of that moment from the observation and artiﬁcially convert them to noon, 
since most of the events take place around 12:00 ECT. 
3. Data 
3.1. Limit order book data 
We use Level II order book data from NASDAQ OMX Nordic (Helsinki, Stockholm, Copenhagen), which are continuous 
limit order based markets. 3 Our sample includes 75 frequently traded stocks listed on NASDAQ OMX Helsinki, NASDAQ OMX 
Stockholm, and NASDAQ OMX Copenhagen. The stocks in our sample have been involved in the following stock indexes: 
OMX Helsinki 25, OMX Stockholm 30, and OMX Copenhagen 20. Out of the 75 stocks, 27 are traded in Helsinki, 28 are 
traded in Stockholm, and 20 are traded in Copenhagen. 
We use the multi-level order book data from 1.1.2006 to 1.1.2010 and calculate the values of OBI based on snapshots of 
the order book taken every 10 seconds with data on the 20 best ask and bid price levels using linear regression. If there 
are data on less than 20 levels available, we use as many levels as possible. We distinguish the moments when trading 
halts occur and exclude them from this study, since normal trading and auto matching of the orders are halted during those 
moments. In particular, we exclude all the events from our sample for which there occurs a trading halt within the event 
window around the announcement release, and exclude the observations during trading halts in estimation windows when 
aggregating over time or events. However, the proportion of announcement releases excluded because of trading halts is 
relatively small. Additionally, we exclude trading days when technical errors at Nasdaq occurred and non-corrupted data 
was not available. 
3.2. News data 
The news data in this study come from NASDAQ OMX Nordic’s website. 4 The announcements included in this study are 
from 1.1.2006 to 1.1.2010, and the respective companies ﬁled them with NASDAQ OMX. The announcement times are given 
at one second precision in the data, but because we sample the order book data every 10 seconds, the times of the an- 
nouncements are rounded to the nearest 10 seconds. In this paper, an announcement is considered positive (negative) if the 
mid-price increases (decreases) between the observation moment preceding the release and the last observation moment of 
the event window. 
We re-categorise the announcements into two speciﬁc groups: scheduled and non-scheduled announcements. An an- 
nouncement is scheduled if its exact publishing date is known to the public beforehand and non-scheduled if it is irregular, 
its publishing schedule is not given and cannot be reliably estimated, or the release is obviously unexpected. To be on the 
safe side, we exclude announcements whose publishing timespan is given non-speciﬁcally in earlier stock exchange releases 
or that are somewhat regular by nature. 
Moreover, we exclude announcements that clearly contain no new information. These mostly include announcements 
published in multiple languages, in which case only the ﬁrst one is involved. We also remove announcements for which 
we do not have enough data to form the 27-day estimation window and that have been published during non-trading 
hours. Additionally, if several announcements are published at the same second on the same stock, then only one of them 
is involved. Finally, we do not consider the cases where there has been a trading halt near the announcement time (within 
the pre- or post-window) ceasing continuous trading. With these restrictions we usually end up with less than 10 scheduled 
announcements and some dozens of non-scheduled announcements per company. 
The ﬁnal sample contains 329 (408) scheduled announcements and 2,102 (2,629) non-scheduled announcements with 
60 (30) minute pre- and post-event windows. Just over 35% of them come from NASDAQ OMX Helsinki, around 45% orig- 
3 Data from NASDAQ Nordic has some advantages over U.S. limit order book markets. First, NASDAQ Nordic markets are little fragmented in comparison 
to the U.S. markets, where the limit orders for a given asset are spread between several exchanges, which poses a problem for empirical research ( O’Hara 
and Ye, 2011 ), and where matching rules and transaction costs complicate comparisons between different limit order books for the same asset ( Gould et al., 
2013 ). Another advantage of using Nordic data from less liquid markets is that, as Butt and Virk (2015) argue, “it is more appropriate to test liquidity-related 
models in markets that are suﬃciently illiquid to diagnose the level and strength of bearing [... ] risks.”
4 http://www.nasdaqomxnordic.com/news/companynews , see the page also for detailed information. 
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inate from NASDAQ OMX Stockholm, and just under 20% are from NASDAQ OMX Copenhagen. Over 70% of the scheduled 
announcements in the ﬁnal sample are ﬁnancial announcements. 
4. Framework of the empirical analysis 
In our analyses, we utilise a framework from prior event studies (see, e.g. Campbell, 1997; Velásquez et al., 2016 ) by 
comparing observations in an event window around the event—in this case, announcement release—to observations in an 
estimation window. An estimation window comprises observations with 10-second frequency from 27 days preceding the 
day of an event. An event window consists of two sub-windows: a 60-minute pre-window and another 60-minute post- 
window. As a robustness check, we run the analyses using 30-minute pre- and post-windows and get similar results, but 
we report results on the 60-minute windows to demonstrate a more comprehensive data. We denote the set of observa- 
tions from the estimation window (27 days preceding the announcement) by E, from the pre-window (60 or 30 minutes 
preceding the announcement) by A −, and from the post-window by A + (60 or 30 minutes following the announcement), 
and from the whole event window by A (120 or 60 minutes around the announcement). 
In our aggregated analysis, to give equal weight to all the announcements and to make them comparable with each other 
regardless of differences in liquidity level and currency, we standardize all the values in estimation and event windows using 
the means and standard deviations calculated from the estimation windows. 5 In addition, to make the plots more readable 
and independent of number of observations N , we standardize the variables by multiplying the mean values taken over the 
events at each moment by 
√ 
N and consequently the variables are distributed with mean 0 and standard deviation of 1 in 
the estimation window. 6 We also sub-sample non-scheduled announcements from the original sample by choosing the same 
number of announcements as with the corresponding scheduled announcement sample with largest relative price impact 
(log-change in mid-price right before the event till the end of event window) to make the two event types more comparable 
with each other. We denote the aggregated, scaled values obtained by taking the mean over the events and multiplying it 
by 
√ 
N with over-line as [variable] . Return makes an exception—in order to get an idea about the actual returns around 
announcements, we just apply the average values without standardization and scaling. 
5. Results 
5.1. Order book liquidity 
To demonstrate announcement effects on the order book dynamics and the evolution of the liquidity at an aggregated 
level, Table 1 and Fig. 1 present OBI for the ask and bid sides of the order book separately around scheduled and non- 
scheduled announcement and positive and negative releases. Additionally, Fig. 1 plots the aggregated mid-price return in 
the event window, A , calculated as follows: 
r i,t = ln [ m i,t ] − ln [ m i,t 0 ] , t ∈ A , 
where t 0 refers to the ﬁrst moment in the event window A and m i, t denotes the mid-price for event i at time t . 
Scheduled Announcements 
For the scheduled announcements, the dynamics around the announcement times for all four cases ( Table 1 , ﬁrst panel, 
and Fig. 1 , plots A, C, E, G) are more or less the same. Notably, for the scheduled announcements, we observe that the 
order book liquidity during the 60-minute period before the event is much lower (i.e. OBI is higher) than in the estimation 
window; all the observations of OBI before the event in Table 1 are outside of the 99.9% conﬁdence interval and in Fig. 1 , OBI 
is constantly above the long-term maximum (obtained from the estimation window) on both ask and bid sides for positive 
announcements and on ask side for negative announcements. Moreover, on bid side for negative announcements OBI is 
well above the 95% conﬁdence level and also reaches the long term maximum. As can be observed from Fig. 1 , maximum 
and minimum values are sensitive to single observations and therefore it is better to analyse the results against conﬁdence 
levels. We also verify the existence of statistically signiﬁcant pre-reactions in the order book in all four cases by conducting 
a t-test comparing the mean values of OBI calculated from pre- and estimation windows (the results are available in the 
Online Appendix). 
The results indicate that limit order books adjust to scheduled announcements before their release. The volume of limit 
orders standing in the book is low, indicating that many investors may have either cancelled their orders prior to the 
announcements or chosen not to submit new limit orders, and therefore informed investors have limited possibilities to 
take advantage of stale limit orders. This could indicate that investors tend not to leave limit orders standing in the order 
book, to avoid adverse selection. 
5 In our analysis, unit of h is 1 million EUR for stocks traded on the Helsinki Stock Exchange and 1 million SEK and 1 million DKK for stocks traded on 
the Stockholm and Copenhagen Stock Exchanges, respectively. While this has an impact on the values of OBI, it is not interfering our analysis since in our 
aggregated analysis we use standardized values. 
6 The variance of the mean taken over the events (assuming that the observations over the events are independent of each other) is 1/ N , i.e. the standard 
deviation is 1 / 
√ 
N , and by multiplying the mean with 
√ 
N , the scaled variable is distributed with standard deviation (and variance) of 1 in the estimation 
window, regardless of N . 
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Table 1 
Order book illiquidity around announcements. This table presents observations of OBI , standardised and ag- 
gregated order book illiquidity, on ask and bid sides around scheduled and non-scheduled announcements sep- 
arately for positive and negative announcements. The statistical signiﬁcance is calculated based on the empir- 
ical distribution of OBI from the estimation window (i.e. 27 days preceding the announcement) and indicated 
by asterisks: ∗∗∗ , ∗∗ , and ∗ indicate that the observations is outside of two sided 99.9%, 99%, and 95% conﬁ- 
dence intervals, respectively. The non-scheduled announcement sample is extracted from the original sample 
by choosing the same number of announcements as with the corresponding scheduled announcement sample 
with largest relative price impact (log-change in mid-price right before the event till the end of event window). 
The sample size N is 151 for positive and 165 for negative announcements. 
Scheduled announcements 
Before 
Announcement Variable −10 s −1 min −5 min −15 min −30 min −60 min 
Positive OBI Ask 16 .59 
∗∗∗ 16 .10 ∗∗∗ 14 .21 ∗∗∗ 11 .80 ∗∗∗ 10 .83 ∗∗∗ 9 .53 ∗∗∗
OBI Bid 27 .52 
∗∗∗ 22 .17 ∗∗∗ 17 .75 ∗∗∗ 16 .89 ∗∗∗ 16 .29 ∗∗∗ 13 .50 ∗∗∗
Negative OBI Ask 17 .18 
∗∗∗ 17 .32 ∗∗∗ 14 .46 ∗∗∗ 10 .45 ∗∗∗ 10 .10 ∗∗∗ 8 .72 ∗∗∗
OBI Bid 25 .20 
∗∗∗ 25 .19 ∗∗∗ 20 .61 ∗∗∗ 15 .75 ∗∗∗ 16 .97 ∗∗∗ 9 .66 ∗∗∗
After 
Announcement Variable + 10 s + 1 min + 5 min + 15 min + 30 min + 60 min 
Positive OBI Ask 19 .37 
∗∗∗ 22 .89 ∗∗∗ 8 .24 ∗∗∗ 0 .16 −3.16 ∗∗ −4.17 ∗∗∗
OBI Bid 21 .66 
∗∗∗ 23 .17 ∗∗∗ 11 .35 ∗∗∗ 0 .62 −3.13 ∗∗∗ −2.94 ∗∗∗
Negative OBI Ask 19 .15 
∗∗∗ 22 .83 ∗∗∗ 12 .85 ∗∗∗ 2 .49 −1.71 −1.68 
OBI Bid 28 .25 
∗∗∗ 31 .82 ∗∗∗ 15 .05 ∗∗∗ 2 .96 0 .60 −2.20 
Non-scheduled announcements 
Before 
Announcement Variable −10 s −1 min −5 min −15 min −30 min −60 min 
Positive OBI Ask 6 .73 
∗∗∗ 6 .49 ∗∗∗ 6 .47 ∗∗∗ 6 .28 ∗∗∗ 6 .99 ∗∗∗ 6 .46 ∗∗∗
OBI Bid 5 .65 
∗∗∗ 2 .66 ∗ 6 .16 ∗∗∗ 2 .27 2 .03 2 .66 ∗
Negative OBI Ask 3 .05 
∗∗ 3 .35 ∗∗ 2 .99 ∗∗ 4 .32 ∗∗∗ 3 .76 ∗∗∗ 5 .01 ∗∗∗
OBI Bid 3 .06 
∗ 2 .66 ∗ 2 .36 ∗ 2 .04 1 .69 2 .25 
After 
Announcement Variable + 10 s + 1 min + 5 min + 15 min + 30 min + 60 min 
Positive OBI Ask 7 .69 
∗∗∗ 9 .94 ∗∗∗ 10 .51 ∗∗∗ 7 .34 ∗∗∗ 5 .14 ∗∗ 4 .62 ∗∗
OBI Bid 4 .57 
∗∗∗ 4 .78 ∗∗∗ 2 .01 −1.50 −1.21 −1.51 
Negative OBI Ask 2 .88 
∗∗ 7 .19 ∗∗∗ 6 .56 ∗∗∗ 3 .73 ∗∗∗ 3 .80 ∗∗∗ 3 .61 ∗∗∗
OBI Bid 5 .18 
∗∗∗ 9 .06 ∗∗∗ 5 .32 ∗∗∗ 3 .80 ∗∗ 5 .57 ∗∗∗ 4 .68 ∗∗∗
This result on the markets’ pre-reaction in terms of liquidity is in line with the predictions of the traditional asym- 
metric information models of liquidity (see Graham et al., 2006 , Table 1). Empirically, Graham et al. (2006) obtain consis- 
tent results for spread (they do not ﬁnd any pattern for depth), Lee et al. (1993) with best-level-liquidity measures, and 
Krinsky and Lee (1996) with the adverse selection component of spread. In addition, the ﬁndings of Engle et al. (2012) on 
the Treasury markets and Erenburg and Lasser (2009) on the equity-index-linked securities market, both using depth at 
multiple price levels, show a decrease in depth before announcements, though they ﬁnd that the reaction starts within ﬁve 
minutes before the announcements, which is in contrast to our ﬁnding that order book liquidity is at a signiﬁcantly low 
level already an hour before an announcement release. 
Next, Table 1 and Fig. 1 demonstrate that at the aggregate level, OBI starts to decline within a few minutes after a 
scheduled announcement and returns to a normal level within 10 to 20 minutes after the announcement, again, consistent 
with the predictions of the traditional asymmetric information models ( Graham et al., 2006 ). Lee et al. (1993) ﬁnd that 
spread and depth return to a normal level substantially slower (one day and three hours, respectively), but we argue that 
this is likely due to the market design and other technical developments since. The recovery time we ﬁnd is consistent with 
the time observed in Gomber et al. (2015) using multi-level data and Degryse et al. (2005) using data on best levels to study 
limit order market recovery around illiquidity shocks. Our results are also in line with the ﬁndings of Engle et al. (2012) on 
the Treasury markets, as they ﬁnd that depths at multiple levels recover fast after an announcement, and Erenburg and 
Lasser (2009) on the equity-index-linked securities market, as they observe that depths rise to original levels within 10 
minutes after an announcement. 
One of the main results of the paper is that after scheduled announcements, aggregated order book liquidity recovers to a 
level better than the long-term average. Particularly, for scheduled positive announcements, the level of OBI falls even below 
the long-term minimum, indicating that the supply of limit orders on both sides of the book is high and the transaction costs 
for large trades sweeping over multiple price levels are low. This may indicate that the release of scheduled announcements 
reduces information asymmetries and adverse selection costs signiﬁcantly. 
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Fig. 1. Order book illiquidity around announcements. OBI , standardised and aggregated order book illiquidity, on ask and bid sides around scheduled 
and non-scheduled announcements separately for positive and negative announcements and r , average return on mid-price. The blue solid line corresponds 
to OBI , the black dashed lines correspond to the 95% conﬁdence level of OBI based on the empirical distribution from the estimation window (i.e. 27 days 
preceding the announcement) and the blue dotted lines correspond to the maximum and minimum values of OBI in the estimation window, all with the 
scale on the left-hand side. The red dash-dot line corresponds to r with the scale on the right-hand side in red. The black dotted vertical line at time 
zero corresponds to the time of the announcement. The non-scheduled announcement sample is extracted from the original sample by choosing the same 
number of announcements as with the corresponding scheduled announcement sample with largest relative price impact (log-change in mid-price right 
before the event till the end of event window). (For interpretation of the references to colour in this ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred to the web version 
of this article.) 
Non-Scheduled Announcements 
For non-scheduled announcements, Table 1 , and Fig. 1 show statistically signiﬁcant pre-reactions, especially on ask side, 
though the pre-reactions are clearly weaker than those for scheduled announcements. According to the predictions of 
traditional models, these pre-reactions can indicate information leakage (see Graham et al., 2006 ). In their study, Gross- 
Klussmann and Hautsch (2011) ﬁnd an increase in spread already before the announcements. 
Moreover, there is variation in the liquidity dynamics after non-scheduled announcements. On the bid side, liquidity im- 
proves to a normal level due to positive non-scheduled news (plot D), whereas the bid side liquidity remains at a relatively 
low level (for 60 minutes at least) after negative non-scheduled news (plot H). On the ask side, OBI peaks slightly within a 
few minutes after both positive and negative non-scheduled announcement releases and the order book remains relatively 
illiquid (plots B and F). Overall, positive non-scheduled announcements clearly improve liquidity on the bid side, but liq- 
uidity remains low in other cases (positive announcements/ask side, negative announcements/ask side, negative announce- 
ments/bid side) in comparison to its long-term mean. Riordan et al. (2013) ﬁnd that liquidity increases (spread tightens and 
depth increases) before and after positive announcements, whereas it decreases around negative announcements (in their 
paper, positivity/negativity is based on the tone of the news). Graham et al. (2006) observe wider spreads and lower depth 
at the best levels after non-scheduled news, whereas Gross-Klussmann and Hautsch (2011) ﬁnd an increased bid–ask spread 
around announcement releases, but ﬁnd no signiﬁcant effects on depth at the best levels. 
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5.2. Asymmetry 
Next, we examine the asymmetry between the bid and ask sides, deﬁned as 
OBI Asymmetry = OBI Bid − OBI Ask . 
We run similar analysis on OBI Asymmetry as presented for OBI , and the table and the ﬁgure are available in the Online 
Appendix. 
We ﬁnd that the order book is abnormally asymmetric before scheduled announcements. In particular, ask side is rela- 
tively more liquid, meaning that it is easier to buy and harder to sell with market orders before scheduled announcements. 
After the scheduled announcements OBI Asymmetry returns to normal level within 10 to 30 minutes. In contrast, asymmetry of 
the order book is more or less at normal levels before non-scheduled announcements. The arrival of positive non-scheduled 
announcements makes the book asymmetric (the ask side is relatively more illiquid) after the release, and this effect seems 
to be quite long lasting (at least 60 minutes). For negative announcements we observe weaker reactions, but the reaction 
seems to be of the opposite sign: negative non-scheduled announcements seem to make the bid side relatively illiquid. 
Intuitively, when the non-scheduled news is positive, informed investors want to buy immediately using market orders 
that are executed against stale limit sell orders available in the book (i.e. OBI on the ask side increases). Moreover, there 
can exist investors who want to buy using limit orders and thus provide liquidity on the bid side (though facing uncertainty 
of the execution). Therefore, the imbalance between the bid and ask sides can be explained by a decrease in the provi- 
sion of sell (buy) limit orders or an increase in the provision of buy (sell) limit orders, or both. The effect is exceptionally 
strong for positive non-scheduled events. This result implies that the news-momentum (news-contrarian) trading strategy 
through market orders after non-scheduled announcements is relatively expensive (inexpensive). In contrast to this, sched- 
uled announcements decrease the transaction costs for both large buy and sell trades, keeping the book symmetric, meaning 
that both news-contrarian and news-momentum trading strategies are symmetrically inexpensive after scheduled company 
announcements. 
5.3. Spread 
We also compare spread (liquidity measure using best offers) and OBI (liquidity measure with multi-level data) around 
announcement arrivals. The relative spread—i.e. the spread between the best bid and ask divided by the mid-price (hereafter 
just spread)—is calculated every 10 seconds around each event (for estimation and event windows). We run similar analysis 
on SPREAD as presented for OBI , and the table and the ﬁgure are available in the Online Appendix. 
One should note that from the practical point of view, spread and order book liquidity measure the transaction costs 
for different types of trades. Around news arrivals, informed investors may require immediacy to take advantage of stale 
limit orders, and in this situation, it is not necessarily possible to gradually execute a large block of orders to mitigate price 
impact. Hence, there can be single large trades or a bunch of simultaneous smaller trades that walk up the book through 
many levels, increasing the practical relevance of liquidity in the book beyond the best levels and necessitating the use of 
multi-level data to capture the real announcement effects. 
We observe a quick and strong reaction in spread around scheduled announcements: the spread starts to rise slightly 
above the 95% conﬁdence level around 10 to 30 minutes before the event and peaks immediately after the announcement 
release, after which it starts to gradually decline, reaching normal level within around 30 to 40 minutes. This indicates that 
around scheduled announcements, there is a relatively short time period during which the trading cost of trades at the best 
levels is above the normal level. 
For non-scheduled announcements, SPREAD is slightly above the normal level already before releases especially for nega- 
tive announcements. After the non-scheduled announcements release, SPREAD peaks to well above the long-term maximum 
value (obtained from the estimation window). Aggregated spread seems to stay above the long-term level during the whole 
60 minute post event window. 
Importantly, the observed effect of scheduled announcements on order books with data on multiple price levels is sig- 
niﬁcantly different from what the spread between the best prices indicates. Whereas (i) SPREAD rises signiﬁcantly just 10 
to 30 minutes before a scheduled announcement and (ii) new information does not improve it beyond its long-term level, 
OBI (i) rises to an abnormally high level well (at least 60 minutes) before the scheduled news arrives and (ii) improves 
even beyond its one-month minimum in 20–30 minutes. Given that the order book slope reﬂects differences in investors 
views on the stock price and hence is related to information asymmetry, multi-level order book data provide evidence that 
scheduled news releases (especially positive ones) reduce the information asymmetry in stock markets in comparison to the 
long-term level, which cannot observed from the best levels. 
6. Summary and conclusion 
This paper examines the stock limit order book characteristics and liquidity around scheduled and non-scheduled com- 
pany announcements using high frequency multi-level limit order book data of 75 frequently traded stocks listed on ex- 
changes belonging to NASDAQ Nordic for the years 2006 to 2009. Parameterising the order book data with an order book 
slope enables us to measure the liquidity available over multiple price levels of the order books. 
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In the aggregated analysis, we ﬁnd quite contradictory results for the multi-level order book liquidity measure (order 
book slope) and conventional bid–ask spread: whereas multi-level order book liquidity is exceptionally low at least an hour 
before the release of a scheduled announcement, the spread widens signiﬁcantly only 10–30 minutes before the announce- 
ment comes. Additionally, unlike the spread, the multi-level liquidity measure improves to an exceptionally good level, even 
beyond its one-month record after the release of a scheduled announcement, which may indicate that scheduled announce- 
ments reduce information asymmetry. Hence, our results provide evidence that order book liquidity is signiﬁcantly affected 
beyond the best price quotes and it can be misleading to use only top-of-the-book data, which is in line with the ﬁnd- 
ings of Sensoy (2016) . Additionally, we ﬁnd that before the release of non-scheduled announcements, aggregated order book 
liquidity is above the normal level with statistical signiﬁcance (especially on the ask side), which can indicate information 
leakage (see Graham et al., 2006 ). 
We also ﬁnd that the asymmetry of the order book is at an abnormally high level after the release of a non-scheduled 
announcement so that the ask (bid) side is abnormally illiquid in comparison to the bid (ask) side after positive (negative) 
news. This indicates that a news-momentum (news-contrarian) trading strategy is relatively expensive (cheap) after the 
release of non-scheduled announcements. Interestingly, scheduled announcements do not demonstrate such a phenomenon; 
they improve the liquidity on both sides of the order book equally. 
There are some limitations in our study. Most importantly, we use multi-level data, but not order ﬂow data (ITCH feed), 
which would be the most comprehensive data on order book markets. In future research, it would be interesting to use 
order ﬂow data to study how order book liquidity is provided and consumed around announcements. For example, does the 
liquidity decrease due to trades (executions) or order cancellations? The statistical properties of message arrivals (submis- 
sions, cancellations, executions) around news releases would shed more light on the liquidity provision in the limit order 
markets around information releases. 
Acknowledgments 
The research leading to these results received funding from Tampere University of Technology through Networked Big 
Data Science and Engineering Center and TUT’s doctoral school. The corresponding author is grateful for the grants received 
from Marcus Wallenberg’s Foundation, Finnish Foundation for Technology Promotion, Foundation for Economic Education, 
and Savings Banks’ Research Foundation. 
Supplementary material 
Supplementary material associated with this article can be found, in the online version, at 10.1016/j.frl.2016.12.016 
References 
Butt, H. , Virk, N. , 2015. Liquidity and asset prices: an empirical investigation of the nordic stock markets. Eur. Financ. Manage. 21 (4), 672–705 . 
Campbell, J. , 1997. The Econometrics of Financial Markets. Princeton University Press . 
Degryse, H. , De Jong, F. , Van Kervel, V. , 2015. The impact of dark trading and visible fragmentation on market quality. Rev. Finance 19, 1587–1622 . 
Degryse, H. , De Jong, F. , Van Ravenswaaij, M. , Wuyts, G. , 2005. Aggressive orders and the resiliency of a limit order market. Rev. Finance 9 (2), 201–242 . 
Deuskar, P. , Johnson, T.C. , 2011. Market liquidity and ﬂow-driven risk. Rev. Financ. Stud. 24, 721–753 . 
Engle, R. , Fleming, M. , Ghysels, E. , Nguyen, G. , 2012. Liquidity, volatility, and ﬂights to safety in the U.S. treasury market: Evidence from a new class of 
dynamic order book models. Technical Report. Staff Report, Federal Reserve Bank of New York . 
Erenburg, G. , Lasser, D. , 2009. Electronic limit order book and order submission choice around macroeconomic news. Rev. Financ. Econ. 18, 172–182 . 
Gomber, P. , Schweickert, U. , Theissen, E. , 2015. Liquidity dynamics in an electronic open limit order book: an event study approach. Eur. Financ. Manage. 21 
(1), 52–78 . 
Gould, M. , Porter, M. , Williams, S. , McDonald, M. , Fenn, D. , Howison, S. , 2013. Limit order books. Quant. Finance 13 (11), 1709–1742 . 
Graham, J. , Koski, J. , Loewenstein, U. , 2006. Information ﬂow and liquidity around anticipated and unanticipated dividend announcements. J. Bus. 79 (5), 
2301–2336 . 
Gross-Klussmann, A. , Hautsch, N. , 2011. When machines read the news: using automated text analytics to quantify high frequency news-implied market 
reactions. J. Empirical Finance 18 (2), 321–340 . 
Härdle, W. , Hautsch, N. , Mihoci, A. , 2012. Modelling and forecasting liquidity supply using semiparametric factor dynamics. J. Empirical Finance 19, 610–615 . 
Krinsky, I. , Lee, J. , 1996. Earnings announcements and the components of the bid-ask spread. J Finance 51 (4), 1523–1535 . 
Lee, C. , Mucklow, B. , Ready, M. , 1993. Spreads, depths, and the impact of earnings information: an intraday analysis. Rev. Financ. Stud. 6 (2), 345–374 . 
Malo, P. , Pennanen, T. , 2012. Reduced form modeling of limit order markets. Quant. Finance 12, 1025–1036 . 
Neuhierl, A. , Scherbina, A. , Schlusche, B. , 2013. Market reaction to corporate press releases. J. Financ. Quant. Anal. 48 (4), 1207–1240 . 
O’Hara, M. , Ye, M. , 2011. Is market fragmentation harming market quality? J. Financ. Econ. 100, 459–474 . 
Riordan, R. , Storkenmaier, A. , Wagener, M. , Zhang, S. , 2013. Public information arrival: price discovery and liquidity in electronic limit order markets. J. 
Banking Finance 37 (4), 1148–1159 . 
Sensoy, A. , 2016. Commonality in liquidity: effects of monetary policy and macroeconomic announcements. Finance Res. Lett. 16, 125–131 . 
Siikanen, M., Kanniainen, J., Luoma, A., 2016. What drives the sensitivity of limit order books to company announcement arrivals? Available at SSRN: 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2891262 . 
Velásquez, S., Kanniainen, J., Mäkinen, S., Valli, J., 2016. Layoff announcements and intra-day market reactions doi: 10.1007/s11846- 016- 0219- 7 , forthcoming 
in Review of Managerial Science . 

Publication III
Siikanen M., Kanniainen, J., Luoma, A. “What drives the sensitivity of limit order books
to company announcement arrivals?”, Economics Letters.
Available at: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2017.07.018
Reprinted with kind permission by © Elsevier B.V. 2017
Economics Letters 159 (2017) 65–68
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Economics Letters
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolet
What drives the sensitivity of limit order books to company
announcement arrivals?
Milla Siikanen a,*, Juho Kanniainen a, Arto Luoma b,1
a Department of Industrial Management, Tampere University of Technology, P.O. Box 541, FI-33101 Tampere, Finland
b School of Management, FI-33014 University of Tampere, Finland
h i g h l i g h t s
• We study illiquidity shocks following scheduled and non-scheduled announcements.
• Wemeasure liquidity over multiple limit order book levels from high-frequency data.
• Recent losses amplify illiquidity shocks following non-scheduled announcements.
• Faster market reactions in terms of order book illiquidity lead to larger shocks.
• Larger asymmetry in the book before announcements is associated with larger shocks.
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a b s t r a c t
We provide evidence that recent losses amplify order book illiquidity shocks caused by non-scheduled
news. Moreover, the faster markets’ reaction to scheduled and non-scheduled news arrivals is in terms of
order book illiquidity, themore illiquid the order book becomes; that is, a fast reaction is a strong reaction.
Additionally, order book asymmetry observed before announcement arrivals is positively associated with
the magnitude of illiquidity shocks.
© 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Many studies show that information arrivals can cause liquidity
shocks (see e.g. Erenburg and Lasser, 2009; Engle et al., 2012;
Riordan et al., 2013; Rosa, 2016; Siikanen et al., 2017). However, to
our knowledge there are no earlier studies investigating the factors
which affect themagnitude of liquidity shocks in limit order books
(LOB) caused by announcement releases. In this paper, we aim to
explain the sensitivity of LOB liquidity to information arrivals using
high-frequency LOB data for 75 companies from NASDAQ Nordic
combined with set of scheduled and non-scheduled company an-
nouncements, for four-year period of 2006–2009.
* Corresponding author.
E-mail address:milla.siikanen@tut.fi (M. Siikanen).
1 Present address: Department of Mathematics and Statistics, P.O. Box 35,
FI-40014 University of Jyväskylä, Finland.
LOB characteristics and the liquidity dynamics beyond the best
levels are intriguing, especially around information arrivals, be-
cause high trading activity and investors’ impatience may gener-
ate a sudden liquidity demand across multiple price levels. Thus,
using the conventional bid–ask spread might lead to misleading
results (Rosa, 2016; Sensoy, 2016; Siikanen et al., 2017). An ap-
propriate method to characterise the LOB and to measure the LOB
liquidity across multiple price levels should capture aspects with
respect to both quantity (depth) over multiple levels and distances
between the price levels. A popular approach is to estimate order
book slope (see e.g. Deuskar and Johnson, 2011;Härdle et al., 2012;
Malo and Pennanen, 2012; Siikanen et al., 2017), which in this
paper is called Order Book Illiquidity (OBI).2
2 Some other liquidity measures exist that incorporate data from multiple LOB
levels, too, such as the Exchange Liquidity Measure (XLM). However, an issue arises
with XLM, because this measure is determined for a specific trade size, yet the total
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2017.07.018
0165-1765/© 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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Siikanen et al. (2017) find that after the immediate illiquidity
shock, scheduled announcements can improve LOB liquidity to
exceptionally good level and provide evidence for pre-reaction in
LOBs before scheduled announcements, which suggests the pos-
sibility of information leakage (see also Graham et al., 2006).3
Additionally, Riordan et al. (2013) and Gomber et al. (2015)
study liquidity over multiple LOB levels in equity markets around
information arrivals. Apart from these studies, Erenburg and Lasser
(2009), Engle et al. (2012), and Rosa (2016) combine multi-
level LOB data with macro announcements, but with data from
equity-index-linked securities market, the U.S. Treasury market,
and futures market, respectively. However, none of these studies
looks extensively into the factors driving the LOB sensitivity, which
is the focus of this paper.
We use 20 order book levels to calculate OBI, and one should
note that thismay affect the results presentedhere. Specifically, Si-
ikanen et al. (2017) show that spread behaves quite differently
around announcement releases when compared to OBI, so it is also
likely that OBI calculated for example over 5 or 10 levels behaves
differently from OBI over 20 levels. Additionally, we restrict our
analysis to liquid stocks, and the results for illiquid stocks may
differ considerably.4
2. LOB parametrisation and liquidity measure
To parametrise the LOB, we follow Malo and Pennanen (2012).
The shape of a LOB is linearly captured as follows:
r(h) = OBI · h,
where
r(h) := ln(s(h/s¯))− ln(s¯),
where s¯ refers to mid-price, and h = s¯x is the mark-to-market
value of a market order of x shares. Here OBI is positive and is
considered to measure LOB liquidity (see Malo and Pennanen,
2012).5 Obviously, the smaller the value of OBI, the more liquid
the stock is.
We use simple linear regression to calculate the values of OBI
based on snapshots of the LOB taken every 10 s including data from
20 best ask and bid price levels. In case there are not 20 different
price levels available on one side of the book, we use asmany as are
available.We also eliminate the effects of the pre- and post-trading
sessions and exclude the first and last trading hours from the data.6
In addition, we de-seasonalise the observations of ln(OBI).
3. Data
We use LOB data from 1.1.2006 to 1.1.2010 for 75 frequently
traded stocks listed on NASDAQ OMX Helsinki, Stockholm, and
Copenhagen, which are continuous limit order based markets. The
multi-level depths on the bid and ask sides vary in time and consequently, the LOB
is not always deep enough to allow us to calculate XLM for a given order size. This
is an issue especially just before scheduled announcements.
3 Siikanen et al. (2017) use largely the same data sets as we use in this study.
4 We thank an anonymous referee for pointing out these important observations.
5 Malo and Pennanen (2012) refer to LOB illiquidity as β , but for clarity, we refer
to it as OBI, since in the finance literature β usually refers to CAPM β .
6 For stocks traded on OMX Helsinki and OMX Stockholm, we remove an addi-
tional half-hour from the end of the trading day because of the different length of
the trading day in comparison to OMX Copenhagen.
stocks in our sample have been involved at some point in OMX
Helsinki 25, OMX Stockholm 30, or OMX Copenhagen 20. Out of
the 75 stocks, 27 are traded in Helsinki, 28 are traded in Stockholm,
and 20 are traded in Copenhagen.7
The news data in this study come from NASDAQ OMX Nordic’s
website.8 The announcement times are given at one second pre-
cision in the data, but because we sample the LOB data every
10 s, the times of the announcements are rounded to the nearest
10 s. We do not restrict our study to any specific news class, such
as earnings announcements, as many other studies do. Rather,
we re-categorise the announcements into two specific groups:
scheduled and non-scheduled announcements (see Siikanen et al.,
2017 for the categorisation). The final sample contains 408 sched-
uled and 2,629 non-scheduled announcements: 35%, 45%, and 20%
originate from NASDAQ OMX Helsinki, Stockholm, Copenhagen,
respectively. Over 70% of the scheduled announcements in the final
sample are financial announcements.
4. Empirical analysis
4.1. Framework of the empirical analysis
An estimation window comprises observations with 10-second
frequency from 27 days preceding the day of an event. An event
window consists of two sub-windows: a 30-minute pre-window
and another 30-minute post-window. We denote the set of ob-
servation times from the estimation window by E , from the pre-
window by A−, and from the post-window by A+, and from the
whole event window by A.
4.2. Regression variables
The dependent variablemeasures the relativemagnitude of LOB
illiquidity shock due to the release of information:
∆ln(OBI)MaxE,A+ = max
t∈A+
[ln(OBI)t ]− ln(OBI)MedE ,
where
ln(OBI)MedE = Mediant∈E [ln(OBI)t ],
is a median observation from the estimation window.
We choose the explanatory variables to capture pre-reactions in
the LOB, the sign (positiveness/negativeness) of new information,
and the markets’ reaction times. The first explanatory variable,
ln(OBI)MedE , is used to control for the preceding level of ln(OBI) (for
the ask and bid sides separately).
Second, the expectations of the effects of the announcements
may be visible in the pre-announcement window, which can indi-
cate information leakage (see e.g. Lee, 1992; Graham et al., 2006;
Siikanen et al., 2017). Intuitively, if the liquidity available on the
ask side is exceptionally low in comparison to the bid side, it might
be that the markets are expecting a positive announcement and
vice versa. So, our second explanatory variable is the maximum
7 We use data from Nordic markets instead of U.S. markets (the most liquid in
the world) because the former are little fragmented in comparison to the latter.
In the United States, fragmentation is clearly an important feature of equity mar-
kets (O’Hara and Ye, 2011). Another advantage of using Nordic data from less
liquid markets is that, as Butt and Virk (2015) argue, ‘‘it is more appropriate to
test liquidity-relatedmodels inmarkets that are sufficiently illiquid to diagnose the
level and strength of bearing [...] risks’’.
8 http://www.nasdaqomxnordic.com/news/companynews, see the page also for
detailed information.
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Table 1
Association between LOB illiquidity shock and LOB related factors. The robust standard errors appear in parentheses. Economic significance levels are reported in braces and
they give the change in the maximum relative price impact due to announcements: for α1 – α4 they are based on one standard deviation increase in explanatory variables
and for α5 on 10 min increase in τ ∗ (α6 is an estimate of a dummy variable).
Parameter Variable Scheduled announcements Non-scheduled announcements
ask bid ask bid
α1 ln(OBI)MedE −0.098* −0.229** −0.065** −0.046
(0.046) (0.073) (0.021) (0.024)
{−0.184} {−0.373} {−0.123}
α2 ln(OBI)
Asymmetry
A− 0.121 0.445*** 0.072* 0.291***
(0.074) (0.107) (0.028) (0.045)
{0.284} {0.041} {0.178}
α3 rE,A− −0.339 −0.407 −1.655*** −1.121***
(0.543) (0.534) (0.260) (0.266)
{−0.142} {−0.099}
α4 SPREADMedA− 70.176*** 61.635*** 29.972*** 12.117
(10.788) (12.983) (3.421) (9.610)
{0.188} {0.163} {0.086}
α5 τ
∗ −0.017*** −0.023** −0.005*** −0.003*
(0.005) (0.008) (0.001) (0.001)
{−0.171} {−0.228} {−0.051} {−0.032}
α6 D+ 0.150* −0.261* 0.146*** −0.122***
(0.075) (0.107) (0.032) (0.029)
Number of observations 408 408 2,629 2,629
R2 0.081 0.166 0.098 0.095
*** p < 0.001.
** p < 0.01.
* p < 0.05.
asymmetry, calculated as
ln(OBI)AsymmetryA− = max
t∈A−
[⏐⏐ln(OBI)Bidt − ln(OBI)Askt ⏐⏐] .
To assess the effects of price pre-reactions to illiquidity shock, the
third explanatory variable is
rE,A− = ln
[
Median
t∈A−
(mt )
]
− ln
[
Median
s∈E (ms)
]
,
wheremt denotes the mid-price at time t .
The fourth explanatory variable is themedian relative spread in
the pre-window, denoted by SPREADMedA− . Herewe use observations
from the pre-event window to avoid a correlation with the other
liquidity measure, ln(OBI)MedE .
The fifth explanatory variable in the regression is time in
minutes from the release of an announcement to the maximum
value of ln(OBI) within the post-window. Formally, by setting
min[A+] = 0,
τ ∗ = argmax
t∈A+
[ln(OBI)t ] .
With this variable, we investigate how the length of ‘‘reaction
time’’ from a release to an illiquidity shock is associated with the
magnitude of the shock. One can also think of this variable from
the perspective of aggressiveness: is there an association between
how fast (i.e. aggressively) liquidity is consumed and what is the
amount of liquidity consumed?
The last explanatory variable in our regression is a dummy
variable for positive events, D+, which is 1 if the news is positive—
that is, the mid-price at the end of the post-window is larger than
the mid-price right before the announcement. Importantly, we
calculate τ ∗ and D+ from post-window whereas other variables
are calculated from pre-window. Means, medians, and standard
deviations of the regression variables are available in the Online
Appendix.
Overall, our stock-specific fixed effect regression is of the
form:9
∆ln(OBI)MaxE,A+ = α1 · ln(OBI)MedE + α2 · ln(OBI)AsymmetryA−
+α3 · rE,A− + α4 · SPREADMedA− + α5 · τ ∗ + α6 · D+.
(1)
4.3. Regression results
Table 1 presents the regression results. The estimated regres-
sion coefficients for ln(OBI)MedE indicate that the more liquid the
stock, the larger the illiquidity shock due to the announcement
with both statistical and economic significance.
For ln(OBI)AsymmetryA− , the estimated regression coefficients indi-
cate that the larger the imbalance between the ask and bid sides
before the event, the larger the maximum illiquidity cost after the
announcement. The asymmetry seems not only be statistically but
also economically significant, especially with the bid side illiquid-
ity shock. This result supports the result of Chordia et al. (2002)
that order imbalances in either direction reduce liquidity.
The estimates of rE,A− for non-scheduled announcements sug-
gest with statistical and economic significance that the more the
stock price decreases (increases) before the announcement arrival,
the larger (smaller) the impact of the announcement is on the
magnitude of illiquidity. This finding seems consistent with the
study of Hameed et al. (2010), who document that negative mar-
ket returns decrease liquidity.10 It is interesting that there is no
apparent statistical association with scheduled announcements.
Overall, this result can be used to understand investor reactions
9 Alternatively, Eq. (1) can be expressed as
max
t∈A+
[OBIt ] = (1+ α1) · OBIMedE + α2 · OBIAsymmetryA− + α3 · rE,A−
+α4 · SPREADMedA− + α5 · τ ∗ + α6 · D+.
.
10 We perform an additional analysis to check if squared returns between the
estimation window and illiquidity shocks at the post-event window, r2E,A+ , are
associated with realised returns, rE,A− , but find no statistically significant asso-
ciations (see Online Appendix).
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to unexpected news releases: recent losses can make investors’
liquidity provisionmore sensitive to announcementswhose arrival
is unexpected.
The regression coefficients estimated for SPREADMedA− indicate
with statistical and economic significance that the larger the rel-
ative spread before the announcement, the larger the illiquidity
shock the announcement causes. Interestingly, this is contradic-
tory with respect to other liquidity measure, ln(OBI)MedE . However,
they are calculated fromdifferentwindows,which can partially ex-
plain the difference. Also, as demonstrated in Siikanen et al. (2017),
multi-level liquidity and spread can behave differently around
announcement releases (see also Sensoy, 2016; Rosa, 2016).
For τ ∗, the estimated regression coefficient show that the faster
the illiquidity shock occurs after the announcement, i.e. the faster
the LOB illiquidity reaches its maximum after a news release, the
larger the illiquidity shock is. As the table demonstrates, if the
shock occurs 10 min later, its magnitude decreases by approxi-
mately 17%–23% for scheduled announcements and 3%–5% for non-
scheduled announcements.
The parameter estimates for dummy variable D+ show that,
in comparison to negative news releases, positive news releases
cause larger illiquidity shocks on the ask side and smaller shocks
on the bid side and vice versa. This is reasonable because informed
investors may buy (sell) shares by picking off stale sell (buy) limit
orders just after the arrival of new positive (negative) information.
As a robustness check, we run the regressions using 60-minute
pre- and post-event windows, and get similar results (the results
are available in the Online Appendix). As an additional robustness
check, we run the regressions usingmean values instead ofmedian
values and the results are essentially the same as those reported for
the median values and are available upon request.
5. Summary and conclusion
We perform regression analysis to explain the magnitude of
the illiquidity shock that follows scheduled and non-scheduled
company announcement releases, and find several associations
with both statistical and economic significance. Most importantly,
recent losses make the illiquidity shock following a non-scheduled
announcement larger. Moreover, a fast reaction is a strong reac-
tion; that is, the faster the LOB illiquidity reaches its maximum
after a news release, the more illiquid the LOB becomes. We also
provide evidence that the LOB asymmetry before both scheduled
and non-scheduled announcements is positively associated with
the magnitude of illiquidity shocks.
The results may be sensitive to the number of LOB levels used
to determinemulti-level liquidity, and future research should con-
sider using different numbers of levels to see how this affects the
findings. Additional analysis with different liquidity measures and
on less liquid stocks could also provide new valuable insights on
the topic. In the future research, it would also be interesting to
use order flow data to study how different factors affect directly
the order submission and cancellation rates (liquidity provision)
around company announcements.
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In foreign exchange (FX) trading, an aggregator is used to connect traders with liquidity providers (LPs).
In an aggregator, a trader receives a continuous stream of bid and ask quotes from a predefined set of LPs,
and the difference between the best bid and ask prices over a set of liquidity streams is called an inside
spread. In this paper, we empirically study liquidity in an FX aggregator and show that, on average,
traders obtain a relatively tight spread already with four or five streams; the use of more streams yields
a marginal benefit only. For given numbers of liquidity streams, we determine the optimal combinations
of streams minimizing the spread. Our findings indicate that most of the traders could—at least in
theory—reduce the average spread by more than half with the optimal combination of streams, and a
trader could save up to $0.18 basis points per e1 traded. However, traders may not be able to fully
exploit improvements in spreads because, in practice, the liquidity streams are set by LPs and not by the
trader. In addition, we find that Oomen’s [Quantitative Finance, 17, 3, (2017)] model fits our empirical
data accurately, even under simplistic assumptions.
Keywords: FX market; Liquidity; Aggregation; Transaction costs
JEL Classification: G15
1. Introduction
The foreign exchange (FX) market is one of the largest financial markets in the world with an
average daily traded volume of over five trillion U.S. dollars (Bank for International Settlements
2016). The FX market is characterized by a high degree of decentralization and fragmentation,
and though it is commonly regarded as highly liquid, FX liquidity is not well understood (see e.g.
Mancini et al. 2013, Karnaukh et al. 2015). FX market shows a high level of electronic trading with
a complex ecosystem of both bilateral and multilateral electronic trading platforms with varying
trading protocols. For example, there are platforms operated by large single dealer banks (single
dealer platforms) and independent platform operators that combine liquidity with more than one
bank as the liquidity provider (LP) (multi-dealer platforms) (see e.g. King et al. 2012). In general,
FX markets are evolving rapidly in response to new trading technologies (King et al. 2013).
The current regulatory requirements, like MiFID II, which came into force this year, are expected
to further push FX trading on platforms, even if the exact shift in the market share and further
regulatory-driven transformation of the FX market are still in the early stages (see e.g. Sherif 2018).
In summary, the FX market shows the very unique characteristic of being still an over-the-counter
∗Corresponding author. Email: milla.siikanen@tut.fi
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(OTC) market, but an extremely liquid one with a very high degree of electronic trading. Further
on, due to its complexity and opaque nature, the FX market is currently under pressure due to its
criticized lack of transparency and recent scandals1, which were partially addressed in the recently
published ’FX Code of Conduct’.2
During recent years, the FX market has been undergoing a transition from pure OTC to electronic
trading with a structure and intrinsic trading dynamics partially similar to central limit order
books. A typical modern trading technology, especially in FX spot trading, but also typical in
other OTC markets, is an aggregator (Oomen 2017a). An aggregator is an electronic trading tool
that connects liquidity seekers (traders) with LPs. The idea is to facilitate best-price execution:
traders receive continuous streams of bid and ask quotes from selected (predefined) LPs and can
choose to trade with the best price. One of the key metrics characterizing a liquidity aggregator
is the trader’s observed inside spread (Oomen 2017a). The observed inside spread measures the
transaction costs and is defined as the difference between the best bid and ask prices over a set of
liquidity streams disclosed for a trader.
According to Mancini et al. (2013) and Karnaukh et al. (2015), liquidity in FX markets has
not been studied in depth, despite of FX market’s the high importance due to its huge size and
the crucial role in guaranteeing efficiency and arbitrage conditions also in many other markets.
One reason for this could be the overall fragmentation of the market which makes the available
and representative data fairly sparse. Regarding aggregator trading technology, which plays an
important role in the FX markets, a welcomed theoretical contribution is Oomen (2017a), who
has introduced a promising stochastic model for liquidity dynamics in an aggregator. However,
to our knowledge, there exists no empirical research utilizing real market data from a liquidity
aggregator. This paper aims to fill this gap by using a unique data set for FX spot trading from
an FX aggregator. We not only aim to reflect our empirical results in light of Oomen’s model but
also, by looking at the liquidity streams that individual traders access in an aggregator, respond
to Gould et al. (2017), who recently suggested (in the context of quasi-centralized limit order
books for FX trading) that ’An interesting challenge for future research will be to gain a deeper
understanding of the subset of liquidity [...] that individual institutions can access in their local
LOBs [limit order books]’.1
The data set that we use includes detailed information on all the streamed quotes for individual
LPs and individual traders on EURUSD over a 10-day trading period. Such detailed data are usually
not available for academic research. To our knowledge, this is the first paper to study empirical
data from an FX aggregator. By studying the empirical properties of an FX aggregator with a
disclosed streaming protocol, we aim to obtain deeper insight into the new and exciting ground of
the FX OTC market. In particular, since traders may access different numbers of liquidity streams
in their aggregator settings, we determine the optimal combinations of streams to minimize the
inside spreads. We do the optimization for different numbers of liquidity streams (corresponding
to traders observing different numbers of streams) and compare the optimal spreads to the inside
spreads that the traders in the aggregator actually observe. Additionally, we quantify the theoretical
1See, for example, ’Third Barclays Trader Faces U.S. Charges in FX Scandal’ (Bloomberg 2018) and ’The global FX rigging
scandal’ (Reuters 2017).
2FX GLOBAL CODE: A set of global principles of good practice in the FX market, developed in a partnership between
central banks and market participants from 16 jurisdictions around the globe, available at https://www.globalfxc.org/docs/
fx_global.pdf.
1Besides Oomen (2017a,b), earlier research on FX market liquidity in an aggregator is scant, but there exists literature focusing
on liquidity in FX markets in general. Mancini et al. (2013) study systemically liquidity in the FX market and find significant
variation in liquidity across exchange rates, substantial illiquidity costs, and strong commonality in liquidity across currencies
and with equity and bond markets. Karnaukh et al. (2015) provide a comprehensive study on liquidity in the FX market and
show that liquidity declines with funding constraints and global risk, and that liquidity can be measured accurately using
daily data. Payne (2003) studies information asymmetries in inter-dealer FX markets and finds that asymmetric information
accounts for around 60% of the average spreads. Banti et al. (2012) construct a measure of global liquidity risk in the FX
market and find that liquidity risk is priced in the cross-section of currency returns. Danielsson and Payne (2012) study order
level data from an FX broking system and analyze several liquidity measures, and they find strong predictability in the arrival
of liquidity supply and demand events.
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cost savings that traders could obtain with the optimal combination of streams (compared to the
present setting). Moreover, using these data, we show that the stochastic model formulated by
Oomen (2017a) can yield empirically reasonable solutions.
Our empirical analysis shows that the more liquidity streams are observed, the lower the observed
inside spread tends to be, as suggested by the model introduced by Oomen (2017a)1. However, there
exists variation among traders: in some cases, a trader with fewer streams observes a lower average
spread than a trader with more streams. According to our data, traders, on one hand, obtain a
relatively tight spread already, on average, with four or five streams, meaning that those with
more than five streams obtain only a marginal benefit, if any. On the other hand, if traders can
obtain the optimal combination of liquidity streams, most of them could cut their observed inside
spread to less than half. Moreover, an optimal combination of just four streams would give a better
spread than any trader observes at the moment (the average number of streams that a trader
observes is 5.4 and the maximum is 23). Oomen (2017a) shows in his model that the trader’s
expected observed inside spread can become negative, and we show with our data that indeed, the
optimal combination of streams leads to a negative average spread when the number of streams
in the aggregator setting is seven or more. Additionally, our results indicate that the most active
trader would save over $1 million per year in transaction costs if he/she could obtain the optimal
combination of streams. Finally, we provide empirical evidence for the model introduced by Oomen
(2017a): even if we assume homogenous streams, which is quite simplistic, Oomen’s model provides
a good fit for the real world data and can be used to describe the observed spread quite accurately.
It should be noted that the cost savings and improvements in average spreads are only theoretical,
since (i) traders are not completely free to choose just any liquidity streams provided by the LPs,
and (ii) due to the last look trading protocol2, streamed prices are indicative in nature. Moreover,
changing the trading more towards all-to-all type of trading would be likely to change the LPs’
behaviour. However, the unique insights into the trading behaviour in an aggregator with disclosed
streaming that we present in this paper indicate that there is room for improvement both for
optimizing the selection of liquidity streams in a trader’s aggregator setting and for the evolution
of the FX market in general. We leave the realization of the theoretical cost savings to be explored
by practitioners.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the logic of the liquidity
aggregator in detail. Then Section 3 describes the data and Section 4 outlines the optimization
method used. Section 5 depicts the empirical results and Section 6 describes the calibration of the
model (Proposition 1) proposed by Oomen (2017a). Finally, Section 7 discusses and concludes this
study.
2. Liquidity aggregator and the selection of liquidity streams
In general, an aggregator can be defined as an electronic trading tool that collects streaming price
quotes from different sources, such as FX dealers, electronic brokers and multibank trading systems
(King et al. 2012). Aggregators are not only used in spot FX markets; the trading protocol in one
form or another is taking an increasingly prominent role in many other OTC markets (Oomen
2017a). In the following, we only consider an aggregator connecting liquidity seekers (traders) with
LPs without further connecting the trader to other external sources of liquidity.
While in regulated equity markets, such as in classical stock exchanges, centralized limit order
books (CLOBs) are typical3, FX trading is still OTC and the trading venues usually allow a variety
1However, Oomen (2017a) notes that nominal spread (as opposed to observed inside spread), which takes into account the
slippage costs caused by possible trade rejections, may not decrease as the number of liquidity streams increases. Nevertheless,
studying nominal spreads is beyond the scope of this paper.
2Last look trading protocol gives an LP a chance choose to either accept or reject the deal request within a certain time period,
typically some milliseconds, after a trader requests the deal (see Oomen 2017a,b, Cartea et al. 2018)
3See, e.g. Malo and Pennanen (2012), Siikanen et al. (2017a,b) and references therein for research on stock markets with
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of trading protocols (see e.g. King et al. 2012). Typical trading protocols in FX markets include,
for example, request for quote (RFQ) and disclosed streaming (DS). While in CLOBs, by default, a
trader always trades with the best price available in the order book, the situation is more complex
in the OTC FX markets and their typical trading venues.
The logic of an aggregator with DS protocol is between the traditional RFQ protocol, which
mimics the classical voice broking in an electronic form and a fully transparent all-to-all (CLOB)
style trading. In an RFQ model, the trader actively sends out ’requests for quotes’ for a number of
dealers (i.e. LPs)—that is, asking prices for a transaction with a given quantity for a given currency
pair (e.g. 1Mio EURUSD). Then LPs can (but are not obliged to) respond by quoting their bid and
ask prices. The trader then can choose to enter the trade with the LP quoting the most favourable
price.1
In an aggregator, the trader receives a continuous stream of quotes from a set of LPs with whom
he/she can trade. Thus, the LPs are constantly providing bid and ask prices for certain quantities
and currency pairs without receiving an explicit request for a certain quote. In a sense, a trader
observes his/her ’personal order book’, though in contrast to CLOBs, the trader cannot submit
quotes (limit orders) himself/herself. Another important difference when compared to CLOBs is
that in an aggregator, the LPs streaming quotes are unable to observe the quotes of other LPs
(Oomen 2017a). CLOBs are also usually anonymous, whereas in an aggregator, both parties know
the identity of the counterparty.
Another interesting trading protocol used in FX markets is the quasi-centralized limit order book
(QCLOB) (see Gould et al. 2017), which can be thought to be between an aggregator and CLOB.
QCLOBs are otherwise like CLOBS, but in QCLOBs, investors can access the trading opportunities
offered only by counterparties with whom they possess sufficient bilateral credit. Consequently, in
QCLOBs (as also in aggregators), investors observe only part of the total liquidity, as they observe
their ’local order books’. However, in QCLOBs, all market participants can submit both limit and
market orders, whereas in aggregators, LPs provide liquidity (in a sense, they ’submit limit orders’)
and traders take liquidity (by ’submitting market orders’) (for more information, see Gould et al.
2017).
One of the key metrics in an aggregator is (trader’s) observed inside spread (Oomen 2017a).
A (half-) inside spread measures the transaction costs that the trader pays at the execution of a
trade and, in general, spread can be seen as a measure of liquidity. Formally, the observed inside
spread is defined as the difference between the best bid and ask prices that the trader observes
at a specific moment. To illustrate this, Table 1 shows a snapshot of the active quotations that a
trader with four streams observes at a specific point in time. A stream can provide an arbitrary
number of price and quantity pairs for both the bid and ask sides. The observed inside spread is
the difference between the lowest ask price and the highest bid price: in this case, the observed
inside spread equals 1.12545− 1.12542 = 0.00003 = 0.3 basis points (bp).
Taking into account the OTC nature of the aggregator in question, it should be clearly pointed
out that an LP can (and usually will) provide different streams of quotes for certain clients (or
subsets of clients). The decision of an LP usually depends on certain criteria, like the client’s
credit rating or their general business relationship; in other words, the LP might provide his/her
’favourite’ clients with better prices. In fact, it has been reported that ’FX trading is becoming
increasingly relationship-driven’ (Moore et al. 2016). Further on, the streamed quotes are highly
dynamic on a microstructure scale and depend on the movement of the FX market as a whole
and on the LP’s current personal internal FX flow, exposure and general trading behaviour. For
instance, some LPs in general internalize trades more often (offset against the LP’s internal trade
flow) or tend to externalize (oﬄoad the trade on the platform itself) (see also Butz and Oomen
CLOBs.
1Nevertheless, it should be noted that the trader can still decide to trade with an LP not quoting the best possible price, but
the trader may add other criteria to his decision, e.g. his/her general relationship to the LP, where he/she might just choose
his/her ’favourite’ LP with whom he/she is in a general business relationship.
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Table 1. Snapshot of most recent quotes observed by a trader with four streams (A, B, C, D). Each
stream can have an arbitrary number of price and quantity pairs for both the bid and ask sides. The best bid and
ask prices are highlighted with bold, and the trader’s observed inside spread is calculated based on these.
Bid quotes Ask quotes
Stream price quantity [M] price quantity [M]
A 1.12513 1 1.12587 1
A 1.12512 2 1.12588 2
B 1.12536 0.5 1.12545 0.5
B 1.12535 1 1.12546 1
B 1.12533 3 1.12549 3
C 1.12536 0.5 1.12547 0.5
C 1.12534 1 1.12550 1
D 1.12542 1 1.12549 1
D 1.12539 2 1.12551 2
D 1.12536 3 1.12557 3
D 1.12532 5 — —
2017, King et al. 2012).2
In addition, because of the last look trade acceptance process adopted in the aggregator, the
streamed quotes are indicative in nature. ’Last look’ gives an LP a chance to accept or reject a deal
request within a fixed period (usually some milliseconds) after the trader has initiated the deal
request (Oomen 2017a,b, Cartea et al. 2018). This means that even though a trader would observe
a negative spread in his/her aggregator setting, the arbitrage opportunity is only theoretical, since
LPs may reject trade requests.
As the liquidity provision to a trader is highly bespoke, and as it can be assumed that LPs’ be-
haviour is generally fairly heterogeneous, the problem of a trader deciding on a suitable aggregation
setup is highly non-trivial (see also Oomen 2017a). For instance, how many and which LPs should
the trader include in his/her aggregator setup and which ones should he/she choose? Moreover,
because of the OTC nature of the trading in FX markets, two parties trading need a bilateral
trading agreement and sufficient bilateral credit to trade (see also Gould et al. 2017), which may
further restrict the selection of LPs.
In the following analysis, based on unique empirical microstructure data, we focus on the question
of how many quoted liquidity streams a trader should include to obtain the ’best execution’ in the
sense of minimal bid-ask spreads, and compare the inside spreads observed by the traders with
their current setups to the optimal combination of liquidity streams. However, it is important to
keep in mind that it is the LP who makes a decision about the liquidity streams that are provided
to a trader (i.e. a trader can choose the LP, but the LP chooses the streams). Hence, the optimal
combinations of liquidity streams that we find in Section 5 are not necessarily achievable by traders
in practice, but they should be considered as the most efficient set of streams, and thus serve as a
yardstick for the actual situation.
3. Streaming data and descriptive statistics
In this paper, we use a detailed and unique data set on all the streamed quotes from an FX
aggregator. The data set is highly sensitive, and we have permission to publish our academic results
as long as it is not possible to identify individual LPs or traders. To guarantee the anonymity of
LPs and traders, we are not allowed to publish the name or any other background information of
the data provider.
2Lyons (1995) studies the trading of a spot FX dealer and finds support for both inventory control and asymmetric information
channels, through which the order flow affects prices according to microstructure theory. Menkhoff and Schmeling (2010) study
information heterogeneity across FX traders and show that information about the counterparty of a trade affects the future
trading decisions of individual traders. Moreover, they argue that ’microstructure research has shown in several ways that
foreign exchange markets are populated by heterogenous participants’.
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We analyse quote data for EURUSD, from an FX liquidity aggregator. EURUSD was the most
traded currency pair in 2016 with 23% of the traded volume (Bank for International Settlements
2016). Our sample covers 10 trading days from 26 September 2016 to 7 October 2016. Table 2
provides descriptive statistics on the data sample. During this two-week period, the traded volume
is over e10 billion and there are almost 12,000 trades. Figure 1 plots the intra-day pattern of
how the trading is distributed over a trading day. Around 90% of the trading (measured both by
traded volume and number of trades) takes place between 6:00 and 16:00, and hence we restrict
our analysis to data from these hours.
Table 2. Descriptive statistics on the data sample. The sample covers a period of 10 trading days on
EURUSD. ’# of streams with > 95% of obs’ provides the number of streams that have active quotes for over 95%
of the minute-by-minute observations, and values in Panel B are calculated over these 165 ’active’ streams. AQS
stands for average quoted spread (of a stream), and AOIS stands for (trader’s) average observed inside spread in
the aggregator. When the presented number is an average value, the median value is presented in parentheses ().
Panel A: Aggregator
Traded volume [Me] 10,541
# of trades 11,448
Average (median) trade size [e] 920,782 (500,000)
# of liquidity providers 42
# of quote updates [M] 306
# of traders 105
# of streams 190
# of streams with > 95% of obs 165
Panel B: Average stream
Average (median) traded volume [Me] 86 (24)
Average (median) number of trades 89 (22)
Average (median) number of quote updates [M] 1.62 (1.32)
Average (median) AQS [bp $] 1.3083 (0.8656)
Panel C: Average trader
Average (median) traded volume [Me] 100 (21)
Average (median) number of trades 109 (24)
Average (median) number of streams 5.4 (5)
Average (median) AOIS [bp $] 0.3796 (0.3373)
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23
10M
20M
30M
40M
50M
60M
70M
80M
90M
100M
110M
120M
130M
140M
150M
t
r
a
d
e
d
 v
o
lu
m
e
hour
Figure 1. Hourly average volume traded per day. The unit of traded volume is e. The darker bars present
data from 6:00–16:00, constituting 92% of the traded volume.
Altogether, there are 190 streams provided by 42 LPs. This means that one LP discloses on
average 4.5 streams, highlighting the point discussed in Section 2 that an LP provides different
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streams for different (subsets of) customers. Over all the streams, there were over 300 million quote
updates during the sample period. We sample the quote data for each stream each minute to obtain
the available bid and ask prices and respective quantities. From these, for every observation time
point and stream, we determine the highest bid price and lowest ask price. Then we subtract the
best bid prices from the best ask prices to get the time series of quoted spread for the streams.
We multiply the absolute spread values by 10,000 to have basis points as units. From these, we
calculate average quoted spreads (AQSs) for each stream. Some streams are not quoting actively
during our sample period, and hence we restrict our analysis to streams for which we have at least
95% of the minute-by-minute observations, yielding a sample of 165 streams. Each of these streams
has, on average, 89 trades with a total traded volume of e 68 million, and over 1.5 million quote
updates, with median AQS of 0.8656.
In the final sample, we have 105 traders with at least one trade. The average traded volume
(number of trades) per trader over the period of 10 trading days is just over e 100 million (109),
while the median is around 21 million (24). We approximate the set of streams that a trader
observes with the set of streams that the trader trades with; hence, in reality, the number of
observed streams may be higher, as there may be streams from which a trader receives quotes, but
with which he/she does not trade during our sample period. On average, a trader trades with 5.4
streams, while the minimum is 1 and the maximum is 23. Given the set of streams that an investor
observes, we determine the best bid and ask prices to form the time series of the observed inside
spread. We get the average observed inside spread (AOIS) as the average of this time series and
see that a trader’s average (median) AOIS is 0.3796 bp (0.3373).
4. Optimization of the combination of liquidity streams
Given a number of streams in a trader’s aggregation setting, our optimization problem is to select
the set of streams with the minimum AOIS. Formally, we can formulate our combinatorial optimiza-
tion problem as follows. We denote the set of all possible streams as M = {1, 2, ...,M}, where M ,
the total number of streams, equals 165. Additionally, let {b(s)1 , b(s)2 , ..., b(s)T } be the time series of the
minute-by-minute observations of the highest bid prices and, correspondingly, {a(s)1 , a(s)2 , ..., a(s)T }
for the lowest ask prices for stream s ∈M, where T = 6, 010 is the number of minute-by-minute ob-
servations per stream. Let n be the number of streams in a trader’s aggregation setting and n ⊂M
be the subset of M including n selected streams. Our problem is to find the optimal combination
of streams n∗ ⊂M that minimizes the AOIS over the set of all streams:
n∗ = arg min
n⊂M
T∑
t=1
[ min
p∈n a
(p)
t −maxq∈n b
(q)
t ]/T.
As the total number of streams is 165, calculating the AOIS for all possible combinations (i.e. to
use brute force) is not feasible: for example, in a setting of 10 streams, the number of possible
combinations is 3.12E+15. The problem is also non-linear: given two sets of streams, adding the
same stream to both sets does not improve the average inside spread by the same amount.
To solve the optimization problem, we use a genetic algorithm (GA). GA is a metaheuristic
optimization method inspired by natural selection (see e.g. Holland 1992, Contreras-Bolton and
Parada 2015).1 The basic idea is to
(i) create a population of possible solutions (i.e. multiple sets of n streams)
(ii) calculate fitness values (i.e. AOISs) for the solutions in the population
1GA was also adapted in previous research in the field of economics and finance; see e.g. Schlottmann and Seese (2004),
Acosta-Gonza´lez et al. (2012), Chen (2013).
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(iii) generate randomly the next population of possible solutions through crossover and mutation
while guaranteeing that the best solutions found so far (sets of streams with lowest AOISs)
move to the next population
(iv) continue steps (ii)–(iii) until some predefined stopping criteria are met, for example, if the
average improvement in best fitness value is less than a given limit or a maximum number
of generations is reached
For each aggregator set-up with number of streams n = {2, 3, . . . , 15}, we run GA 10 times and
select the best solution.1 As GA is a metaheuristic method, there is no guarantee that we will find
the global optimum; instead, we find a sufficiently good solution. To be exact, the actual solution
(global optima) is not worse than the optimized AOIS for a given number of streams. However,
for the purposes of this analysis, this is sufficient, as the analysis in the following Section 5 shows
that the AOISs which we find are still substantially lower than what the traders observe and, when
n increases, we get relatively close to the minimum AOIS over all 165 streams in the aggregator.
Additionally, for cases where n ≤ 5, we calculate the true optima with brute force and find that
the genetic algorithm works quite well: when we repeat the GA 10 times for each n = 2, 3, 4, 5, the
best solution over the 10 runs is always the global optima.
5. Optimal and observed inside spreads
Figure 2 shows the optimal inside spread as a function of the number of streams in an aggregator
set-up, n. In addition, the figure depicts the variation of AOISs over the traders. We see that
increasing the number of streams typically reduces the inside spread, although there is variation
among investors and sometimes a trader observing a smaller number of streams observes a better
spread than another trader with more streams. Interestingly, on average, a trader with four or five
streams obtains a relatively tight spread compared to other traders having more streams. Therefore,
increasing the number of streams to more than five yields a quite marginal benefit, if any. We also
see that for all n, the optimal (minimum) average inside spreads is clearly lower than the AOISs
that traders observe. In general, most of the traders would cut their observed spread by less than
half given that they could obtain the optimal combination of streams. In fact, with the optimal
combination of just four streams, an investor could observe a lower inside spread than any trader
observes currently with any number of streams.
In general, the shape of the curve formed by the optimal spread points resembles the theoretical
prediction of Oomen (2017a) (see Figure 2. Panel A in Oomen 2017a, we also get back to this
in Section 6). The model proposed by Oomen (2017a) also suggests that in an aggregator, the
expected observed inside spread may become negative as n increases. One reason why negative
spreads may arise quite naturally is that LPs cannot observe the prices streamed by other LPs.
In the case of our data, the optimal average inside spread is negative when n is larger or equal to
seven. The minimum spread over all 165 streams is –0.0968 bp. A negative observed inside spread
would introduce an arbitrage opportunity with firm quotes, but the last look practice, which makes
the quoted prices indicative, may prevent an investor from exploiting the arbitrage (see also Oomen
2017a,b, Cartea et al. 2018).2 Moreover, even if the traders can choose the LPs, they cannot choose
the streams disclosed by the LPs; therefore, it may not be possible in practice to select this optimal
combination of liquidity streams in the aggregator.
1We do not run the analysis for n > 15 because there is only one customer observing more than 15 streams. For more details
on parameter specifications, see Appendix A.
2Gould et al. (2017) study FX market liquidity in quasi-centralized limit order books and identify periods with negative global
spread. In a sense, this corresponds to negative inside spread in our aggregator setting when combining quotes from all streams.
Akram et al. (2008) study arbitrage opportunities in FX markets and document short-lived, economically significant deviations
from the covered interest rate parity. Foucault et al. (2017) study short-lived toxic arbitrage opportunities, where traders take
advantage of stale quotes. They show with FX market data that with more frequent toxic arbitrage opportunities and faster
responses by trades to these opportunities, liquidity is affected negatively.
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Additionally, we can see from Figure 2 that there is considerable variation in AOIS values between
different investors with the same n. In many cases, for example, when the number of streams is 1,
2, 4, or 7, the AOIS of the trader with the lowest value is less than half that of the one with the
highest value. This means that even though two traders would have the same number of streams
in their aggregator setting, the inside spreads that they observe can differ quite markedly.
Table 3 presents the differences in average trader’s AOIS with the optimal inside spreads for
different values of n. The half-difference in spread indicates the amount saved in trading costs per
one e traded when trading with the optimal spread instead of AOIS. We see that depending on
n, the (theoretical) saved amount is between $0.1329 bp and $0.1801 bp $ per one e traded. The
table also shows that the (theoretical) amount that an average trader would save in transaction
costs per year varies from around $800 to over $1 million.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
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Figure 2. Optimal and observed inside spreads. n gives the number of streams in the aggregator setting and
the red circles give the optimal inside spreads. The box plot gives the median, maximum and minimum average
observed inside spread (AOIS) values with the 25th and 75th percentiles for investors with given numbers of streams.
Values for inside spread are depicted in basis points (bp). The pink line gives the inside spread over all 165 streams.
In addition, there is one investor with 23 observed streams, and his/her AOIS is 0.2058 bp (omitted in the figure).
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6. Calibration to model for expected observed spread
As stated in Section 5, the shape of the curve formed by the optimal spread points in Figure 2
resembles the curve for expected observed spread in (Oomen 2017a, Figure 2. Panel A). To further
test Oomen’s model against our empirical data, we calibrate his model to our data in a special case
where LPs are assumed to be homogeneous (see Oomen 2017a, Proposition 1). Oomen (2017a)
assumes that the true (logarithmic) price process follows a random walk, and the mid-price of
a stream1 i deviates from the true price by m
(i)
t . Then m
(i)
t follows an AR(1) process (without
a constant), and the error term of that process is depicted with η
(i)
t ∼ i.i.d. N (0, (1 − β2)ω2),
where 0 ≤ β < 1 is the autocorrelation coefficient of the AR(1) process, and ρi,j = corr(η(i)t , η(j)t ).
According to Proposition 1 by Oomen (2017a), for a panel of n homogeneous streams quoting a
spread of s, the expected observed spread in the aggregator is
S = s− 2ω
√
1− ρψn, (1)
where ψn = E (maxi{ui}ni=1) for ui ∼ i.i.d. N (0, 1) (Eq 5 in Oomen 2017a). To sum up, the
parameters of the model to be calibrated are s, s > 0 (spread of individual stream), ω (’dispersion’)
and ρ,−1 ≤ ρ ≤ 1 (correlation between the error terms of two streams). The form of Eq 1 (Eq 5 in
Oomen 2017a) prevents us from estimating ω and ρ without fixing one of them because otherwise,
an increase in value of ρ can be counterbalanced with an increase of ω, and vice versa, and thus
there would be an arbitrary number of ρ and ω pair combinations that lead to the same fit.
We calibrate the model by minimizing the mean squared error between model-implied values of
S (Eq 1) and the average AOIS stemming from the data. In particular, we use average AOIS values
over actual traders given the number of streams in the aggregator setting to calibrate the model for
the data. Since there are only a few stray traders observing more than 10 streams, we use values of
n up to 10. Additionally, we use several different fixed values for both ρ and ω, corresponding to
low and high correlation and dispersion values. Table 4 shows the parameter estimates and Figure
3 plots the fitted model with the lowest mean squared error and data points (calibrated models
(A)–(D) and (H)–(J) in Table 4 all lead to the same fitted values up to the precision of six decimal
points).
Figure 3 shows that the mapping based on Proposition 1 in (Oomen 2017a) is reasonable: the
model fits well when we calibrate s and ω (or ρ) freely. Table 4 shows that panels (A)–(D) and (H)–
(J) provide the best fit (lowest MSE), and regardless of the fixed value for ρ or ω, the parameter
estimate for inside spread is 0.587. This is quite close to the median spread that the streams quote
in the aggregator, which is 0.866 (see Table 2). When ρ (ω) increases, the value of ω (ρ) increases
as well. Panels (F) and (G) show that fixing the value of ω at a very low value leads to a poor
model fit, since ρ (correlation) is naturally limited to –1, and hence it cannot counterbalance values
of ω lower than 0.076 (see panel (A) in Table 4). Calibrating parameters for panel (J) in Table 4
leads to numerical issues with a matrix being singular to working precision when setting ρ = 1,
and hence the fit is not as good as for panels (A)–(D) and (H)–(J).
7. Discussion and conclusion
In this paper, we study liquidity in an FX aggregator. With our unique, detailed data set, we
show that a trader with a larger number of streams typically observes a lower inside spread,
thought there is considerable variation among the traders, and in some cases traders with fewer
1We refer to ’stream’ where Oomen (2017a) refers to ’LP’, since in our aggregator, an LP may be streaming multiple liquidity
streams.
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Table 4. Calibrated parameter estimates. The table gives the estimated parameter values. The fixed values
are depicted with italics: we calibrate the model using several values for correlation ρ and ω, i.e. ’dispersion’.
p-values are reported in parentheses (). MSE gives the calibrated model’s mean squared error.
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E)
Fixed ρ: –1 –0.5 0 0.5 1
s 0.587 0.587 0.587 0.587 0.357
(1.02E–13) (1.02E–13) (1.02E–13) (1.02E–13) (0.500)
ω 0.076 8.79E-02 0.108 1.52E-01 0.549
(1.27E–10) (1.27E–10) (1.27E–10) (1.27E–10) (0.500)
MSE 2.51E–04 2.51E–04 2.51E–04 2.51E–04 9.94E–03
(F) (G) (H) (I) (J)
Fixed ω: 0.01 0.05 0.1 0.35 0.5
s 0.387 0.508 0.587 0.587 0.587
(3.29E–09) (4.46E–13) (1.02E–13) (1.02E–13) (1.02E–13)
ρ –1.000 –1.000 –0.158 0.905 0.954
(1.000) (1.000) (0.984) (4.44E-16) (0.00E+00)
MSE 7.56E–03 1.39E–03 2.51E–04 2.51E–04 2.51E–04
streams still observe better spreads than traders with more streams. On average, traders obtain
a relatively tight spread already with four or five streams, and traders with more streams obtain
a marginal benefit only, if any. Additionally, we show that if traders could choose the optimal
combination of streams, most of them could cut their observed spread by more than half while
maintaining the same number of liquidity streams. Moreover, with seven or more streams, the
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
A
O
I
S
n
Figure 3. Calibrated model fit. n gives the number of streams in the aggregator setting and the red crosses give
the average inside spreads that a trader observes with n streams in his/her aggregator setting. The grey line depicts
the calibrated model fit. The parameter values of the model correspond to models (A)–(D) and (H)–(J) in Table 4,
which all lead to the same fitted values for up to 6 decimal points. Values for inside spread are depicted in basis
points (bp).
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optimal combination leads to negative average spreads. We also calibrate the model (Proposition
1) proposed by Oomen (2017a) to our empirical data and find that though we study the model
under a simplistic assumption of homogeneous liquidity streams, the model can be fitted to the
real world data accurately and be used to describe the markets.
For completeness, it should be mentioned that the analysis only captures part of the ’real world’.
The aggregator (with DS protocol) is in the market evolution between the classical OTC with the
electronic version of a platform-based RFQ trading model and CLOBs. Therefore, a trader sees a
constant stream of quotes, but in a disclosed fashion, such as only the streamed quotes that he/she
is receiving from his/her LPs. Respectively, the LP quotes the stream for this particular trader or a
subset of traders and cannot see streamed prices disclosed by other LPs. Moreover, because of the
OTC nature of the trading, a trader may only have a trading relationship with a limited number
of LPs. Furthermore, even if a trader can select an LP, it is the LP that selects the streams that
are observable to the trader.
Additionally, the LP’s quoting behaviour usually depends on multiple factors, like the client’s
credit rating, trading behaviour (e.g. algo trader vs institutional investor driven by physical FX
demand) and even more soft criteria, such as the general business relationship of the LP with the
client (trader). Therefore, it is also not completely straightforward that in a totally transparent
market (e.g. CLOB trading protocol), the quoting behaviour of LPs would be exactly the same
as in a DS model (aggregator), as LPs would have to provide quotes which fit all their clients.
Moreover, unlike in an aggregator, in a CLOB, LPs would observe the quotes of the other LPs.
Therefore, this enhanced transparency of a CLOB might affect the behaviour of the LPs.
Nevertheless, this analysis provides valuable and unique insights into the trading behaviour
in the DS (aggregator) market model and the FX market as an OTC market in general. This
analysis shows that there is still significant room for improvement in optimizing the combination
of liquidity streams and in the evolution of the FX market in general. The ongoing discussion and
regulatory pressure (e.g. enhanced transparency requirements with MiFID II) may further improve
the efficiency of the market to benefit the end clients.
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Appendix A: Details on genetic algorithm set up
The genetic algorithm optimization was run using MATLAB’s ga-function with R2017b version and
using parallel computing with eight parallel workers. Table A1 presents the option values specified
for the ga-function (for other options, MATLAB’s default values were used).
The option values were tested with n = {2, 3, 4, 5}, and FunctionTolerance was set to a low
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enough value so that the algorithm found the true optimum at least with a few runs out of the 10
total runs. PopulationSize, MaxTime, EliteCount, MaxStallGenerations and MaxGenerations
were set to increase as n increases, although they increase with a lower rate than the number
of possible combinations. CrossoverFraction was set to a slightly lower value when compared
to the default value to add more randomization to the algorithm. The optimal combination of
n − 1 streams with an added random stream is seeded to the initial population for n using
InitialPopulationMatrix to ensure that the optimum found for n is not lower than for n − 1
(the spread is strictly non-decreasing when a new stream is added to the set).
Table A2 presents statistics on the optimization runs (we run the optimization algorithm 10
times for each n = {2, 3, . . . , 15}). For all runs with n < 6, and some runs with n = 6, the
algorithm converges. For larger values of n, the optimization is terminated because the time limit
is reached. For n > 9, some of the runs have a substantially smaller number of generations because
the computer momentarily slowed down (not evident in Table A2). However, the average number
of evaluations of the fitness function (i.e. how many stream combinations were evaluated during
the optimization) still increases with n.
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Table A2. Satistics on GA runs. There are 10 runs for each n. Stopping criteria equal to 1 means that the
algorithm converged (’Optimization terminated: average change in the penalty fitness value less than options.
FunctionTolerance and constraint violation are less than options. ConstraintTolerance.’) and stopping criteria equal
to 2 means that the time limit was exceeded (’Optimization terminated: time limit exceeded.’). The function count
is the number of evaluations of the fitness function.
n stopping criteria avg # generations avg function count
2 1 144 7,231
3 1 294 19,451
4 1 1,300 253,677
5 1 3,773 1,709,714
6 1 & 2 10,063 9,117,532
7 2 14,727 23,962,457
8 2 13,093 35,393,083
9 2 14,250 60,252,806
10 2 9,622 60,720,500
11 2 7,243 65,663,243
12 2 5,650 71,291,755
13 2 4,371 74,768,041
14 2 3,307 74,968,163
15 2 2,846 83,855,441
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Appendix A
This Appendix describes filtering of the company announcement data set. In addition,
Tables 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 give the lists of stocks included in Articles II and III from
Helsinki, Stockholm, and Copenhagen stock exchanges and the numbers of scheduled and
non-scheduled announcements per company in each stage of the filtering.
The following rules are used to filter the company announcements:
• Announcements that clearly contain no new information are excluded. These mostly
include announcements published in multiple languages, in which case only the first
one is involved.2
• Announcements for which there are not enough data to from the 27-day estimation
window are removed from the sample.
• To study the immediate reactions, the sample is restricted to announcements
published during trading hours, with enough data from that day to get the pre- and
post-event samples (i.e. announcement release in the middle of the trading day).
• If several announcements are published at the same second on the same stock, then
only one of them is involved and the others are excluded.
• The cases where there has been a trading halt ceasing continuous trading near the
announcement time (within the 30 or 60 minute pre- or post-window around the
announcement release) are not considered.
2For NASDAQ OMX Stockholm (Copenhagen), the announcements are commonly published both
in English and Swedish (Danish), and for NASDAQ OMX Helsinki, many companies publish the
announcements in English, Finnish, and Swedish.
91
92 Appendix A
T
able
1:
N
um
bers
ofscheduled
com
pany
announcem
ent
releases
for
H
elsinkistock
exchange.
30
m
inute
w
indow
60
m
inute
w
indow
ISIN
C
om
pany
first
release
&
new
inform
a-
tion
w
ith
27
previous
days
in
data
inside
trading
hours
sam
e
tim
e
excluded
m
iddle
of
trading
day
no
trad-
ing
halts
m
iddle
of
trading
day
no
trad-
ing
halts
FI0009000681
N
okia
12
10
8
8
7
7
7
7
SE
0000667925
TeliaSonera
32
22
3
3
2
2
1
1
FI0009005987
U
P
M
49
35
22
20
18
18
6
6
FI0009007132
Fortum
29
21
4
4
1
0
0
0
FI0009013403
K
one
30
18
17
17
17
16
16
16
FI0009000285
A
m
er
Sports
30
24
22
22
20
20
19
19
FI0009013429
C
argotec
35
21
18
18
15
14
9
9
FI0009007884
E
lisa
34
21
5
5
1
1
1
1
FI0009000459
H
uhtam
äki
27
17
1
1
1
1
1
1
FI0009005870
K
onecranes
29
19
9
9
1
1
1
1
FI0009000202
K
esko
30
21
11
11
3
3
2
2
FI0009004824
K
em
ira
28
21
3
3
3
3
1
1
FI0009007835
M
etso
32
23
21
21
21
20
9
9
FI0009902530
N
ordea
17
13
1
1
0
0
0
0
FI0009013296
N
este
26
19
3
3
2
2
1
1
FI0009005318
N
okian
R
enkaat
25
18
3
3
1
1
1
1
FI0009014377
O
rion
31
17
14
14
9
9
7
7
FI0009014575
O
utotec
20
14
1
1
1
1
0
0
FI0009003222
Pohjola
67
45
9
9
5
5
4
4
FI0009003552
R
autaruukki
31
22
4
4
4
4
1
1
FI0009003305
Sam
po
23
17
0
0
0
0
0
0
FI0009005961
Stora
E
nso
31
20
11
11
8
7
5
5
FI0009003727
W
ärtsilä
29
22
6
6
2
2
2
2
FI0009800643
Y
IT
36
26
6
6
4
4
4
4
FI0009002422
O
utokum
pu
29
20
17
17
15
14
13
13
FI0009007694
Sanom
a
23
16
11
11
3
3
0
0
FI0009000277
T
ieto
26
17
2
2
2
2
2
2
Total
811
559
232
230
166
160
113
113
Appendix A 93
T
ab
le
2:
N
um
be
rs
of
sc
he
du
le
d
co
m
pa
ny
an
no
un
ce
m
en
t
re
le
as
es
fo
r
St
oc
kh
ol
m
st
oc
k
ex
ch
an
ge
.
30
m
in
ut
e
w
in
do
w
60
m
in
ut
e
w
in
do
w
IS
IN
C
om
pa
ny
fir
st
re
-
le
as
e
&
ne
w
in
fo
w
it
h
27
pr
ev
io
us
da
ys
in
da
ta
in
si
de
tr
ad
in
g
ho
ur
s
sa
m
e
ti
m
e
ex
cl
ud
ed
m
id
dl
e
of
tr
ad
in
g
da
y
no
tr
ad
-
in
g
ha
lts
m
id
dl
e
of
tr
ad
in
g
da
y
no
tr
ad
-
in
g
ha
lts
C
H
00
12
22
17
16
A
B
B
25
17
4
4
4
4
4
4
SE
00
00
69
58
76
A
lfa
32
23
14
14
10
10
10
10
SE
00
00
25
56
48
A
ss
a
A
bl
oy
23
15
3
3
3
3
3
3
SE
00
00
10
10
32
A
tla
s
C
op
co
56
35
29
29
25
23
23
23
G
B
00
09
89
52
92
A
st
ra
Ze
ne
ca
25
16
15
15
15
15
14
13
SE
00
00
86
96
46
B
ol
id
en
26
16
14
13
12
9
6
6
SE
00
00
10
38
14
E
le
ct
ro
lu
x
44
30
3
3
1
1
1
1
SE
00
00
10
86
49
E
ri
cs
so
n
53
33
1
1
0
0
0
0
SE
00
00
20
26
24
G
et
in
ge
29
19
13
13
11
11
9
9
SE
00
00
10
62
70
H
en
ne
s
&
M
au
ri
tz
24
14
1
1
0
0
0
0
SE
00
00
10
74
19
In
ve
st
or
27
17
1
1
0
0
0
0
SE
00
00
82
58
20
Lu
nd
in
Pe
tr
ol
eu
m
28
18
1
1
0
0
0
0
SE
00
00
41
23
71
M
od
er
n
T
im
es
G
ro
up
26
17
12
12
12
12
12
12
SE
00
00
42
73
61
N
or
de
a
B
an
k
51
34
20
20
5
5
4
4
SE
00
00
66
78
91
Sa
nd
vi
k
28
18
4
4
4
4
4
4
SE
00
00
17
18
86
SC
A
26
19
12
12
9
8
8
8
SE
00
00
30
82
80
SC
A
N
IA
26
17
13
13
8
8
6
6
SE
00
00
14
88
84
SE
B
50
30
14
14
5
5
5
5
SE
00
00
16
35
94
Se
cu
ri
ta
s
28
17
1
1
0
0
0
0
SE
00
00
19
31
20
Sv
en
sk
a
H
an
de
ls
ba
nk
en
26
18
10
10
10
10
8
8
SE
00
00
11
32
50
Sk
an
sk
a
28
19
1
1
0
0
0
0
SE
00
00
10
82
27
SK
F
23
14
8
8
8
8
8
8
SE
00
00
17
11
00
SS
A
B
52
37
21
17
14
14
10
10
SE
00
00
31
03
36
Sw
ed
is
h
M
at
ch
22
14
2
2
2
2
0
0
SE
00
00
31
43
12
Te
le
2
24
16
4
4
3
3
3
3
SE
00
00
66
79
25
Te
lia
So
ne
ra
31
21
2
2
1
1
1
1
SE
00
00
11
54
46
Vo
lv
o
28
18
2
2
2
2
1
1
SE
00
00
24
24
55
Sw
ed
ba
nk
41
28
15
18
14
14
13
13
To
ta
l
90
2
59
0
24
0
23
8
17
8
17
2
15
3
15
2
94 Appendix A
T
able
3:
N
um
bers
ofscheduled
com
pany
announcem
ent
releases
for
C
openhagen
stock
exchange.
30
m
inute
w
indow
60
m
inute
w
indow
ISIN
C
om
pany
first
release
&
new
inform
a-
tion
w
ith
27
previous
days
in
data
inside
trading
hours
sam
e
tim
e
excluded
m
iddle
of
trading
day
no
trad-
ing
halts
m
iddle
of
trading
day
no
trad-
ing
halts
D
K
0060534915
N
ovo
N
ordisk
19
14
0
0
0
0
0
0
D
K
0060336014
N
ovozym
es
20
15
5
5
5
0
0
0
D
K
0060228559
T
D
C
24
19
4
4
2
1
0
0
D
K
0060477503
Topdanm
ark
17
13
12
12
12
8
8
8
D
K
0060013274
Tryg
23
18
4
4
3
1
1
1
D
K
0010268606
Vestas
W
ind
System
s
15
12
0
0
0
0
0
0
D
K
0010268440
W
illiam
D
em
ant
H
olding
24
18
9
9
9
4
4
4
D
K
0060448595
C
oloplast
26
20
13
13
10
6
6
6
D
K
0010274414
D
anske
B
ank
25
21
12
12
12
5
3
1
D
K
0010234467
FLSm
idth
16
12
10
10
10
7
7
7
D
K
0010272202
G
enm
ab
41
32
0
0
0
0
0
0
D
K
0010272632
G
N
Store
N
ord
20
17
13
13
11
7
7
7
D
K
0010307958
Jyske
B
ank
21
16
13
13
3
2
0
0
D
K
0010244508
A
P
M
oeller
M
aersk
16
12
10
10
8
5
5
5
SE
0000427361
N
ordea
B
ank
23
19
7
7
1
1
1
1
D
K
0010287234
H
Lundbeck
20
16
0
0
0
0
0
0
D
K
0010207497
D
anisco
24
19
18
18
16
11
8
8
D
K
0010287663
N
K
T
H
olding
15
12
9
9
6
5
4
3
D
K
0010311471
Sydbank
20
16
16
16
15
10
10
10
D
K
0010181676
C
arlsberg
25
20
4
4
4
3
3
3
Total
434
341
159
159
127
76
67
64
Appendix A 95
T
ab
le
4:
N
um
be
rs
of
no
n-
sc
he
du
le
d
co
m
pa
ny
an
no
un
ce
m
en
t
re
le
as
es
fo
r
H
el
sin
ki
st
oc
k
ex
ch
an
ge
.
30
m
in
ut
e
w
in
do
w
60
m
in
ut
e
w
in
do
w
IS
IN
C
om
pa
ny
fir
st
re
le
as
e
&
ne
w
in
fo
rm
a-
tio
n
w
it
h
27
pr
ev
io
us
in
si
de
tr
ad
in
g
ho
ur
s
sa
m
e
ti
m
e
ex
cl
ud
ed
m
id
dl
e
of
tr
ad
in
g
da
y
no
tr
ad
-
in
g
ha
lts
m
id
dl
e
of
tr
ad
in
g
da
y
no
tr
ad
-
in
g
ha
lts
FI
00
09
00
06
81
N
ok
ia
98
81
43
43
21
20
17
17
SE
00
00
66
79
25
Te
lia
So
ne
ra
21
5
16
0
10
2
10
2
59
59
51
51
FI
00
09
00
59
87
U
P
M
14
6
10
6
66
66
45
45
35
35
FI
00
09
00
71
32
Fo
rt
um
12
1
86
50
50
29
29
25
25
FI
00
09
01
34
03
K
on
e
94
56
41
41
29
29
28
28
FI
00
09
00
02
85
A
m
er
Sp
or
ts
11
8
89
59
59
34
34
31
31
FI
00
09
01
34
29
C
ar
go
te
c
14
7
99
56
56
37
37
35
35
FI
00
09
00
78
84
E
lis
a
10
5
70
40
40
27
27
23
23
FI
00
09
00
04
59
H
uh
ta
m
äk
i
86
58
21
21
13
13
11
11
FI
00
09
00
58
70
K
on
ec
ra
ne
s
13
7
10
8
94
94
59
59
47
47
FI
00
09
00
02
02
K
es
ko
10
3
72
43
43
29
29
22
22
FI
00
09
00
48
24
K
em
ir
a
84
58
33
33
25
25
22
22
FI
00
09
00
78
35
M
et
so
23
7
18
9
14
6
14
6
96
96
88
88
FI
00
09
90
25
30
N
or
de
a
17
5
10
6
95
71
47
47
17
17
FI
00
09
01
32
96
N
es
te
75
51
34
34
26
26
24
24
FI
00
09
00
53
18
N
ok
ia
n
R
en
ka
at
76
50
37
37
19
19
16
16
FI
00
09
01
43
77
O
ri
on
13
0
57
29
29
12
12
9
9
FI
00
09
01
45
75
O
ut
ot
ec
59
38
22
22
15
14
13
13
FI
00
09
00
32
22
Po
hj
ol
a
22
2
14
1
10
5
10
5
55
55
44
44
FI
00
09
00
35
52
R
au
ta
ru
uk
ki
14
6
11
7
79
79
51
51
39
39
FI
00
09
00
33
05
Sa
m
po
11
2
78
52
52
31
30
19
19
FI
00
09
00
59
61
St
or
a
E
ns
o
26
7
18
0
10
5
10
5
62
62
56
56
FI
00
09
00
37
27
W
är
ts
ilä
83
55
28
28
15
15
14
14
FI
00
09
80
06
43
Y
IT
12
2
94
64
64
40
39
34
34
FI
00
09
00
24
22
O
ut
ok
um
pu
96
57
39
39
27
27
19
19
FI
00
09
00
76
94
Sa
no
m
a
99
61
44
44
23
23
20
20
FI
00
09
00
02
77
T
ie
to
18
6
11
4
74
74
58
58
47
47
To
ta
l
3,
53
9
2,
43
1
1,
60
1
1,
57
7
98
4
98
0
80
6
80
6
96 Appendix A
T
able
5:
N
um
bers
ofnon-scheduled
com
pany
announcem
ent
releases
for
Stockholm
stock
exchange.
30
m
inute
w
indow
60
m
inute
w
indow
ISIN
C
om
pany
first
re-
lease
&
new
info
w
ith
27
previous
days
in
data
inside
trading
hours
sam
e
tim
e
excluded
m
iddle
of
trading
day
no
trad-
ing
halts
m
iddle
of
trading
day
no
trad-
ing
halts
C
H
0012221716
A
B
B
239
150
126
126
90
90
83
83
SE
0000695876
A
lfa
131
92
35
35
20
20
18
18
SE
0000255648
A
ssa
A
bloy
59
40
20
20
13
13
10
10
SE
0000101032
A
tlas
C
opco
187
121
72
72
39
38
26
26
G
B
0009895292
A
stra
Zeneca
324
226
123
123
72
72
58
58
SE
0000869646
B
oliden
86
52
38
38
27
27
24
24
SE
0000103814
E
lectrolux
42
25
17
17
10
10
8
8
SE
0000108649
E
ricsson
449
242
181
176
62
61
45
45
SE
0000202624
G
etinge
51
40
22
22
14
14
11
11
SE
0000106270
H
ennes
&
M
auritz
73
54
7
7
1
1
1
1
SE
0000107419
Investor
59
46
21
21
9
9
5
5
SE
0000825820
Lundin
Petroleum
208
152
16
16
10
10
7
7
SE
0000412371
M
odern
T
im
es
G
roup
150
90
39
39
25
25
22
22
SE
0000427361
N
ordea
B
ank
152
91
80
78
49
49
33
33
SE
0000667891
Sandvik
74
53
34
34
17
17
9
9
SE
0000171886
SC
A
99
77
67
66
39
39
30
30
SE
0000308280
SC
A
N
IA
216
151
123
123
77
77
66
66
SE
0000148884
SE
B
239
142
121
120
57
57
35
34
SE
0000163594
Securitas
96
68
42
42
18
18
14
14
SE
0000193120
Svenska
H
andelsbanken
369
323
298
298
153
153
123
123
SE
0000113250
Skanska
435
286
97
97
57
57
43
43
SE
0000108227
SK
F
130
79
63
63
46
46
36
36
SE
0000171100
SSA
B
55
46
29
29
15
12
11
11
SE
0000310336
Sw
edish
M
atch
31
17
9
9
6
6
4
4
SE
0000314312
Tele2
146
75
34
34
21
21
15
15
SE
0000667925
TeliaSonera
244
158
99
99
55
54
46
46
SE
0000115446
Volvo
417
275
205
205
115
115
88
88
SE
0000242455
Sw
edbank
430
307
171
172
94
94
78
78
Total
5,191
3,478
2,189
2,181
1,211
1,205
949
948
Appendix A 97
T
ab
le
6:
N
um
be
rs
of
no
n-
sc
he
du
le
d
co
m
pa
ny
an
no
un
ce
m
en
t
re
le
as
es
fo
r
C
op
en
ha
ge
n
st
oc
k
ex
ch
an
ge
.
30
m
in
ut
e
w
in
do
w
60
m
in
ut
e
w
in
do
w
IS
IN
C
om
pa
ny
fir
st
re
le
as
e
&
ne
w
in
fo
rm
a-
tio
n
w
it
h
27
pr
ev
io
us
da
ys
in
da
ta
in
si
de
tr
ad
in
g
ho
ur
s
sa
m
e
ti
m
e
ex
cl
ud
ed
m
id
dl
e
of
tr
ad
in
g
da
y
no
tr
ad
-
in
g
ha
lts
m
id
dl
e
of
tr
ad
in
g
da
y
no
tr
ad
-
in
g
ha
lts
D
K
00
60
53
49
15
N
ov
o
N
or
di
sk
41
35
18
18
9
9
8
8
D
K
00
60
33
60
14
N
ov
oz
ym
es
21
17
12
12
10
7
4
3
D
K
00
60
22
85
59
T
D
C
11
3
70
43
43
27
19
17
17
D
K
00
60
47
75
03
To
pd
an
m
ar
k
36
25
20
20
14
13
10
10
D
K
00
60
01
32
74
Tr
yg
40
28
18
18
14
13
10
10
D
K
00
10
26
86
06
Ve
st
as
W
in
d
Sy
st
em
s
17
0
13
1
80
80
49
42
30
30
D
K
00
10
26
84
40
W
ill
ia
m
D
em
an
t
H
ol
di
ng
22
16
14
14
6
5
4
4
D
K
00
60
44
85
95
C
ol
op
la
st
80
75
61
61
38
33
27
27
D
K
00
10
27
44
14
D
an
sk
e
B
an
k
10
9
88
74
74
36
35
23
23
D
K
00
10
23
44
67
FL
Sm
id
th
14
6
11
6
86
86
50
36
32
32
D
K
00
10
27
22
02
G
en
m
ab
23
4
19
5
87
87
47
36
30
30
D
K
00
10
27
26
32
G
N
St
or
e
N
or
d
62
43
33
33
18
11
11
11
D
K
00
10
30
79
58
Jy
sk
e
B
an
k
43
38
32
32
20
15
11
11
D
K
00
10
24
45
08
A
P
M
oe
lle
r
M
ae
rs
k
38
28
20
20
14
14
11
11
SE
00
00
42
73
61
N
or
de
a
B
an
k
60
47
39
39
30
30
21
21
D
K
00
10
28
72
34
H
Lu
nd
be
ck
15
0
12
3
49
49
30
24
19
19
D
K
00
10
20
74
97
D
an
is
co
40
35
24
24
16
14
13
13
D
K
00
10
28
76
63
N
K
T
H
ol
di
ng
59
38
35
35
24
19
14
14
D
K
00
10
31
14
71
Sy
db
an
k
34
28
27
27
24
19
15
14
D
K
00
10
18
16
76
C
ar
ls
be
rg
13
0
11
7
77
77
52
50
41
40
To
ta
l
1,
62
8
1,
29
3
84
9
84
9
52
8
44
4
35
1
34
8

Appendix B
Online appendix of Article I:
Siikanen M., Baltakys, K., Kanniainen, J., Vatrapu, R., Mukkamala, R., Hussain, A.
“Facebook drives behavior of passive households in stock markets”, Finance Research
Letters.
Available at: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.frl.2018.03.020
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Ravi Vatrapu2,3, Raghava Mukkamala2 ,3, and Abid Hussain2  
1 DARE Business Data Research Group, Laboratory of Industrial and Information Management,  
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3 Westerdals Oslo School of Arts, Communication and Technology, Norway 
Online Appendix: Complete regression tables 
For descriptions of the variables and regression equations, see Section 3. Framework of 
empirical analysis in the paper 
Investor sectors 
Nonfinancial companies 
1. Companies, posts 
 
Fixed effects coefficients (95% CIs): 
    Name                   Estimate     SE           tStat       DF     pValue         Lower         Upper     
    Intercept               -0.34255     0.055783     -6.1408    318     2.4477e-09       -0.4523      -0.2328 
    FB_posts                0.010967    0.0015177       7.226    318     3.7113e-12     0.0079811     0.013953 
    scD(t-1)                  1.8742     0.057405      32.649    318    1.4251e-103        1.7613       1.9871 
    NEWS(T)                 -0.10647     0.016281     -6.5397    318     2.4586e-10      -0.13851    -0.074441 
    Ret(t)                   -5.5532      0.10637     -52.207    318    5.0366e-158       -5.7624      -5.3439 
    Ret(t-1)                 0.17885      0.13126      1.3626    318        0.17396     -0.079387      0.43709 
    Y(2011)                 -0.30798     0.030747     -10.017    318     1.0467e-20      -0.36847     -0.24749 
    Y(2012)                 -0.32176     0.031833     -10.108    318     5.1894e-21      -0.38439     -0.25913 
    Y(2013)                 -0.73415     0.036955     -19.866    318     1.1378e-57      -0.80686     -0.66144 
    Y(2014)                 -0.64433      0.03684      -17.49    318     1.8486e-48      -0.71681     -0.57185 
    Y(2015)                 -0.61576     0.038191     -16.123    318     3.6959e-43      -0.69089     -0.54062 
    Y(2016)                -0.025703     0.032439    -0.79233    318        0.42876     -0.089525      0.03812 
    M(Feb)                   0.18572     0.034169      5.4354    318     1.0905e-07       0.11849      0.25294 
    M(Mar)                   0.13361     0.036486       3.662    318     0.00029294      0.061829       0.2054 
    M(Apr)                   0.27877     0.036435      7.6511    318     2.3957e-13       0.20709      0.35046 
    M(May)                  -0.15644     0.035718     -4.3798    318     1.6145e-05      -0.22671    -0.086166 
    M(Jun)                   0.15413     0.036492      4.2237    318     3.1417e-05      0.082336      0.22593 
    M(Jul)                   0.12814     0.036428      3.5177    318     0.00049872      0.056472      0.19981 
    M(Aug)                 -0.083501     0.034778      -2.401    318       0.016925      -0.15192    -0.015077 
    M(Sep)                 -0.079554     0.035298     -2.2538    318       0.024892        -0.149    -0.010106 
    M(Oct)                   0.22586     0.033608      6.7204    318      8.388e-11       0.15974      0.29198 
    M(Nov)                  0.065511     0.034227       1.914    318       0.056512    -0.0018281      0.13285 
    M(Dec)                  -0.14215     0.034438     -4.1277    318     4.6851e-05      -0.20991    -0.074397 
 
 
2. Companies, comments 
 
Fixed effects coefficients (95% CIs): 
    Name                      Estimate      SE            tStat      DF     pValue         Lower          Upper      
    Intercept                   -0.30743       0.05575    -5.5144    318      7.253e-08       -0.41711      -0.19774 
    FB_comments               5.5534e-06    3.3498e-06     1.6578    318       0.098342    -1.0373e-06    1.2144e-05 
    scD(t-1)                      1.9194      0.057063     33.636    318    9.1555e-107         1.8071        2.0317 
    NEWS(T)                     -0.11705      0.016207    -7.2219    318     3.8087e-12       -0.14893     -0.085159 
    Ret(t)                       -5.5641       0.10647    -52.259    318    3.7858e-158        -5.7735       -5.3546 
    Ret(t-1)                     0.31624       0.12987      2.435    318       0.015441       0.060722       0.57176 
    Y(2011)                     -0.28513      0.030771     -9.266    318     2.9999e-18       -0.34567      -0.22459 
    Y(2012)                     -0.27476      0.032301    -8.5065    318      7.135e-16       -0.33831      -0.21122 
    Y(2013)                     -0.67357      0.036362    -18.524    318     1.7792e-52       -0.74511      -0.60203 
                                                          
* Corresponding author, milla.siikanen@tut.fi  
    Y(2014)                     -0.56256      0.034976    -16.084    318     5.2165e-43       -0.63137      -0.49374 
    Y(2015)                      -0.6157      0.038325    -16.065    318     6.1832e-43        -0.6911      -0.54029 
    Y(2016)                     0.018798      0.032304     0.5819    318        0.56105      -0.044759      0.082355 
    M(Feb)                       0.13989      0.033566     4.1677    318     3.9711e-05       0.073851       0.20593 
    M(Mar)                        0.1065      0.036373      2.928    318      0.0036579       0.034937       0.17806 
    M(Apr)                       0.23245      0.036001     6.4568    318     3.9981e-10        0.16162       0.30328 
    M(May)                      -0.17939      0.035568    -5.0436    318     7.6917e-07       -0.24937      -0.10941 
    M(Jun)                       0.13576      0.036441     3.7255    318     0.00023063       0.064064       0.20746 
    M(Jul)                       0.12108      0.036377     3.3285    318     0.00097549       0.049512       0.19265 
    M(Aug)                     -0.095455        0.0347    -2.7509    318      0.0062838       -0.16372     -0.027185 
    M(Sep)                     -0.083545      0.035273    -2.3685    318       0.018458       -0.15294     -0.014146 
    M(Oct)                        0.2267      0.033603     6.7466    318     7.1619e-11        0.16059       0.29281 
    M(Nov)                      0.071577      0.034108     2.0985    318       0.036647      0.0044706       0.13868 
    M(Dec)                      -0.14686      0.034319    -4.2791    318     2.4857e-05       -0.21438     -0.079335 
 
 
3. Companies, likes 
 
Fixed effects coefficients (95% CIs): 
    Name                   Estimate     SE            tStat      DF     pValue         Lower         Upper      
    Intercept               -0.28819      0.055549    -5.1881    318     3.7924e-07      -0.39748       -0.1789 
    FB_likes               7.606e-07    2.7732e-07     2.7427    318      0.0064393    2.1499e-07    1.3062e-06 
    scD(t-1)                  1.9119      0.057135     33.463    318     3.289e-106        1.7995        2.0243 
    NEWS(T)                 -0.11035      0.016403    -6.7272    318     8.0522e-11      -0.14262     -0.078074 
    Ret(t)                   -5.5392       0.10702    -51.761    318    5.8002e-157       -5.7498       -5.3287 
    Ret(t-1)                 0.30788       0.12997     2.3688    318       0.018442      0.052166       0.56359 
    Y(2011)                 -0.28845      0.030686    -9.4001    318     1.1111e-18      -0.34882      -0.22807 
    Y(2012)                 -0.30968      0.035972    -8.6088    318     3.4696e-16      -0.38045       -0.2389 
    Y(2013)                 -0.73109       0.04381    -16.688    318     2.4001e-45      -0.81728      -0.64489 
    Y(2014)                 -0.61224      0.039751    -15.402    318     2.2342e-40      -0.69045      -0.53404 
    Y(2015)                 -0.63232      0.038399    -16.467    318     1.7183e-44      -0.70787      -0.55677 
    Y(2016)                0.0041003      0.032173    0.12745    318        0.89867     -0.059198      0.067399 
    M(Feb)                   0.13855      0.033481     4.1383    318     4.4855e-05      0.072681       0.20442 
    M(Mar)                   0.10029      0.036225     2.7687    318      0.0059587      0.029024       0.17157 
    M(Apr)                   0.23194      0.035749      6.488    318       3.33e-10        0.1616       0.30227 
    M(May)                  -0.18324      0.035476    -5.1651    318      4.248e-07      -0.25303      -0.11344 
    M(Jun)                   0.13145       0.03636     3.6153    318     0.00034863      0.059917       0.20299 
    M(Jul)                   0.10745      0.036616     2.9344    318       0.003585      0.035406       0.17949 
    M(Aug)                  -0.10812         0.035     -3.089    318      0.0021853      -0.17698     -0.039256 
    M(Sep)                 -0.093253      0.035574    -2.6214    318      0.0091787      -0.16324     -0.023263 
    M(Oct)                   0.21122      0.034196     6.1766    318     1.9995e-09       0.14394        0.2785 
    M(Nov)                  0.063598      0.034218     1.8586    318       0.064005    -0.0037239       0.13092 
    M(Dec)                  -0.15842      0.034489    -4.5934    318     6.2939e-06      -0.22628     -0.090566 
 
 
4. Companies, shares 
 
Fixed effects coefficients (95% CIs): 
    Name                     Estimate     SE            tStat       DF     pValue         Lower          Upper      
    Intercept                 -0.29924      0.055651     -5.3771    318     1.4686e-07       -0.40873      -0.18975 
    FB_shares                -6.4e-07    2.2416e-06    -0.28551    318        0.77544    -5.0502e-06    3.7702e-06 
    scD(t-1)                    1.9216      0.057164      33.615    318    1.0717e-106         1.8091         2.034 
    NEWS(T)                   -0.11814      0.016425     -7.1925    318      4.584e-12       -0.15045     -0.085823 
    Ret(t)                     -5.5749        0.1073     -51.957    318    1.9808e-157         -5.786       -5.3638 
    Ret(t-1)                   0.31521       0.12987      2.4271    318       0.015774       0.059697       0.57072 
    Y(2011)                   -0.27668      0.030626     -9.0342    318     1.6401e-17       -0.33693      -0.21642 
    Y(2012)                   -0.25257      0.035525     -7.1097    318     7.7103e-12       -0.32247      -0.18268 
    Y(2013)                   -0.65575      0.039594     -16.562    318     7.3876e-45       -0.73365      -0.57785 
    Y(2014)                   -0.55774      0.036032     -15.479    318     1.1299e-40       -0.62863      -0.48684 
    Y(2015)                   -0.61977      0.038476     -16.108    318     4.2226e-43       -0.69546      -0.54407 
    Y(2016)                   0.012991       0.03221     0.40332    318        0.68698       -0.05038      0.076362 
    M(Feb)                     0.13545      0.033473      4.0466    318     6.5306e-05       0.069596       0.20131 
    M(Mar)                     0.10118      0.036242      2.7918    318       0.005558       0.029878       0.17249 
    M(Apr)                      0.2233      0.035751      6.2459    318     1.3495e-09        0.15296       0.29364 
    M(May)                     -0.1834        0.0355     -5.1661    318     4.2267e-07       -0.25325      -0.11355 
    M(Jun)                      0.1317      0.036376      3.6206    318     0.00034191       0.060134       0.20327 
    M(Jul)                     0.11993      0.036404      3.2943    318      0.0010979       0.048303       0.19155 
    M(Aug)                   -0.094141      0.035099     -2.6821    318      0.0076977        -0.1632     -0.025085 
    M(Sep)                   -0.079099      0.035439      -2.232    318       0.026313       -0.14882    -0.0093743 
    M(Oct)                     0.23129      0.034139       6.775    318     6.0335e-11        0.16413       0.29846 
    M(Nov)                    0.071537      0.034159      2.0942    318       0.037031      0.0043306       0.13874 
    M(Dec)                    -0.14772      0.034442     -4.2889    318     2.3848e-05       -0.21548     -0.079954 
 
 
Financial and insurance institutions 
5. Financial, posts 
 
Fixed effects coefficients (95% CIs): 
    Name                   Estimate     SE           tStat       DF     pValue        Lower         Upper      
    Intercept               -0.27359      0.14378     -1.9028    318       0.05797      -0.55647     0.0092961 
    FB_posts               0.0059153    0.0044514      1.3289    318       0.18485    -0.0028426      0.014673 
    scD(t-1)                  1.4857      0.14501      10.246    318    1.7822e-21        1.2004         1.771 
    NEWS(T)                 -0.10078     0.046347     -2.1744    318       0.03041      -0.19196    -0.0095925 
    Ret(t)                    -1.741      0.32126     -5.4192    318    1.1845e-07        -2.373       -1.1089 
    Ret(t-1)                  -1.014      0.34216     -2.9636    318     0.0032702       -1.6872      -0.34084 
    Y(2011)                 -0.26161     0.090425     -2.8931    318      0.004078      -0.43952     -0.083701 
    Y(2012)                 -0.37656     0.094684      -3.977    318    8.6461e-05      -0.56284      -0.19027 
    Y(2013)                 -0.63504      0.10044     -6.3226    318    8.7001e-10      -0.83265      -0.43743 
    Y(2014)                 -0.45838     0.098697     -4.6443    318    5.0016e-06      -0.65256       -0.2642 
    Y(2015)                 -0.37838     0.096714     -3.9123    318    0.00011182      -0.56866       -0.1881 
    Y(2016)                -0.086654     0.096335    -0.89951    318       0.36906      -0.27619       0.10288 
    M(Feb)                  0.040755       0.1021     0.39918    318       0.69003      -0.16012       0.24163 
    M(Mar)                 -0.021464      0.10422    -0.20594    318       0.83697      -0.22651       0.18358 
    M(Apr)                   0.27561      0.10545      2.6137    318     0.0093828      0.068146       0.48308 
    M(May)                 -0.084239      0.10172    -0.82814    318       0.40821      -0.28437       0.11589 
    M(Jun)                  -0.11166      0.10319     -1.0821    318       0.28001      -0.31467      0.091351 
    M(Jul)                  0.085172      0.10749     0.79238    318       0.42873      -0.12631       0.29665 
    M(Aug)                  -0.14365      0.10012     -1.4347    318       0.15235      -0.34063       0.05334 
    M(Sep)                  -0.22464     0.098681     -2.2764    318      0.023486      -0.41879     -0.030488 
    M(Oct)                   0.20171     0.098066      2.0568    318      0.040516     0.0087666       0.39465 
    M(Nov)                   -0.0461     0.099805     -0.4619    318       0.64447      -0.24246       0.15026 
    M(Dec)                 0.0050582      0.10184    0.049668    318       0.96042      -0.19531       0.20542 
 
6. Financial, comments 
 
Fixed effects coefficients (95% CIs): 
    Name                      Estimate      SE            tStat       DF     pValue        Lower          Upper      
    Intercept                   -0.25559       0.14224     -1.7969    318      0.073298       -0.53543      0.024257 
    FB_comments               1.2522e-05    9.6864e-06      1.2927    318       0.19705    -6.5359e-06    3.1579e-05 
    scD(t-1)                      1.4851       0.14514      10.232    318    1.9797e-21         1.1995        1.7706 
    NEWS(T)                     -0.10288      0.046279      -2.223    318      0.026917       -0.19393     -0.011828 
    Ret(t)                       -1.7315        0.3215     -5.3857    318    1.4056e-07         -2.364        -1.099 
    Ret(t-1)                    -0.96583       0.34042     -2.8371    318     0.0048441        -1.6356      -0.29606 
    Y(2011)                      -0.2659      0.090877     -2.9259    318     0.0036817        -0.4447     -0.087102 
    Y(2012)                      -0.3836      0.096472     -3.9763    318    8.6685e-05       -0.57341       -0.1938 
    Y(2013)                     -0.63089      0.099859     -6.3178    318    8.9449e-10       -0.82735      -0.43442 
    Y(2014)                     -0.42411      0.094102     -4.5069    318    9.2562e-06       -0.60925      -0.23897 
    Y(2015)                     -0.37767      0.096808     -3.9012    318    0.00011683       -0.56814       -0.1872 
    Y(2016)                    -0.054148      0.096408    -0.56165    318       0.57475       -0.24382       0.13553 
    M(Feb)                      0.023447       0.10081     0.23258    318       0.81624        -0.1749       0.22179 
    M(Mar)                     -0.026627       0.10389     -0.2563    318       0.79789       -0.23103       0.17778 
    M(Apr)                       0.26566       0.10421      2.5492    318      0.011267       0.060625        0.4707 
    M(May)                     -0.089213       0.10142    -0.87963    318       0.37972       -0.28875       0.11033 
    M(Jun)                      -0.11135       0.10323     -1.0787    318       0.28152       -0.31444      0.091738 
    M(Jul)                       0.08613       0.10748     0.80137    318       0.42352       -0.12533       0.29759 
    M(Aug)                       -0.1475       0.10002     -1.4746    318        0.1413       -0.34429      0.049295 
    M(Sep)                      -0.23391      0.098936     -2.3643    318      0.018666       -0.42856      -0.03926 
    M(Oct)                        0.1947      0.098145      1.9838    318      0.048138      0.0016043        0.3878 
    M(Nov)                     -0.038349      0.099645    -0.38485    318        0.7006        -0.2344        0.1577 
    M(Dec)                     0.0061782       0.10184    0.060664    318       0.95166       -0.19419       0.20655 
 
7. Financial, likes 
 
Fixed effects coefficients (95% CIs): 
    Name                   Estimate      SE            tStat        DF     pValue        Lower          Upper      
    Intercept                 -0.2329       0.14207      -1.6394    318       0.10212       -0.51241      0.046609 
    FB_likes               9.4247e-07    7.7724e-07       1.2126    318       0.22619    -5.8672e-07    2.4717e-06 
    scD(t-1)                   1.4932       0.14464       10.323    318     9.737e-22         1.2086        1.7777 
    NEWS(T)                 -0.095804       0.04683      -2.0458    318      0.041602       -0.18794    -0.0036675 
    Ret(t)                    -1.7111       0.32258      -5.3044    318    2.1219e-07        -2.3457       -1.0764 
    Ret(t-1)                 -0.96512       0.34064      -2.8333    318     0.0049018        -1.6353      -0.29493 
    Y(2011)                  -0.25983      0.090342       -2.876    318     0.0042988       -0.43757     -0.082084 
    Y(2012)                  -0.40819       0.10564      -3.8639    318    0.00013526       -0.61604      -0.20034 
    Y(2013)                  -0.68726       0.12076      -5.6912    318    2.8659e-08       -0.92485      -0.44967 
    Y(2014)                  -0.48133        0.1074      -4.4819    318    1.0339e-05       -0.69262      -0.27003 
    Y(2015)                  -0.39996      0.096603      -4.1403    318    4.4486e-05       -0.59002       -0.2099 
    Y(2016)                  -0.07959      0.095878     -0.83012    318       0.40709       -0.26823       0.10905 
    M(Feb)                   0.021093       0.10076      0.20934    318       0.83432       -0.17715       0.21934 
    M(Mar)                  -0.040063       0.10364     -0.38654    318       0.69935       -0.24398       0.16385 
    M(Apr)                     0.2576       0.10352       2.4883    318      0.013347       0.053919       0.46127 
    M(May)                  -0.098709       0.10124     -0.97502    318       0.33029       -0.29789       0.10047 
    M(Jun)                   -0.12185       0.10286      -1.1846    318       0.23708       -0.32422      0.080529 
    M(Jul)                   0.068195       0.10801      0.63137    318       0.52825       -0.14431        0.2807 
    M(Aug)                    -0.1627        0.1007      -1.6158    318       0.10714       -0.36082      0.035414 
    M(Sep)                   -0.23992      0.099478      -2.4118    318      0.016441       -0.43564     -0.044202 
    M(Oct)                    0.17868      0.099592       1.7941    318      0.073741      -0.017261       0.37462 
    M(Nov)                  -0.048569      0.099917     -0.48609    318       0.62724       -0.24515       0.14801 
    M(Dec)                 -0.0063766       0.10175    -0.062669    318       0.95007       -0.20657       0.19381 
 8. Financial, shares 
 
Fixed effects coefficients (95% CIs): 
    Name                     Estimate       SE            tStat        DF     pValue        Lower          Upper      
    Intercept                   -0.24623       0.14238      -1.7294    318      0.084709       -0.52636      0.033895 
    FB_shares               -1.9448e-06    6.3045e-06     -0.30847    318       0.75792    -1.4348e-05    1.0459e-05 
    scD(t-1)                      1.5077       0.14473       10.418    318    4.6489e-22          1.223        1.7925 
    NEWS(T)                     -0.10724      0.046981      -2.2826    318      0.023115       -0.19967     -0.014805 
    Ret(t)                       -1.7555       0.32294      -5.4359    318    1.0876e-07        -2.3908       -1.1201 
    Ret(t-1)                    -0.96966       0.34029      -2.8495    318     0.0046643        -1.6392      -0.30016 
    Y(2011)                     -0.24577       0.09027      -2.7226    318     0.0068347       -0.42337     -0.068166 
    Y(2012)                     -0.32812       0.10514      -3.1209    318     0.0019686       -0.53496      -0.12127 
    Y(2013)                     -0.58476       0.10875      -5.3769    318    1.4702e-07       -0.79873      -0.37079 
    Y(2014)                     -0.41073      0.097118      -4.2292    318    3.0698e-05       -0.60181      -0.21966 
    Y(2015)                     -0.38722      0.096884      -3.9967    318    7.9894e-05       -0.57783       -0.1966 
    Y(2016)                    -0.067442      0.096061     -0.70207    318       0.48315       -0.25644       0.12155 
    M(Feb)                      0.018691       0.10077      0.18549    318       0.85297       -0.17956       0.21694 
    M(Mar)                     -0.036118       0.10365     -0.34846    318       0.72773       -0.24005       0.16781 
    M(Apr)                       0.24376       0.10344       2.3564    318      0.019059       0.040235       0.44728 
    M(May)                     -0.096697       0.10124     -0.95513    318       0.34024       -0.29588       0.10249 
    M(Jun)                      -0.12341       0.10293       -1.199    318       0.23142       -0.32593      0.079099 
    M(Jul)                      0.083551       0.10756      0.77675    318       0.43788       -0.12808       0.29518 
    M(Aug)                      -0.14459        0.1009       -1.433    318       0.15283        -0.3431       0.05392 
    M(Sep)                      -0.22135      0.099184      -2.2317    318      0.026331       -0.41649      -0.02621 
    M(Oct)                       0.20587      0.099729       2.0643    318      0.039805      0.0096537       0.40208 
    M(Nov)                     -0.037633      0.099786     -0.37714    318       0.70632       -0.23396       0.15869 
    M(Dec)                    0.00043414       0.10175    0.0042666    318        0.9966       -0.19976       0.20063 
 
 
General governmental organizations 
9. Governmental, posts 
 
Fixed effects coefficients (95% CIs): 
    Name                   Estimate     SE           tStat       DF     pValue        Lower         Upper     
    Intercept              -0.052584      0.24366    -0.21581    309       0.82928      -0.53202      0.42685 
    FB_posts                0.014641    0.0086466      1.6933    309      0.091412    -0.0023726     0.031655 
    scD(t-1)                 0.70828      0.18245       3.882    309    0.00012669       0.34927       1.0673 
    NEWS(T)                  0.20171     0.095884      2.1037    309      0.036215      0.013041      0.39038 
    Ret(t)                   -2.0893      0.67428     -3.0986    309     0.0021229       -3.4161     -0.76259 
    Ret(t-1)                 -1.9302      0.69156     -2.7911    309     0.0055802       -3.2909     -0.56943 
    Y(2011)                 -0.50268      0.16858     -2.9819    309     0.0030928      -0.83439     -0.17097 
    Y(2012)                 -0.48266      0.18034     -2.6765    309     0.0078376       -0.8375     -0.12782 
    Y(2013)                 -0.97142      0.19832     -4.8982    309     1.563e-06       -1.3617     -0.58118 
    Y(2014)                  -0.8833      0.19908     -4.4369    309    1.2709e-05        -1.275     -0.49158 
    Y(2015)                  -1.0279      0.20705     -4.9644    309    1.1414e-06       -1.4353     -0.62048 
    Y(2016)                 -0.45068      0.19325     -2.3322    309      0.020335      -0.83093    -0.070435 
    M(Feb)                  0.062391      0.20193     0.30897    309       0.75755      -0.33494      0.45973 
    M(Mar)                   0.26514      0.21088      1.2573    309       0.20958      -0.14979      0.68008 
    M(Apr)                   0.46221      0.20898      2.2117    309      0.027718      0.051002      0.87343 
    M(May)                   0.28204      0.21426      1.3164    309       0.18903      -0.13955      0.70363 
    M(Jun)                    0.1684      0.21964      0.7667    309       0.44384      -0.26378      0.60058 
    M(Jul)                   0.24541      0.22395      1.0958    309       0.27401      -0.19525      0.68607 
    M(Aug)                  -0.19373      0.20465    -0.94663    309       0.34457      -0.59641      0.20896 
    M(Sep)                  0.085418      0.20959     0.40756    309       0.68388      -0.32698      0.49781 
    M(Oct)                    0.5011      0.20099      2.4932    309      0.013184       0.10562      0.89659 
    M(Nov)                   0.28888      0.20528      1.4072    309       0.16036      -0.11504       0.6928 
    M(Dec)                  0.074541      0.21514     0.34648    309       0.72922      -0.34879      0.49787 
 
10. Governmental, comments 
 
Fixed effects coefficients (95% CIs): 
    Name                      Estimate      SE            tStat       DF     pValue        Lower         Upper      
    Intercept                  -0.039507       0.23797    -0.16602    309       0.86825      -0.50774       0.42873 
    FB_comments               5.4546e-05    2.0163e-05      2.7053    309     0.0072031    1.4872e-05    9.4219e-05 
    scD(t-1)                     0.67547       0.18322      3.6867    309    0.00026823       0.31496         1.036 
    NEWS(T)                      0.19591      0.095952      2.0417    309      0.042029     0.0071042       0.38471 
    Ret(t)                       -2.0751       0.67443     -3.0768    309     0.0022793       -3.4022      -0.74806 
    Ret(t-1)                     -1.7414       0.68892     -2.5278    309      0.011977        -3.097      -0.38586 
    Y(2011)                     -0.55124        0.1702     -3.2387    309     0.0013316      -0.88614      -0.21633 
    Y(2012)                      -0.5752        0.1853     -3.1041    309     0.0020855      -0.93982      -0.21058 
    Y(2013)                      -1.0181       0.19868      -5.124    309    5.2799e-07        -1.409      -0.62711 
    Y(2014)                     -0.81809       0.19193     -4.2624    309    2.6895e-05       -1.1958      -0.44043 
    Y(2015)                      -1.0116       0.20691     -4.8892    309    1.6304e-06       -1.4188      -0.60449 
    Y(2016)                     -0.35213       0.19359     -1.8189    309      0.069895      -0.73305      0.028801 
    M(Feb)                      0.042501       0.20016     0.21234    309       0.83198      -0.35135       0.43635 
    M(Mar)                       0.29009       0.21112       1.374    309       0.17043      -0.12533        0.7055 
    M(Apr)                       0.48291       0.20768      2.3252    309      0.020707      0.074261       0.89157 
    M(May)                       0.30657        0.2145      1.4292    309       0.15395      -0.11549       0.72863 
    M(Jun)                       0.18274       0.21982     0.83128    309       0.40646       -0.2498       0.61527 
    M(Jul)                       0.26122       0.22415      1.1654    309       0.24477      -0.17984       0.70228 
    M(Aug)                      -0.18473       0.20467    -0.90255    309       0.36747      -0.58746         0.218 
    M(Sep)                      0.039457       0.21048     0.18746    309       0.85142       -0.3747       0.45361 
    M(Oct)                       0.48516       0.20125      2.4108    309      0.016503      0.089169       0.88115 
    M(Nov)                        0.3232       0.20481       1.578    309       0.11559     -0.079809       0.72621 
    M(Dec)                        0.1013       0.21568     0.46968    309       0.63891      -0.32309        0.5257 
11. Governmental, likes 
 
Fixed effects coefficients (95% CIs): 
    Name                   Estimate      SE           tStat       DF     pValue        Lower          Upper      
    Intercept                0.079835       0.2354     0.33914    309       0.73473       -0.38336       0.54303 
    FB_likes               2.6212e-06    1.643e-06      1.5953    309       0.11166    -6.1174e-07    5.8542e-06 
    scD(t-1)                   0.6898      0.18289      3.7717    309    0.00019427        0.32994        1.0497 
    NEWS(T)                   0.21615     0.096781      2.2334    309      0.026235       0.025722       0.40659 
    Ret(t)                    -2.0272      0.67495     -3.0035    309      0.002887        -3.3553      -0.69914 
    Ret(t-1)                  -1.8004      0.68907     -2.6128    309     0.0094199        -3.1562      -0.44453 
    Y(2011)                  -0.50681      0.16892     -3.0004    309      0.002916       -0.83918      -0.17444 
    Y(2012)                  -0.57798      0.20504     -2.8189    309     0.0051301       -0.98142      -0.17453 
    Y(2013)                   -1.1363      0.24587     -4.6216    309    5.5995e-06        -1.6201      -0.65254 
    Y(2014)                  -0.97138      0.22205     -4.3745    309    1.6659e-05        -1.4083      -0.53445 
    Y(2015)                   -1.0995      0.20723     -5.3056    309    2.1465e-07        -1.5072      -0.69172 
    Y(2016)                  -0.44867      0.19323      -2.322    309      0.020885       -0.82888     -0.068459 
    M(Feb)                   0.010471      0.19905    0.052606    309       0.95808       -0.38119       0.40213 
    M(Mar)                    0.23358      0.20918      1.1166    309       0.26502       -0.17802       0.64518 
    M(Apr)                    0.41772      0.20497      2.0379    309      0.042408       0.014402       0.82103 
    M(May)                    0.25218      0.21259      1.1862    309       0.23645       -0.16613       0.67048 
    M(Jun)                    0.12845      0.21834      0.5883    309       0.55676       -0.30117       0.55807 
    M(Jul)                    0.18769      0.22485     0.83476    309        0.4045       -0.25473       0.63012 
    M(Aug)                   -0.26145      0.20544     -1.2726    309       0.20411       -0.66569       0.14279 
    M(Sep)                   0.026845      0.21177     0.12676    309       0.89921       -0.38985       0.44354 
    M(Oct)                    0.43846       0.2035      2.1546    309      0.031963       0.038047       0.83887 
    M(Nov)                    0.28485      0.20495      1.3898    309       0.16558       -0.11843       0.68813 
    M(Dec)                   0.043126      0.21542     0.20019    309       0.84146       -0.38076       0.46701 
12. Governmental, shares 
 
Fixed effects coefficients (95% CIs): 
    Name                     Estimate      SE            tStat       DF     pValue        Lower          Upper      
    Intercept                  0.097605       0.23615     0.41332    309       0.67966       -0.36706       0.56227 
    FB_shares               2.1855e-05    1.2734e-05      1.7163    309      0.087118    -3.2015e-06    4.6911e-05 
    scD(t-1)                    0.68168       0.18309      3.7232    309    0.00023377        0.32141        1.0419 
    NEWS(T)                     0.21933      0.096932      2.2627    309      0.024349       0.028597       0.41006 
    Ret(t)                       -1.982       0.67637     -2.9303    309     0.0036389        -3.3128      -0.65108 
    Ret(t-1)                    -1.8061       0.68895     -2.6215    309     0.0091879        -3.1617      -0.45045 
    Y(2011)                    -0.50449       0.16857     -2.9927    309     0.0029879       -0.83619       -0.1728 
    Y(2012)                    -0.57892       0.20125     -2.8766    309     0.0042994       -0.97491      -0.18292 
    Y(2013)                     -1.0697       0.21872     -4.8907    309    1.6188e-06        -1.5001      -0.63933 
    Y(2014)                    -0.88097       0.19843     -4.4396    309    1.2558e-05        -1.2714      -0.49052 
    Y(2015)                     -1.1096       0.20778     -5.3405    309    1.8001e-07        -1.5185       -0.7008 
    Y(2016)                    -0.45485       0.19347      -2.351    309      0.019349       -0.83554      -0.07417 
    M(Feb)                    0.0039606         0.199    0.019903    309       0.98413        -0.3876       0.39552 
    M(Mar)                      0.23816       0.20917      1.1386    309       0.25575       -0.17342       0.64974 
    M(Apr)                      0.41816        0.2048      2.0418    309      0.042022       0.015178       0.82113 
    M(May)                      0.25279       0.21266      1.1887    309       0.23547       -0.16565       0.67123 
    M(Jun)                      0.13848       0.21841     0.63404    309       0.52652       -0.29128       0.56824 
    M(Jul)                      0.21092       0.22373     0.94274    309       0.34655       -0.22931       0.65115 
    M(Aug)                      -0.2736       0.20633      -1.326    309       0.18581       -0.67958       0.13239 
    M(Sep)                     0.029716       0.21121      0.1407    309        0.8882       -0.38587        0.4453 
    M(Oct)                      0.43169       0.20364      2.1199    309      0.034812       0.030997       0.83238 
    M(Nov)                      0.28837       0.20468      1.4089    309       0.15988       -0.11438       0.69112 
    M(Dec)                     0.042815       0.21519     0.19896    309       0.84242        -0.3806       0.46623 
 
 
Nonprofit institutions 
13. Nonprofit, posts 
 
Fixed effects coefficients (95% CIs): 
    Name                   Estimate     SE           tStat       DF     pValue        Lower        Upper      
    Intercept                0.41785      0.19479      2.1451    318      0.032701     0.034608        0.8011 
    FB_posts                0.032679    0.0061768      5.2907    318    2.2734e-07     0.020527      0.044832 
    scD(t-1)                  1.3724      0.13864       9.899    318    2.5805e-20       1.0997        1.6452 
    NEWS(T)                 0.041756     0.062358     0.66961    318       0.50359    -0.080931       0.16444 
    Ret(t)                  -0.63331      0.40943     -1.5468    318        0.1229      -1.4388       0.17222 
    Ret(t-1)                 -1.6034      0.42745      -3.751    318    0.00020925      -2.4444      -0.76239 
    Y(2011)                 -0.83456      0.12535     -6.6577    318    1.2212e-10      -1.0812      -0.58793 
    Y(2012)                 -0.94372      0.13529     -6.9758    318    1.7704e-11      -1.2099      -0.67756 
    Y(2013)                  -1.7647      0.14827     -11.902    318    2.8925e-27      -2.0565        -1.473 
    Y(2014)                  -1.4929      0.14882     -10.032    318    9.3177e-21      -1.7857       -1.2001 
    Y(2015)                  -1.3249      0.14122     -9.3822    318    1.2692e-18      -1.6028       -1.0471 
    Y(2016)                 -0.45549      0.13052     -3.4899    318    0.00055141     -0.71227       -0.1987 
    M(Feb)                 0.0066968      0.12964    0.051658    318       0.95883     -0.24836       0.26175 
    M(Mar)                   -0.2825      0.13962     -2.0233    318      0.043875      -0.5572    -0.0078023 
    M(Apr)                   0.31919      0.13637      2.3406    318      0.019873     0.050882       0.58749 
    M(May)                  -0.28778      0.12792     -2.2496    318      0.025157     -0.53946     -0.036095 
    M(Jun)                  -0.34654      0.14148     -2.4494    318      0.014848     -0.62489     -0.068189 
    M(Jul)                  -0.45161      0.15709     -2.8749    318     0.0043139     -0.76067      -0.14255 
    M(Aug)                 0.0015287      0.14423    0.010599    318       0.99155     -0.28224        0.2853 
    M(Sep)                  -0.34669      0.13489     -2.5702    318      0.010619     -0.61207     -0.081301 
    M(Oct)                   0.18621      0.13462      1.3832    318       0.16756    -0.078645       0.45106 
    M(Nov)                  -0.11959      0.12943      -0.924    318       0.35618     -0.37424       0.13505 
    M(Dec)                  -0.15748      0.13742      -1.146    318       0.25267     -0.42784       0.11289 
 
14. Nonprofit, comments 
 
Fixed effects coefficients (95% CIs): 
    Name                      Estimate      SE            tStat        DF     pValue        Lower        Upper      
    Intercept                    0.50168       0.19403       2.5856    318      0.010167      0.11993       0.88342 
    FB_comments               3.7564e-05    1.3222e-05        2.841    318     0.0047877    1.155e-05    6.3578e-05 
    scD(t-1)                      1.4567       0.13752       10.593    318    1.1745e-22       1.1862        1.7273 
    NEWS(T)                     0.018372      0.062107      0.29582    318       0.76756     -0.10382       0.14056 
    Ret(t)                      -0.56132       0.40944      -1.3709    318       0.17137      -1.3669       0.24424 
    Ret(t-1)                     -1.3599       0.42627      -3.1901    318     0.0015639      -2.1985      -0.52119 
    Y(2011)                     -0.81209       0.12569       -6.461    318    3.8995e-10      -1.0594       -0.5648 
    Y(2012)                     -0.87963       0.13787      -6.3801    318    6.2433e-10      -1.1509      -0.60837 
    Y(2013)                      -1.6334       0.14549      -11.227    318    7.3382e-25      -1.9196       -1.3471 
    Y(2014)                      -1.2501          0.14      -8.9296    318    3.5002e-17      -1.5256      -0.97469 
    Y(2015)                      -1.3221       0.14157      -9.3393    318    1.7449e-18      -1.6006       -1.0436 
    Y(2016)                     -0.31492       0.13006      -2.4213    318      0.016022     -0.57081     -0.059034 
    M(Feb)                      -0.08647       0.12838     -0.67356    318       0.50108     -0.33905       0.16611 
    M(Mar)                      -0.31869        0.1397      -2.2812    318      0.023195     -0.59354     -0.043836 
    M(Apr)                       0.24295       0.13544       1.7938    318      0.073787    -0.023512       0.50941 
    M(May)                      -0.32371       0.12677      -2.5536    318      0.011129     -0.57312     -0.074301 
    M(Jun)                      -0.35988       0.14142      -2.5448    318      0.011406     -0.63812     -0.081648 
    M(Jul)                      -0.43714       0.15673      -2.7892    318     0.0056022      -0.7455      -0.12879 
    M(Aug)                    -0.0097459       0.14385    -0.067749    318       0.94603     -0.29277       0.27328 
    M(Sep)                      -0.37549       0.13432      -2.7955    318     0.0054963     -0.63976      -0.11123 
    M(Oct)                       0.17766       0.13405       1.3253    318       0.18603    -0.086085       0.44141 
    M(Nov)                     -0.074263       0.12806     -0.57989    318        0.5624     -0.32622        0.1777 
    M(Dec)                      -0.13406       0.13649     -0.98217    318       0.32676     -0.40259       0.13448 
 
15. Nonprofit, likes 
 
Fixed effects coefficients (95% CIs): 
    Name                   Estimate      SE            tStat       DF     pValue        Lower        Upper      
    Intercept                 0.61566        0.1935      3.1817    318     0.0016086      0.23496       0.99637 
    FB_likes               4.4277e-06    1.1856e-06      3.7345    318    0.00022288    2.095e-06    6.7603e-06 
    scD(t-1)                   1.4074       0.13848      10.163    318    3.3903e-21       1.1349        1.6798 
    NEWS(T)                  0.053152      0.062844     0.84578    318       0.39831    -0.070491        0.1768 
    Ret(t)                   -0.44153       0.41229     -1.0709    318       0.28501      -1.2527       0.36962 
    Ret(t-1)                    -1.35       0.42895     -3.1471    318     0.0018048      -2.1939      -0.50603 
    Y(2011)                  -0.81176       0.12476     -6.5063    318    2.9909e-10      -1.0572      -0.56629 
    Y(2012)                   -1.0462       0.15171     -6.8961    318    2.8892e-11      -1.3447      -0.74774 
    Y(2013)                    -1.949       0.17783      -10.96    318    6.3236e-24      -2.2989       -1.5991 
    Y(2014)                   -1.5478       0.16373     -9.4532    318    7.4784e-19        -1.87       -1.2257 
    Y(2015)                   -1.4197       0.14184     -10.009    318    1.1066e-20      -1.6988       -1.1407 
    Y(2016)                  -0.40512       0.12968      -3.124    318     0.0019482     -0.66025      -0.14998 
    M(Feb)                  -0.098622       0.12755    -0.77321    318       0.43997     -0.34957       0.15232 
    M(Mar)                   -0.33273       0.13869     -2.3991    318       0.01701     -0.60559     -0.059867 
    M(Apr)                    0.23834       0.13466      1.7699    318      0.077697    -0.026599       0.50328 
    M(May)                   -0.34163       0.12644     -2.7019    318     0.0072652     -0.59041     -0.092861 
    M(Jun)                   -0.38387       0.14074     -2.7275    318      0.006736     -0.66077      -0.10697 
    M(Jul)                   -0.51121       0.15695     -3.2572    318     0.0012467        -0.82      -0.20242 
    M(Aug)                  -0.078559       0.14468      -0.543    318       0.58751     -0.36321       0.20609 
    M(Sep)                   -0.40045       0.13514     -2.9632    318     0.0032745     -0.66634      -0.13457 
    M(Oct)                    0.10546       0.13552     0.77817    318       0.43705     -0.16118        0.3721 
    M(Nov)                   -0.10993       0.12838    -0.85626    318        0.3925      -0.3625       0.14265 
    M(Dec)                   -0.18347       0.13684     -1.3408    318       0.18095      -0.4527      0.085753 
 16. Nonprofit, shares 
 
Fixed effects coefficients (95% CIs): 
    Name                     Estimate      SE            tStat       DF     pValue        Lower         Upper     
    Intercept                   0.63207       0.19427      3.2535    318     0.0012624       0.24985       1.0143 
    FB_shares               3.0261e-05    9.6311e-06       3.142    318      0.001836    1.1312e-05    4.921e-05 
    scD(t-1)                     1.4068       0.13881      10.135    318    4.2169e-21        1.1337       1.6799 
    NEWS(T)                    0.049813      0.062948     0.79133    318       0.42934     -0.074035      0.17366 
    Ret(t)                     -0.40964       0.41327     -0.9912    318       0.32234       -1.2227      0.40346 
    Ret(t-1)                     -1.371       0.42754     -3.2068    318     0.0014788       -2.2122     -0.52986 
    Y(2011)                    -0.79589       0.12451     -6.3924    318    5.8153e-10       -1.0408     -0.55093 
    Y(2012)                    -0.98982        0.1498     -6.6076    318    1.6453e-10       -1.2846      -0.6951 
    Y(2013)                     -1.7965       0.16222     -11.075    318      2.51e-24       -2.1157      -1.4774 
    Y(2014)                     -1.3584       0.14566     -9.3263    318     1.921e-18        -1.645      -1.0719 
    Y(2015)                     -1.4226        0.1423     -9.9974    318    1.2146e-20       -1.7026      -1.1427 
    Y(2016)                    -0.40508        0.1299     -3.1184    318     0.0019849      -0.66066     -0.14951 
    M(Feb)                     -0.11333       0.12745    -0.88919    318       0.37457      -0.36409      0.13743 
    M(Mar)                     -0.33647       0.13888     -2.4228    318       0.01596      -0.60971    -0.063235 
    M(Apr)                      0.23024       0.13454      1.7113    318      0.087994     -0.034457      0.49494 
    M(May)                     -0.33348       0.12646      -2.637    318     0.0087739      -0.58228    -0.084676 
    M(Jun)                     -0.37494       0.14092     -2.6606    318     0.0081952       -0.6522    -0.097684 
    M(Jul)                     -0.47441       0.15667      -3.028    318     0.0026628      -0.78266     -0.16617 
    M(Aug)                    -0.076577       0.14507    -0.52786    318       0.59796      -0.36199      0.20884 
    M(Sep)                     -0.39276       0.13482     -2.9131    318     0.0038314      -0.65802      -0.1275 
    M(Oct)                      0.11811       0.13554     0.87137    318       0.38421      -0.14856      0.38478 
    M(Nov)                     -0.09836       0.12812     -0.7677    318       0.44324      -0.35044      0.15372 
    M(Dec)                     -0.17922       0.13638     -1.3142    318       0.18974      -0.44754     0.089095 
 
 
Households 
17. Households, posts 
 
Fixed effects coefficients (95% CIs): 
    Name                   Estimate      SE            tStat       DF     pValue         Lower         Upper    
    Intercept                0.036811      0.014795      2.4881    318       0.013354      0.007703    0.065918 
    FB_posts                 0.010896    0.00040914      26.632    318     5.7387e-83      0.010091    0.011701 
    scD(t-1)                   1.5001      0.014255      105.24    318    3.4599e-249        1.4721      1.5281 
    NEWS(T)                 -0.039957     0.0041561     -9.6142    318     2.2392e-19     -0.048134    -0.03178 
    Ret(t)                    -5.2764      0.026473     -199.31    318              0       -5.3285     -5.2243 
    Ret(t-1)                 -0.48546      0.031587     -15.369    318     2.9861e-40      -0.54761    -0.42332 
    Y(2011)                  -0.21663     0.0081581     -26.554    318     1.0907e-82      -0.23268    -0.20058 
    Y(2012)                  -0.20003     0.0083398     -23.984    318     2.6671e-73      -0.21643    -0.18362 
    Y(2013)                  -0.75546     0.0094403     -80.025    318     9.414e-213      -0.77404    -0.73689 
    Y(2014)                   -0.7962     0.0096552     -82.463    318    1.0453e-216       -0.8152    -0.77721 
    Y(2015)                  -0.63079     0.0098027     -64.349    318    2.1219e-184      -0.65008     -0.6115 
    Y(2016)                   0.07737     0.0084833      9.1202    318     8.7552e-18      0.060679     0.09406 
    M(Feb)                     0.2758     0.0090565      30.454    318     2.7852e-96       0.25799     0.29362 
    M(Mar)                    0.21536     0.0096964       22.21    318      1.214e-66       0.19628     0.23444 
    M(Apr)                    0.22415      0.009544      23.486    318     1.9248e-71       0.20537     0.24292 
    M(May)                   0.070463     0.0095385      7.3872    318      1.329e-12      0.051697     0.08923 
    M(Jun)                     0.2067     0.0095061      21.744    318     7.1728e-65         0.188      0.2254 
    M(Jul)                    0.19668     0.0092698      21.217    318     7.3224e-63       0.17844     0.21491 
    M(Aug)                   0.014564     0.0089101      1.6346    318        0.10312    -0.0029658    0.032095 
    M(Sep)                 -0.0020314     0.0090309    -0.22494    318        0.82217     -0.019799    0.015736 
    M(Oct)                    0.17061     0.0087869      19.417    318      6.198e-56       0.15332      0.1879 
    M(Nov)                   0.066463     0.0089276      7.4446    318     9.1892e-13      0.048898    0.084027 
    M(Dec)                   -0.18137     0.0087435     -20.743    318     4.7857e-61      -0.19857    -0.16416 
18. Households, comments 
 
Fixed effects coefficients (95% CIs): 
    Name                      Estimate       SE            tStat       DF     pValue         Lower          Upper       
    Intercept                     0.11745      0.014779      7.9473    318      3.342e-14       0.088375        0.14653 
    FB_comments               -4.4579e-06    8.8363e-07      -5.045    318     7.6393e-07    -6.1964e-06    -2.7194e-06 
    scD(t-1)                       1.5072      0.014279      105.55    318    1.3585e-249         1.4791         1.5353 
    NEWS(T)                     -0.050044     0.0041388     -12.091    318     5.9927e-28      -0.058186      -0.041901 
    Ret(t)                        -5.3052      0.026515     -200.08    318              0        -5.3573         -5.253 
    Ret(t-1)                     -0.40271      0.031479     -12.793    318     1.6273e-30       -0.46465       -0.34078 
    Y(2011)                      -0.18399     0.0081646     -22.535    318     7.1688e-68       -0.20005       -0.16793 
    Y(2012)                      -0.13096     0.0084913     -15.423    318     1.8518e-40       -0.14767       -0.11426 
    Y(2013)                        -0.682     0.0093033     -73.308    318    2.8931e-201        -0.7003        -0.6637 
    Y(2014)                      -0.71917     0.0092151     -78.042    318    1.8711e-209        -0.7373       -0.70104 
    Y(2015)                      -0.65546     0.0098601     -66.477    318    1.3941e-188       -0.67486       -0.63606 
    Y(2016)                       0.10514     0.0084697      12.413    318     4.0421e-29       0.088474         0.1218 
    M(Feb)                        0.22511     0.0089298      25.209    318     8.1937e-78        0.20754        0.24268 
    M(Mar)                          0.181     0.0096687       18.72    318     3.1017e-53        0.16197        0.20002 
    M(Apr)                         0.1657     0.0094557      17.524    318     1.3638e-48         0.1471         0.1843 
    M(May)                       0.047583     0.0095291      4.9934    318     9.7965e-07       0.028835       0.066331 
    M(Jun)                        0.18251     0.0094991      19.214    318     3.7718e-55        0.16383         0.2012 
    M(Jul)                        0.19061     0.0092574       20.59    318      1.847e-60         0.1724        0.20882 
    M(Aug)                      0.0051563     0.0088948      0.5797    318        0.56253      -0.012344       0.022656 
    M(Sep)                     -0.0022091     0.0090052    -0.24531    318        0.80637      -0.019926       0.015508 
    M(Oct)                        0.17591     0.0087766      20.043    318     2.3599e-58        0.15864        0.19318 
    M(Nov)                       0.069467     0.0089007      7.8046    318     8.6843e-14       0.051955       0.086979 
    M(Dec)                       -0.19131     0.0087185     -21.943    318     1.2489e-65       -0.20847       -0.17416 
 
19. Households, likes 
 
Fixed effects coefficients (95% CIs): 
    Name                   Estimate      SE            tStat       DF     pValue         Lower         Upper      
    Intercept                  0.1051      0.014589      7.2044    318     4.2541e-12      0.076402       0.13381 
    FB_likes               1.9186e-07    7.0535e-08      2.7201    318      0.0068852    5.3088e-08    3.3064e-07 
    scD(t-1)                   1.5121      0.014262      106.02    318    3.4962e-250         1.484        1.5401 
    NEWS(T)                 -0.047872     0.0041922     -11.419    318     1.5368e-25      -0.05612     -0.039624 
    Ret(t)                    -5.2895      0.026641     -198.55    318              0       -5.3419       -5.2371 
    Ret(t-1)                 -0.39393      0.031462     -12.521    318     1.6351e-29      -0.45583      -0.33203 
    Y(2011)                  -0.19163     0.0081284     -23.575    318     8.8996e-72      -0.20762      -0.17564 
    Y(2012)                  -0.15729     0.0094328     -16.675    318     2.6956e-45      -0.17585      -0.13873 
    Y(2013)                  -0.70775      0.010964      -64.55    318    8.4517e-185      -0.72933      -0.68618 
    Y(2014)                  -0.73225      0.010262     -71.355    318    9.4631e-198      -0.75244      -0.71206 
    Y(2015)                  -0.65063     0.0097949     -66.426    318    1.7502e-188       -0.6699      -0.63136 
    Y(2016)                   0.10926     0.0084132      12.987    318     3.1326e-31      0.092707       0.12581 
    M(Feb)                    0.22968     0.0088952      25.821    318     4.8215e-80       0.21218       0.24718 
    M(Mar)                    0.18462      0.009634      19.164    318     5.8991e-55       0.16567       0.20358 
    M(Apr)                    0.17505     0.0093885      18.645    318     6.0312e-53       0.15658       0.19352 
    M(May)                   0.050653      0.009505      5.3292    318     1.8729e-07      0.031953      0.069354 
    M(Jun)                    0.18617      0.009474      19.651    318     7.7064e-57       0.16753       0.20481 
    M(Jul)                    0.18845     0.0093244       20.21    318     5.3366e-59       0.17011        0.2068 
    M(Aug)                  0.0025782     0.0089501     0.28807    318        0.77348     -0.015031      0.020187 
    M(Sep)                 -0.0055631     0.0090473    -0.61489    318        0.53907     -0.023363      0.012237 
    M(Oct)                    0.17034     0.0089165      19.104    318     1.0087e-54       0.15279       0.18788 
    M(Nov)                    0.06879     0.0089202      7.7118    318     1.6071e-13       0.05124       0.08634 
    M(Dec)                   -0.19057     0.0087307     -21.827    318     3.4476e-65      -0.20774      -0.17339 
 20. Households, shares 
 
Fixed effects coefficients (95% CIs): 
    Name                     Estimate       SE            tStat      DF     pValue         Lower          Upper       
    Intercept                    0.10485      0.014605     7.1791    318     4.9886e-12       0.076114        0.13358 
    FB_shares               -9.0402e-06    5.7473e-07    -15.729    318     1.2251e-41    -1.0171e-05    -7.9094e-06 
    scD(t-1)                      1.5051      0.014274     105.44    318     1.902e-249          1.477         1.5331 
    NEWS(T)                    -0.060349     0.0041961    -14.382    318      1.787e-36      -0.068604      -0.052093 
    Ret(t)                       -5.3519      0.026697    -200.47    318              0        -5.4044        -5.2994 
    Ret(t-1)                    -0.41371      0.031478    -13.143    318     8.2429e-32       -0.47564       -0.35178 
    Y(2011)                     -0.18012     0.0081142    -22.198    318     1.3478e-66       -0.19609       -0.16416 
    Y(2012)                    -0.071317     0.0093383    -7.6371    318     2.6275e-13       -0.08969      -0.052944 
    Y(2013)                     -0.62961     0.0099336    -63.381    318    1.8538e-182       -0.64915       -0.61006 
    Y(2014)                     -0.69029     0.0094072    -73.379    318    2.1576e-201        -0.7088       -0.67179 
    Y(2015)                     -0.63949     0.0098074    -65.205    318    4.2695e-186       -0.65879       -0.62019 
    Y(2016)                       0.1204     0.0084168     14.305    318     3.4979e-36        0.10384        0.13696 
    M(Feb)                       0.22823     0.0089021     25.638    318     2.2229e-79        0.21072        0.24575 
    M(Mar)                        0.1856     0.0096429     19.247    318     2.7954e-55        0.16663        0.20457 
    M(Apr)                       0.16046     0.0093935     17.082    318     7.1174e-47        0.14197        0.17894 
    M(May)                      0.049881     0.0095182     5.2406    318      2.921e-07       0.031155       0.068608 
    M(Jun)                       0.18145     0.0094837     19.133    318     7.7371e-55         0.1628        0.20011 
    M(Jul)                       0.19695      0.009266     21.256    318     5.2127e-63        0.17872        0.21519 
    M(Aug)                      0.022949     0.0089673     2.5592    318       0.010953      0.0053065       0.040592 
    M(Sep)                      0.008407     0.0090222    0.93182    318        0.35214     -0.0093437       0.026158 
    M(Oct)                       0.19793     0.0089067     22.222    318     1.0912e-66        0.18041        0.21545 
    M(Nov)                      0.076644     0.0089086     8.6033    318     3.6065e-16       0.059117       0.094171 
    M(Dec)                      -0.17974     0.0087284    -20.593    318     1.8101e-60       -0.19691       -0.16257 
 
 
 
Household activity groups 
Active investors 
21. Active investors, posts 
Fixed effects coefficients (95% CIs): 
    Name                   Estimate      SE           tStat       DF     pValue        Lower        Upper      
    Intercept                 0.60538     0.092679       6.532    318    2.5715e-10      0.42304       0.78772 
    FB_posts               0.00024134    0.0033095    0.072923    318       0.94191     -0.00627     0.0067527 
    scD(t-1)                 -0.82969     0.097284     -8.5285    318    6.1119e-16      -1.0211      -0.63829 
    NEWS(T)                  -0.13305     0.033665     -3.9523    318    9.5428e-05     -0.19929     -0.066819 
    Ret(t)                    -7.9946      0.27513     -29.058    318    1.6452e-91      -8.5359       -7.4533 
    Ret(t-1)                   1.6007      0.30539      5.2413    318     2.911e-07      0.99981        2.2015 
    Y(2011)                  -0.12886     0.062632     -2.0574    318      0.040459     -0.25209    -0.0056358 
    Y(2012)                 -0.088595     0.059998     -1.4766    318       0.14077     -0.20664      0.029449 
    Y(2013)                 -0.079748      0.06202     -1.2859    318       0.19943     -0.20177      0.042273 
    Y(2014)                 -0.020625     0.066816    -0.30868    318       0.75777     -0.15208       0.11083 
    Y(2015)                 -0.028919     0.068288    -0.42349    318       0.67223     -0.16327       0.10543 
    Y(2016)                   0.10083     0.063944      1.5768    318       0.11584    -0.024982       0.22663 
    M(Feb)                   0.046021     0.078498     0.58627    318       0.55811     -0.10842       0.20046 
    M(Mar)                   0.087959     0.077226       1.139    318       0.25557     -0.06398        0.2399 
    M(Apr)                  -0.098081     0.083243     -1.1783    318       0.23958     -0.26186      0.065695 
    M(May)                   -0.11265     0.084266     -1.3368    318       0.18224     -0.27844      0.053142 
    M(Jun)                   -0.17391     0.083183     -2.0906    318      0.037354     -0.33757     -0.010247 
    M(Jul)                  -0.032485     0.080163    -0.40523    318       0.68558      -0.1902       0.12523 
    M(Aug)                   -0.16885     0.080643     -2.0938    318      0.037068     -0.32751     -0.010191 
    M(Sep)                   -0.11495     0.078531     -1.4637    318       0.14425     -0.26946      0.039557 
    M(Oct)                   0.032025     0.075289     0.42536    318       0.67086      -0.1161       0.18015 
    M(Nov)                   -0.03916     0.075414    -0.51927    318       0.60393     -0.18753       0.10921 
    M(Dec)                  -0.050813      0.07676    -0.66197    318       0.50847     -0.20183       0.10021 
22. Active investors, comments 
 
Fixed effects coefficients (95% CIs): 
    Name                      Estimate       SE            tStat       DF     pValue        Lower          Upper      
    Intercept                     0.61757      0.091376      6.7586    318    6.6641e-11        0.43779       0.79735 
    FB_comments               -5.8237e-06    6.7028e-06    -0.86884    318       0.38559    -1.9011e-05    7.3637e-06 
    scD(t-1)                     -0.82853      0.096677     -8.5701    318    4.5609e-16        -1.0187      -0.63833 
    NEWS(T)                      -0.13361      0.033577     -3.9791    318    8.5729e-05       -0.19967     -0.067545 
    Ret(t)                        -8.0021       0.27526     -29.071    318    1.4796e-91        -8.5436       -7.4605 
    Ret(t-1)                       1.6028       0.30324      5.2856    318    2.3318e-07         1.0062        2.1994 
    Y(2011)                       -0.1195      0.062149     -1.9228    318      0.055399       -0.24178     0.0027757 
    Y(2012)                     -0.066811      0.061938     -1.0787    318       0.28155       -0.18867       0.05505 
    Y(2013)                     -0.063958      0.061507     -1.0399    318       0.29919       -0.18497      0.057053 
    Y(2014)                     -0.017393      0.063602    -0.27347    318       0.78467       -0.14253       0.10774 
    Y(2015)                     -0.036331      0.068405    -0.53112    318       0.59571       -0.17092      0.098253 
    Y(2016)                      0.094549      0.063514      1.4886    318       0.13758      -0.030412       0.21951 
    M(Feb)                       0.044578      0.077387     0.57604    318       0.56499       -0.10768       0.19683 
    M(Mar)                        0.08213      0.076383      1.0752    318       0.28308       -0.06815       0.23241 
    M(Apr)                       -0.10733      0.081747     -1.3129    318       0.19016       -0.26816      0.053507 
    M(May)                       -0.11733      0.083998     -1.3968    318       0.16345       -0.28259      0.047935 
    M(Jun)                       -0.17977      0.083093     -2.1634    318      0.031252       -0.34325     -0.016285 
    M(Jul)                      -0.034668      0.080139     -0.4326    318        0.6656       -0.19234         0.123 
    M(Aug)                       -0.16769      0.080547     -2.0819    318      0.038151       -0.32616    -0.0092181 
    M(Sep)                       -0.10968      0.078731     -1.3931    318       0.16457       -0.26458      0.045222 
    M(Oct)                       0.035482       0.07534     0.47097    318       0.63799       -0.11274       0.18371 
    M(Nov)                      -0.039115      0.075418    -0.51865    318       0.60437        -0.1875       0.10927 
    M(Dec)                       -0.05407      0.076615    -0.70573    318       0.48087       -0.20481      0.096667 
23. Active investors, likes 
 
Fixed effects coefficients (95% CIs): 
    Name                   Estimate       SE           tStat       DF     pValue        Lower          Upper      
    Intercept                   0.5954     0.090741      6.5616    318      2.16e-10        0.41688       0.77393 
    FB_likes               -9.7367e-07    5.253e-07     -1.8536    318      0.064728    -2.0072e-06    5.9827e-08 
    scD(t-1)                  -0.82842     0.096672     -8.5693    318    4.5855e-16        -1.0186      -0.63822 
    NEWS(T)                   -0.14222     0.033928     -4.1918    318    3.5905e-05       -0.20897     -0.075468 
    Ret(t)                     -8.0472        0.277     -29.052    318    1.7262e-91        -8.5922       -7.5022 
    Ret(t-1)                    1.6012        0.303      5.2843    318    2.3473e-07          1.005        2.1973 
    Y(2011)                   -0.11403     0.061849     -1.8437    318      0.066153       -0.23572      0.007652 
    Y(2012)                  -0.011414     0.070421    -0.16209    318       0.87134       -0.14996       0.12714 
    Y(2013)                   0.016191     0.078214     0.20701    318       0.83613       -0.13769       0.17007 
    Y(2014)                   0.043365      0.07196     0.60262    318       0.54719      -0.098213       0.18494 
    Y(2015)                  -0.018897     0.068181    -0.27716    318       0.78183       -0.15304       0.11524 
    Y(2016)                    0.11316     0.063309      1.7874    318      0.074824      -0.011398       0.23772 
    M(Feb)                    0.046537     0.077373     0.60146    318       0.54796       -0.10569       0.19876 
    M(Mar)                    0.096434     0.076282      1.2642    318       0.20709      -0.053647       0.24651 
    M(Apr)                    -0.10167     0.081279     -1.2508    318       0.21191       -0.26158      0.058246 
    M(May)                    -0.10686     0.083961     -1.2728    318       0.20402       -0.27205      0.058325 
    M(Jun)                     -0.1692     0.082921     -2.0405    318      0.042129       -0.33234    -0.0060549 
    M(Jul)                   -0.014418     0.080717    -0.17862    318       0.85835       -0.17322       0.14439 
    M(Aug)                    -0.14715     0.081367     -1.8084    318      0.071481       -0.30723      0.012938 
    M(Sep)                   -0.083781     0.080274     -1.0437    318       0.29742       -0.24172      0.074155 
    M(Oct)                    0.062521     0.077039     0.81155    318       0.41766       -0.08905       0.21409 
    M(Nov)                   -0.023606     0.075872    -0.31113    318       0.75591       -0.17288       0.12567 
    M(Dec)                   -0.040007     0.076815    -0.52083    318       0.60285       -0.19114       0.11112 
  
24. Active investors, shares 
 
Fixed effects coefficients (95% CIs): 
    Name                     Estimate       SE            tStat        DF     pValue        Lower          Upper      
    Intercept                     0.5885        0.0907       6.4884    318    3.3229e-10        0.41005       0.76695 
    FB_shares               -1.3561e-05    4.1848e-06      -3.2406    318     0.0013189    -2.1795e-05    -5.328e-06 
    scD(t-1)                    -0.83397      0.096712      -8.6233    318    3.1319e-16        -1.0242       -0.6437 
    NEWS(T)                     -0.15116       0.03404      -4.4407    318    1.2387e-05       -0.21813     -0.084189 
    Ret(t)                       -8.1049       0.27788      -29.167    318    6.9221e-92        -8.6517       -7.5582 
    Ret(t-1)                      1.5762       0.30292       5.2034    318    3.5148e-07        0.98025        2.1722 
    Y(2011)                     -0.10616      0.061774      -1.7185    318      0.086672        -0.2277      0.015376 
    Y(2012)                     0.040188      0.069535      0.57795    318       0.56371      -0.096619       0.17699 
    Y(2013)                     0.034905      0.068783      0.50746    318       0.61219       -0.10042       0.17023 
    Y(2014)                     0.033569      0.065631      0.51148    318       0.60937      -0.095558        0.1627 
    Y(2015)                   -0.0053148      0.068365    -0.077742    318       0.93808       -0.13982       0.12919 
    Y(2016)                      0.12596       0.06347       1.9846    318      0.048044      0.0010908       0.25084 
    M(Feb)                      0.048186        0.0774      0.62255    318       0.53403        -0.1041       0.20047 
    M(Mar)                      0.090362      0.076126        1.187    318       0.23611      -0.059412       0.24014 
    M(Apr)                       -0.1087      0.081363       -1.336    318        0.1825       -0.26878      0.051375 
    M(May)                      -0.11027      0.083908      -1.3142    318       0.18974       -0.27535      0.054816 
    M(Jun)                      -0.17829      0.082859      -2.1517    318       0.03217       -0.34131      -0.01527 
    M(Jul)                     -0.020393      0.080197     -0.25428    318       0.79944       -0.17818       0.13739 
    M(Aug)                      -0.13075      0.081349      -1.6073    318       0.10898        -0.2908      0.029297 
    M(Sep)                     -0.070921      0.079628     -0.89066    318       0.37379       -0.22758      0.085742 
    M(Oct)                      0.081037      0.076761       1.0557    318       0.29191      -0.069987       0.23206 
    M(Nov)                      -0.02133      0.075604     -0.28213    318       0.77803       -0.17008       0.12742 
    M(Dec)                     -0.035848      0.076734     -0.46718    318       0.64069       -0.18682       0.11512 
 
 
Moderate investors 
25. Moderate investors, posts 
 
Fixed effects coefficients (95% CIs): 
    Name                   Estimate     SE           tStat       DF     pValue         Lower          Upper     
    Intercept                0.54365      0.03572       15.22    318     1.1216e-39        0.47337      0.61392 
    FB_posts               0.0018524    0.0010636      1.7416    318       0.082539    -0.00024018     0.003945 
    scD(t-1)               -0.024271      0.04043    -0.60033    318        0.54872       -0.10382     0.055273 
    NEWS(T)                 -0.14771     0.011301     -13.071    318     1.5195e-31       -0.16995     -0.12548 
    Ret(t)                   -7.6544     0.084024     -91.098    318    6.6606e-230        -7.8198      -7.4891 
    Ret(t-1)                 0.47688      0.10513      4.5361    318     8.1314e-06        0.27004      0.68372 
    Y(2011)                 -0.27199     0.022059      -12.33    318     8.1202e-29       -0.31539     -0.22859 
    Y(2012)                 -0.18958      0.02179     -8.7002    318     1.8137e-16       -0.23245     -0.14671 
    Y(2013)                 -0.36673     0.023078     -15.891    318     2.9146e-42       -0.41214     -0.32133 
    Y(2014)                 -0.39681     0.024365     -16.287    318     8.6073e-44       -0.44475     -0.34888 
    Y(2015)                 -0.44763      0.02471     -18.116    318     6.8641e-51       -0.49625     -0.39902 
    Y(2016)                -0.039814     0.022435     -1.7746    318       0.076917      -0.083955    0.0043262 
    M(Feb)                  0.075762       0.0242      3.1307    318       0.001906        0.02815      0.12337 
    M(Mar)                   0.32328     0.025054      12.903    318     6.3674e-31        0.27399      0.37258 
    M(Apr)                  0.068406     0.025804       2.651    318      0.0084269       0.017638      0.11917 
    M(May)                  0.080219     0.025941      3.0923    318      0.0021618       0.029181      0.13126 
    M(Jun)                   0.12228     0.026217      4.6642    318     4.5678e-06       0.070702      0.17386 
    M(Jul)                   0.15454     0.025664      6.0217    318     4.7619e-09        0.10405      0.20504 
    M(Aug)                 -0.037919     0.024942     -1.5203    318        0.12943      -0.086991     0.011153 
    M(Sep)                 -0.036723     0.024634     -1.4908    318        0.13702       -0.08519     0.011743 
    M(Oct)                   0.17037     0.023294      7.3141    318     2.1218e-12        0.12454       0.2162 
    M(Nov)                   0.17819     0.023731      7.5086    318     6.0725e-13         0.1315      0.22488 
    M(Dec)                  0.094594      0.02377      3.9796    318     8.5561e-05       0.047828      0.14136 
 
26. Moderate investors, comments 
 
Fixed effects coefficients (95% CIs): 
    Name                      Estimate      SE            tStat       DF     pValue         Lower          Upper      
    Intercept                    0.54767      0.035417      15.464    318     1.2935e-40        0.47799       0.61735 
    FB_comments               4.1075e-06    2.2706e-06       1.809    318       0.071392    -3.5973e-07    8.5747e-06 
    scD(t-1)                   -0.020608      0.040281    -0.51161    318        0.60928      -0.099859      0.058643 
    NEWS(T)                     -0.14904      0.011266     -13.229    318     3.9456e-32        -0.1712      -0.12687 
    Ret(t)                        -7.655      0.084026     -91.103    318    6.5597e-230        -7.8203       -7.4897 
    Ret(t-1)                     0.49747       0.10429        4.77    318     2.8112e-06        0.29228       0.70266 
    Y(2011)                     -0.27176      0.022024      -12.34    318     7.5044e-29       -0.31509      -0.22843 
    Y(2012)                     -0.19268      0.022251     -8.6595    318     2.4223e-16       -0.23646      -0.14891 
    Y(2013)                     -0.36604      0.022918     -15.972    318     1.4158e-42       -0.41113      -0.32095 
    Y(2014)                     -0.38596      0.023311     -16.557    318     7.7032e-45       -0.43182      -0.34009 
    Y(2015)                     -0.44628      0.024765      -18.02    318     1.6074e-50         -0.495      -0.39755 
    Y(2016)                    -0.028937      0.022358     -1.2943    318        0.19651      -0.072925      0.015051 
    M(Feb)                      0.069433      0.023792      2.9183    318      0.0037706       0.022622       0.11624 
    M(Mar)                       0.32006       0.02482      12.895    318       6.83e-31        0.27123       0.36889 
    M(Apr)                      0.064499      0.025392      2.5401    318       0.011556       0.014542       0.11446 
    M(May)                      0.079295      0.025894      3.0623    318      0.0023838        0.02835       0.13024 
    M(Jun)                       0.12126      0.026166      4.6342    318     5.2348e-06       0.069778       0.17274 
    M(Jul)                       0.15392      0.025646      6.0015    318     5.3233e-09        0.10346       0.20438 
    M(Aug)                     -0.041399      0.024898     -1.6627    318        0.09735      -0.090386     0.0075869 
    M(Sep)                     -0.042049      0.024727     -1.7005    318       0.090006      -0.090698     0.0065997 
    M(Oct)                        0.1669      0.023311      7.1599    318     5.6277e-12        0.12104       0.21276 
    M(Nov)                       0.17874      0.023727      7.5334    318     5.1717e-13        0.13206       0.22543 
    M(Dec)                      0.093743      0.023739      3.9489    318     9.6704e-05       0.047038       0.14045 
 
27. Moderate investors, likes 
 
Fixed effects coefficients (95% CIs): 
    Name                   Estimate      SE           tStat       DF     pValue         Lower          Upper      
    Intercept                 0.55861      0.03544      15.762    318     9.1807e-42        0.48888       0.62833 
    FB_likes               2.6701e-07    1.807e-07      1.4776    318        0.14049    -8.8506e-08    6.2252e-07 
    scD(t-1)                -0.022048     0.040364    -0.54624    318        0.58528       -0.10146      0.057365 
    NEWS(T)                  -0.14671     0.011396     -12.874    318     8.1571e-31       -0.16913      -0.12429 
    Ret(t)                    -7.6488     0.084253     -90.784    318    1.9214e-229        -7.8146       -7.4831 
    Ret(t-1)                  0.49417      0.10439      4.7339    318     3.3207e-06        0.28879       0.69954 
    Y(2011)                  -0.27044     0.021993     -12.296    318     1.0796e-28       -0.31371      -0.22717 
    Y(2012)                  -0.19955     0.025112     -7.9465    318     3.3594e-14       -0.24896      -0.15015 
    Y(2013)                  -0.38131     0.028115     -13.563    318     2.2289e-33       -0.43663        -0.326 
    Y(2014)                  -0.40231     0.026268     -15.316    318     4.7991e-40         -0.454      -0.35063 
    Y(2015)                  -0.45439     0.024799     -18.323    318     1.0757e-51       -0.50318       -0.4056 
    Y(2016)                 -0.037196      0.02229     -1.6687    318       0.096154      -0.081051     0.0066585 
    M(Feb)                   0.067934     0.023782      2.8566    318      0.0045644       0.021145       0.11472 
    M(Mar)                    0.31548     0.024739      12.752    318      2.304e-30        0.26681       0.36415 
    M(Apr)                   0.060401     0.025212      2.3957    318       0.017166       0.010797       0.11001 
    M(May)                   0.075376     0.025827      2.9185    318      0.0037675       0.024563       0.12619 
    M(Jun)                    0.11705     0.026116      4.4819    318     1.0336e-05       0.065669       0.16843 
    M(Jul)                    0.14806     0.025807      5.7374    318     2.2398e-08       0.097291       0.19884 
    M(Aug)                  -0.046126     0.025193     -1.8309    318       0.068048      -0.095692     0.0034395 
    M(Sep)                  -0.045323     0.025121     -1.8042    318       0.072154      -0.094748     0.0041023 
    M(Oct)                    0.16146     0.023835       6.774    318     6.0714e-11        0.11456       0.20835 
    M(Nov)                    0.17508     0.023824      7.3489    318      1.699e-12        0.12821       0.22196 
    M(Dec)                   0.088485     0.023845      3.7108    318      0.0002438       0.041571        0.1354 
  
28. Moderate investors, shares 
 
Fixed effects coefficients (95% CIs): 
    Name                     Estimate       SE            tStat       DF     pValue         Lower          Upper      
    Intercept                    0.54964      0.035417      15.519    318     7.9077e-41        0.47996       0.61932 
    FB_shares               -1.7066e-06    1.4039e-06     -1.2157    318        0.22502    -4.4686e-06    1.0554e-06 
    scD(t-1)                   -0.015233      0.040303    -0.37795    318        0.70572      -0.094527      0.064062 
    NEWS(T)                     -0.15146      0.011409     -13.275    318     2.6545e-32       -0.17391      -0.12901 
    Ret(t)                       -7.6699      0.084504     -90.764    318    2.0554e-229        -7.8361       -7.5036 
    Ret(t-1)                     0.50227       0.10429       4.816    318     2.2694e-06        0.29708       0.70745 
    Y(2011)                     -0.26343      0.021934      -12.01    318     1.1817e-27       -0.30658      -0.22027 
    Y(2012)                     -0.16346      0.024558     -6.6562    318     1.2321e-10       -0.21178      -0.11515 
    Y(2013)                     -0.34208      0.024928     -13.723    318     5.5599e-34       -0.39112      -0.29304 
    Y(2014)                     -0.37771       0.02393     -15.784    318     7.5416e-42       -0.42479      -0.33063 
    Y(2015)                     -0.44708      0.024814     -18.017    318     1.6524e-50        -0.4959      -0.39826 
    Y(2016)                    -0.031188      0.022303     -1.3984    318        0.16298      -0.075068      0.012692 
    M(Feb)                      0.068283      0.023785      2.8708    318      0.0043688       0.021487       0.11508 
    M(Mar)                        0.3162      0.024729      12.787    318     1.7152e-30        0.26755       0.36486 
    M(Apr)                      0.057004      0.025229      2.2595    318       0.024532      0.0073669       0.10664 
    M(May)                      0.075899      0.025831      2.9383    318      0.0035418       0.025077       0.12672 
    M(Jun)                        0.1179      0.026107      4.5159    318     8.8939e-06       0.066533       0.16926 
    M(Jul)                       0.15394      0.025659      5.9994    318     5.3871e-09        0.10345       0.20442 
    M(Aug)                     -0.035038      0.025287     -1.3856    318        0.16684      -0.084789      0.014713 
    M(Sep)                     -0.033083      0.024937     -1.3267    318        0.18557      -0.082146      0.015979 
    M(Oct)                       0.17466      0.023734      7.3591    318     1.5921e-12        0.12796       0.22135 
    M(Nov)                       0.18011      0.023773      7.5764    318     3.9067e-13        0.13334       0.22689 
    M(Dec)                      0.094619       0.02381       3.974    318     8.7497e-05       0.047775       0.14146 
 
 
 
Passive investors 
29. Passive investors, posts 
 
Fixed effects coefficients (95% CIs): 
    Name                   Estimate     SE            tStat      DF     pValue         Lower        Upper     
    Intercept                0.37889      0.022039     17.191    318      2.667e-47      0.33553      0.42225 
    FB_posts                0.012314    0.00064394     19.122    318     8.5505e-55     0.011047      0.01358 
    scD(t-1)                 0.68562      0.020412     33.589    318    1.2973e-106      0.64546      0.72578 
    NEWS(T)                -0.053805      0.006542    -8.2246    318     5.0651e-15    -0.066676    -0.040934 
    Ret(t)                   -5.2018      0.043553    -119.43    318    3.0976e-266      -5.2875      -5.1161 
    Ret(t-1)                 -1.5922      0.049179    -32.375    318    1.1223e-102      -1.6889      -1.4954 
    Y(2011)                 -0.27167      0.012836    -21.165    318     1.1575e-62     -0.29692     -0.24641 
    Y(2012)                 -0.24963      0.013122    -19.023    318     2.0704e-54     -0.27544     -0.22381 
    Y(2013)                  -0.5247      0.014359    -36.542    318    7.3271e-116     -0.55295     -0.49645 
    Y(2014)                 -0.55782      0.014777     -37.75    318    1.6201e-119      -0.5869     -0.52875 
    Y(2015)                 -0.31908       0.01499    -21.286    318     3.9728e-63     -0.34857     -0.28959 
    Y(2016)                  0.29242      0.013184      22.18    318     1.5779e-66      0.26648      0.31836 
    M(Feb)                   0.31605      0.014244     22.188    318     1.4704e-66      0.28803      0.34408 
    M(Mar)                   0.50699      0.015252      33.24    318    1.7231e-105      0.47698        0.537 
    M(Apr)                   0.31124       0.01526     20.396    318      1.034e-59      0.28122      0.34126 
    M(May)                   0.26069       0.01494     17.449    318     2.6701e-48       0.2313      0.29008 
    M(Jun)                   0.29087      0.014876     19.552    318     1.8533e-56       0.2616      0.32013 
    M(Jul)                   0.15161      0.014626     10.365    318     7.0052e-22      0.12283      0.18039 
    M(Aug)                   0.16516      0.014004     11.794    318      7.078e-27      0.13761      0.19271 
    M(Sep)                   0.27598      0.014267     19.344    318     1.1847e-55      0.24791      0.30405 
    M(Oct)                   0.35994      0.013815     26.055    318      6.828e-81      0.33277      0.38712 
    M(Nov)                    0.4006      0.014293     28.028    318     6.3925e-88      0.37248      0.42872 
    M(Dec)                   0.22895      0.013904     16.466    318     1.7299e-44      0.20159       0.2563 
 
 
30. Passive investors, comments 
 
Fixed effects coefficients (95% CIs): 
    Name                      Estimate       SE            tStat      DF     pValue         Lower          Upper       
    Intercept                     0.49717      0.021758      22.85    318     4.6447e-69        0.45436        0.53998 
    FB_comments               -9.3322e-06    1.4257e-06    -6.5458    318     2.3706e-10    -1.2137e-05    -6.5273e-06 
    scD(t-1)                      0.67761       0.02045     33.134    318    3.7865e-105        0.63737        0.71784 
    NEWS(T)                     -0.063599     0.0065187    -9.7563    318     7.6502e-20      -0.076424      -0.050773 
    Ret(t)                        -5.2286      0.043597    -119.93    318    8.5882e-267        -5.3143        -5.1428 
    Ret(t-1)                      -1.5282      0.049135    -31.102    318     1.8423e-98        -1.6249        -1.4315 
    Y(2011)                      -0.23317      0.012855    -18.139    318      5.549e-51       -0.25846       -0.20788 
    Y(2012)                       -0.1569      0.013342     -11.76    318     9.3498e-27       -0.18315       -0.13065 
    Y(2013)                       -0.4354      0.014158    -30.752    318     2.7348e-97       -0.46326       -0.40755 
    Y(2014)                      -0.46554      0.014024    -33.195    318    2.4023e-105       -0.49314       -0.43795 
    Y(2015)                      -0.35915       0.01505    -23.863    318     7.5196e-73       -0.38876       -0.32954 
    Y(2016)                       0.31943      0.013154     24.283    318     2.0766e-74        0.29355        0.34531 
    M(Feb)                        0.24945      0.013989     17.832    318     8.6512e-50        0.22193        0.27697 
    M(Mar)                        0.45547      0.015167     30.029    318     7.6659e-95        0.42562        0.48531 
    M(Apr)                        0.22674      0.015019     15.096    318     3.3329e-39        0.19719        0.25629 
    M(May)                        0.22648      0.014936     15.163    318     1.8462e-39         0.1971        0.25587 
    M(Jun)                        0.25065      0.014826     16.906    318     3.4171e-46        0.22148        0.27982 
    M(Jul)                        0.13114      0.014593      8.986    318     2.3266e-17        0.10242        0.15985 
    M(Aug)                        0.14713      0.013962     10.538    318     1.8098e-22        0.11966         0.1746 
    M(Sep)                        0.26898      0.014231     18.901    318     6.1528e-54        0.24098        0.29698 
    M(Oct)                         0.3561      0.013813      25.78    318      6.818e-80        0.32892        0.38328 
    M(Nov)                        0.39636      0.014268     27.779    318     4.7742e-87        0.36829        0.42443 
    M(Dec)                        0.20496      0.013859     14.789    318     5.0282e-38        0.17769        0.23223 
31. Passive investors, likes 
 
Fixed effects coefficients (95% CIs): 
    Name                   Estimate       SE            tStat      DF     pValue         Lower          Upper       
    Intercept                  0.47594      0.021504     22.133    318     2.3752e-66        0.43364        0.51825 
    FB_likes               -7.3294e-07    1.1389e-07    -6.4354    318     4.5294e-10    -9.5701e-07    -5.0886e-07 
    scD(t-1)                   0.67793       0.02045      33.15    318    3.3615e-105        0.63769        0.71816 
    NEWS(T)                  -0.070091     0.0066076    -10.608    318     1.0435e-22      -0.083091      -0.057091 
    Ret(t)                       -5.24      0.043677    -119.97    318    7.6843e-267         -5.326        -5.1541 
    Ret(t-1)                   -1.5343       0.04917    -31.204    318     8.4075e-99         -1.631        -1.4375 
    Y(2011)                   -0.23608      0.012809    -18.431    318     4.1062e-52       -0.26128       -0.21088 
    Y(2012)                   -0.13478      0.014819    -9.0948    318     1.0542e-17       -0.16394       -0.10562 
    Y(2013)                    -0.3915      0.016962    -23.081    318     6.3343e-70       -0.42487       -0.35813 
    Y(2014)                   -0.41947      0.015979    -26.251    318     1.3434e-81       -0.45091       -0.38803 
    Y(2015)                   -0.34191      0.014943     -22.88    318     3.5876e-69       -0.37131       -0.31251 
    Y(2016)                    0.33763      0.013066     25.841    318     4.0721e-80        0.31192        0.36334 
    M(Feb)                     0.25578      0.013934     18.357    318     7.9445e-52        0.22837         0.2832 
    M(Mar)                     0.46588      0.015102     30.849    318     1.2965e-97        0.43616        0.49559 
    M(Apr)                     0.23341      0.014898     15.667    318     2.1255e-41         0.2041        0.26272 
    M(May)                     0.23511      0.014891     15.789    318     7.2128e-42        0.20581        0.26441 
    M(Jun)                     0.25832       0.01478     17.478    318     2.0569e-48        0.22924         0.2874 
    M(Jul)                     0.14593      0.014676      9.943    318     1.8436e-20        0.11705         0.1748 
    M(Aug)                     0.15996      0.014084     11.358    318     2.5405e-25        0.13225        0.18767 
    M(Sep)                     0.27357      0.014266     19.176    318     5.3046e-55         0.2455        0.30164 
    M(Oct)                     0.37173      0.014097     26.369    318     5.0368e-82          0.344        0.39947 
    M(Nov)                     0.40597      0.014305     28.379    318     3.7642e-89        0.37782        0.43411 
    M(Dec)                     0.21751      0.013881      15.67    318     2.0738e-41         0.1902        0.24482 
 32. Passive investors, shares 
 
Fixed effects coefficients (95% CIs): 
    Name                     Estimate       SE            tStat      DF     pValue         Lower          Upper       
    Intercept                    0.47085      0.021534     21.866    318     2.4579e-65        0.42849        0.51322 
    FB_shares               -1.6005e-05    9.0144e-07    -17.755    318     1.7318e-49    -1.7778e-05    -1.4231e-05 
    scD(t-1)                      0.6733      0.020476     32.883    318    2.4733e-104        0.63302        0.71359 
    NEWS(T)                    -0.081345     0.0066067    -12.312    318     9.4425e-29      -0.094343      -0.068346 
    Ret(t)                       -5.2983      0.043818    -120.92    318    6.6858e-268        -5.3845        -5.2121 
    Ret(t-1)                     -1.5621       0.04918    -31.762    318    1.1702e-100        -1.6588        -1.4653 
    Y(2011)                     -0.22793      0.012782    -17.833    318     8.6269e-50       -0.25308       -0.20278 
    Y(2012)                     -0.05932      0.014556    -4.0753    318     5.8097e-05      -0.087958      -0.030682 
    Y(2013)                     -0.34785      0.015125    -22.997    318     1.2994e-69       -0.37761       -0.31809 
    Y(2014)                     -0.41334      0.014371    -28.762    318     1.7361e-90       -0.44162       -0.38507 
    Y(2015)                     -0.33096      0.014962     -22.12    318     2.6645e-66        -0.3604       -0.30152 
    Y(2016)                       0.3475      0.013068     26.592    318     7.9519e-83        0.32179        0.37321 
    M(Feb)                       0.25625      0.013939     18.384    318     6.2507e-52        0.22883        0.28368 
    M(Mar)                       0.46576      0.015109     30.826    318     1.5485e-97        0.43603        0.49549 
    M(Apr)                       0.22142      0.014896     14.864    318     2.5817e-38        0.19211        0.25073 
    M(May)                       0.23267      0.014903     15.613    318     3.4544e-41        0.20335        0.26199 
    M(Jun)                       0.25306      0.014788     17.112    318       5.44e-47        0.22396        0.28215 
    M(Jul)                       0.14507      0.014595     9.9396    318     1.8913e-20        0.11635        0.17379 
    M(Aug)                        0.1835      0.014116     12.999    318      2.814e-31        0.15573        0.21127 
    M(Sep)                        0.2856      0.014242     20.053    318     2.1558e-58        0.25758        0.31362 
    M(Oct)                       0.39828      0.014062     28.324    318     5.8487e-89        0.37061        0.42594 
    M(Nov)                       0.41146       0.01428     28.814    318     1.1454e-90        0.38336        0.43955 
    M(Dec)                       0.22877      0.013883     16.478    318     1.5644e-44        0.20145        0.25608 
 
Inactive investors 
33. Inactive investors, posts 
 
Fixed effects coefficients (95% CIs): 
    Name                   Estimate      SE            tStat       DF     pValue         Lower        Upper     
    Intercept                -0.53309      0.023454     -22.729    318     1.3256e-68     -0.57923     -0.48694 
    FB_posts                 0.014977    0.00067134      22.309    318      5.118e-67     0.013656     0.016298 
    scD(t-1)                   2.7061      0.021064      128.47    318    4.2012e-276       2.6647       2.7476 
    NEWS(T)                  0.014338     0.0066059      2.1705    318        0.03071    0.0013412     0.027335 
    Ret(t)                    -4.6532      0.039041     -119.19    318    5.8857e-266      -4.7301      -4.5764 
    Ret(t-1)                 -0.44413      0.047307     -9.3882    318     1.2133e-18      -0.5372     -0.35105 
    Y(2011)                   -0.2492      0.012984     -19.193    318     4.5602e-55     -0.27474     -0.22365 
    Y(2012)                  -0.15783       0.01348     -11.708    318     1.4353e-26     -0.18435     -0.13131 
    Y(2013)                  -0.89546      0.016024     -55.883    318    1.6839e-166     -0.92699     -0.86393 
    Y(2014)                  -0.95598       0.01612     -59.305    318    5.4177e-174      -0.9877     -0.92427 
    Y(2015)                  -0.80527      0.016245      -49.57    318    1.1995e-151     -0.83723     -0.77331 
    Y(2016)                 -0.093399       0.01375     -6.7925    318     5.4283e-11     -0.12045    -0.066346 
    M(Feb)                    0.28113      0.014101      19.936    318     6.0939e-58      0.25338      0.30887 
    M(Mar)                  0.0071384      0.015488      0.4609    318        0.64519    -0.023333      0.03761 
    M(Apr)                    0.22834       0.01472      15.513    318     8.3886e-41      0.19938       0.2573 
    M(May)                   -0.14367      0.014649     -9.8077    318     5.1775e-20     -0.17249     -0.11485 
    M(Jun)                    0.17724      0.014879      11.912    318      2.672e-27      0.14796      0.20651 
    M(Jul)                    0.25704      0.014413      17.834    318     8.5142e-50      0.22869       0.2854 
    M(Aug)                   -0.13043       0.01374     -9.4925    318     5.5763e-19     -0.15746     -0.10339 
    M(Sep)                   -0.22186      0.014273     -15.544    318      6.354e-41     -0.24994     -0.19378 
    M(Oct)                 -0.0094852      0.013844    -0.68515    318        0.49375    -0.036723     0.017752 
    M(Nov)                    -0.1521       0.01382     -11.006    318     4.3775e-24     -0.17929     -0.12491 
    M(Dec)                   -0.58371      0.013784     -42.346    318    9.3673e-133     -0.61083     -0.55659 
34. Inactive investors, comments 
 
Fixed effects coefficients (95% CIs): 
    Name                      Estimate      SE            tStat      DF     pValue         Lower         Upper      
    Intercept                   -0.49684      0.023623    -21.032    318     3.7415e-62      -0.54332      -0.45036 
    FB_comments               1.0111e-05    1.4096e-06     7.1729    318     5.1878e-12    7.3373e-06    1.2884e-05 
    scD(t-1)                      2.7456      0.021074     130.29    318    5.2664e-278        2.7041         2.787 
    NEWS(T)                     0.002696     0.0065825    0.40957    318         0.6824     -0.010255      0.015647 
    Ret(t)                       -4.6551       0.03919    -118.78    318    1.7018e-265       -4.7322       -4.5779 
    Ret(t-1)                    -0.29915      0.047047    -6.3585    318     7.0753e-10      -0.39171      -0.20659 
    Y(2011)                     -0.22246      0.012996    -17.118    318     5.1191e-47      -0.24803       -0.1969 
    Y(2012)                     -0.11503      0.013715     -8.387    318      1.646e-15      -0.14202     -0.088047 
    Y(2013)                     -0.82229       0.01575     -52.21    318    4.9675e-158      -0.85328      -0.79131 
    Y(2014)                     -0.84671      0.015325    -55.249    318    4.5234e-165      -0.87687      -0.81656 
    Y(2015)                     -0.80669      0.016353     -49.33    318    4.7025e-151      -0.83886      -0.77451 
    Y(2016)                    -0.034296      0.013727    -2.4984    318       0.012979     -0.061303    -0.0072887 
    M(Feb)                       0.24096      0.014016     17.191    318     2.6781e-47       0.21338       0.26853 
    M(Mar)                    -0.0068534      0.015519    -0.4416    318        0.65908     -0.037387       0.02368 
    M(Apr)                       0.19463      0.014702     13.238    318     3.6338e-32        0.1657       0.22355 
    M(May)                      -0.15241      0.014634    -10.415    318      4.754e-22       -0.1812      -0.12362 
    M(Jun)                       0.17608      0.014915     11.805    318     6.4442e-27       0.14673       0.20542 
    M(Jul)                       0.27194       0.01437     18.924    318     5.0125e-54       0.24366       0.30021 
    M(Aug)                      -0.12676      0.013718    -9.2408    318     3.6138e-18      -0.15375     -0.099774 
    M(Sep)                      -0.20609      0.014215    -14.498    318     6.4797e-37      -0.23406      -0.17812 
    M(Oct)                      0.015157      0.013759     1.1017    318        0.27144     -0.011912      0.042227 
    M(Nov)                      -0.12793      0.013718    -9.3261    318     1.9235e-18      -0.15492      -0.10094 
    M(Dec)                      -0.56432        0.0137    -41.192    318    1.5938e-129      -0.59128      -0.53737 
 
35. Inactive investors, likes 
 
 
Fixed effects coefficients (95% CIs): 
    Name                   Estimate      SE           tStat      DF     pValue         Lower         Upper      
    Intercept                -0.48393     0.023321    -20.751    318     4.4679e-61      -0.52981      -0.43805 
    FB_likes               1.8368e-06    1.149e-07     15.987    318     1.2431e-42    1.6108e-06    2.0629e-06 
    scD(t-1)                   2.7522     0.021051     130.74    318    1.7823e-278        2.7108        2.7936 
    NEWS(T)                    0.0173    0.0066498     2.6016    318      0.0097143     0.0042166      0.030383 
    Ret(t)                    -4.5906       0.0395    -116.22    318    1.5019e-262       -4.6683       -4.5129 
    Ret(t-1)                 -0.30593     0.047069    -6.4996    318     3.1122e-10      -0.39853      -0.21332 
    Y(2011)                  -0.22639     0.012898    -17.552    318      1.062e-48      -0.25176      -0.20101 
    Y(2012)                  -0.21376     0.015283    -13.987    318      5.602e-35      -0.24383      -0.18369 
    Y(2013)                  -0.95545     0.018229    -52.415    318    1.6231e-158      -0.99131      -0.91958 
    Y(2014)                   -0.9579     0.016858    -56.822    318    1.3592e-168      -0.99107      -0.92474 
    Y(2015)                  -0.82965     0.016244    -51.076    318    2.5489e-155      -0.86161       -0.7977 
    Y(2016)                 -0.059337     0.013624    -4.3555    318     1.7934e-05     -0.086141     -0.032533 
    M(Feb)                    0.23785     0.013914     17.095    318     6.3287e-47       0.21047       0.26522 
    M(Mar)                  -0.020017     0.015438    -1.2967    318        0.19568      -0.05039      0.010355 
    M(Apr)                    0.20427     0.014622      13.97    318     6.5037e-35        0.1755       0.23304 
    M(May)                   -0.15798     0.014578    -10.837    318     1.6882e-23      -0.18666       -0.1293 
    M(Jun)                    0.17349     0.014865     11.671    318     1.9495e-26       0.14425       0.20274 
    M(Jul)                    0.24147     0.014482     16.674    318     2.7129e-45       0.21297       0.26996 
    M(Aug)                   -0.14518     0.013767    -10.546    318     1.7006e-22      -0.17227       -0.1181 
    M(Sep)                   -0.21678      0.01429     -15.17    318     1.7371e-39      -0.24489      -0.18866 
    M(Oct)                  -0.014625     0.013887    -1.0531    318         0.2931     -0.041948      0.012698 
    M(Nov)                   -0.14076     0.013736    -10.248    318      1.754e-21      -0.16778      -0.11373 
    M(Dec)                    -0.5834     0.013735    -42.475    318    4.1205e-133      -0.61042      -0.55637 
 36. Inactive investors, shares 
 
Fixed effects coefficients (95% CIs): 
    Name                     Estimate      SE            tStat      DF     pValue         Lower          Upper      
    Intercept                  -0.46994      0.023328    -20.145    318     9.5339e-59       -0.51584      -0.42405 
    FB_shares               1.0911e-07    9.7565e-07    0.11184    318        0.91102    -1.8104e-06    2.0286e-06 
    scD(t-1)                      2.737      0.021045     130.06    318    9.0966e-278         2.6956        2.7784 
    NEWS(T)                   0.0015177     0.0066619    0.22781    318        0.81994      -0.011589      0.014625 
    Ret(t)                      -4.6787      0.039507    -118.43    318    4.3212e-265        -4.7565        -4.601 
    Ret(t-1)                   -0.30962      0.047036    -6.5825    318     1.9086e-10       -0.40216      -0.21708 
    Y(2011)                    -0.20882      0.012887    -16.204    318     1.7989e-43       -0.23417      -0.18346 
    Y(2012)                   -0.086963      0.015318    -5.6772    318      3.087e-08        -0.1171     -0.056826 
    Y(2013)                    -0.80129      0.016866    -47.508    318    1.7795e-146       -0.83448      -0.76811 
    Y(2014)                    -0.84592       0.01565    -54.053    318    2.4467e-162       -0.87671      -0.81513 
    Y(2015)                    -0.82065      0.016284    -50.396    318     1.132e-153       -0.85269      -0.78861 
    Y(2016)                   -0.047446      0.013637    -3.4791    318     0.00057329      -0.074276     -0.020615 
    M(Feb)                      0.22938      0.013925     16.473    318     1.6367e-44        0.20198       0.25677 
    M(Mar)                    -0.016097      0.015474    -1.0403    318        0.29901       -0.04654      0.014347 
    M(Apr)                      0.18046      0.014639     12.327    318     8.3442e-29        0.15165       0.20926 
    M(May)                     -0.15891      0.014614    -10.874    318     1.2599e-23       -0.18766      -0.13016 
    M(Jun)                      0.16915      0.014893     11.358    318     2.5379e-25        0.13985       0.19846 
    M(Jul)                      0.27327      0.014384     18.999    318     2.5698e-54        0.24497       0.30157 
    M(Aug)                     -0.12712      0.013776    -9.2275    318     3.9857e-18       -0.15422      -0.10001 
    M(Sep)                     -0.20558      0.014211    -14.467    318     8.4953e-37       -0.23354      -0.17762 
    M(Oct)                     0.017963      0.013893     1.2929    318        0.19697     -0.0093709      0.045296 
    M(Nov)                     -0.13051      0.013712    -9.5176    318     4.6213e-19       -0.15748      -0.10353 
    M(Dec)                     -0.56859        0.0137    -41.502    318    2.1318e-130       -0.59554      -0.54163 
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Appendix
This appendix provides additional tables and figures: i) t-test, ii) the evolution of order book
asymmetry, and iii) the evolution of spread between the best levels.
Table 1: Pre-reaction in order book illiquidity (OBI). This table tests if there is a liquidity reaction in the book
before the announcement using the one-sample t-test. Given that ∆ln(OBI)E,A− = ln(OBI)
Med
A− − ln(OBI)MedE , where
ln(OBI)MedA− and ln(OBI)
Med
E are median values of ln(OBI) from pre-event and estimation windows, respectively, the
null hypothesis is that ∆ln(OBI)E,A− comes from a normal distribution with mean zero. ∆ln(OBI)E,A− is calculated
separately for the bid and ask sides for positive and negative, scheduled and non-scheduled announcements, using 60-
minute pre-event window. We use logarithmic values to better fulfill the the normality assumption. For the robustness
check, we run a Wilcoxon signed rank test to test the null hypothesis that ∆ln(OBI)E,A− comes from a distribution
whose median is zero (the test assumes that observations come from a continuous distribution, symmetric about its
median) and get similar results. We also repeat the analysis using mean values from pre- and estimation windows instead
of median to calculate ∆ln(OBI)E,A−, and the results remain the same. The non-scheduled announcement sample is
extracted from the original sample by choosing the same number of announcements as with the corresponding scheduled
announcement sample with largest relative price impact (log-change in mid-price right before the event till the end of
event window). The sample size N is 151 for positive and 165 for negative announcements.
Scheduled
Positive Negative
ask bid ask bid
MEAN (∆OBIE,A−) 0.753 *** 0.923 *** 0.562 *** 0.685 ***
t-statistic (8.560) (8.952) (5.738) (6.315)
Non-scheduled
Positive Negative
ask bid ask bid
MEAN (∆OBIE,A−) 0.457 *** 0.086 0.173 * 0.149
t-statistic (5.169) (0.919) (1.977) (1.931)
*** p < 0.001; ** p< 0.01; * p< 0.05
∗Corresponding author: tel. +358 50 353 1130
Email addresses: milla.siikanen@tut.fi (Milla Siikanen), juho.kanniainen@tut.fi (Juho Kanniainen),
jaakko.s.valli@gmail.com (Jaakko Valli)
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D: Negative non−scheduled announcements (N = 165)
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A: Positive scheduled announcements (N = 151)
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Figure 1: Order book asymmetry around announcements. OBIAsymmetry, standardised and aggregated of bid
side minus ask side order book illiquidity, around scheduled and non-scheduled announcements, separately for positive
and negative announcements and r, average return on mid-price. The blue solid line corresponds to OBIAsymmetry, the
black dashed lines correspond to the 95% confidence level of OBIAsymmetry based on the empirical distribution from the
estimation window (i.e. 27 days preceding the announcement) and the blue dotted lines correspond to the maximum and
minimum values of OBIAsymmetry in the estimation window, all with the scale on the left-hand side. The red dash-dot
line corresponds to r with the scale on the right-hand side in red. The black dotted vertical line at time zero corresponds
to the time of the announcement. The non-scheduled announcement sample is extracted from the original sample by
choosing the same number of announcements as with the corresponding scheduled announcement sample with largest
relative price impact (log-change in mid-price right before the event till the end of event window).
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Figure 2: Relative spread around announcements. SPREAD, standardised and aggregated relative spread, and r,
average return on mid-price, around scheduled and non-scheduled announcements, separately for positive and negative
announcements. The blue solid line corresponds to SPREAD, the black dashed lines correspond to the 95% confidence
level of SPREAD based on the empirical distribution from the estimation window (i.e. 27 days preceding the an-
nouncement), and the blue dotted lines correspond to the maximum and minimum values of SPREAD in the estimation
window, all with the scale on the left-hand side. The red dash-dot line corresponds to r with the scale on the right-hand
side in red. The black line at time zero corresponds to the time of the announcement. The black dotted vertical line
at time zero corresponds to the time of the announcement. The non-scheduled announcement sample is extracted from
the original sample by choosing the same number of announcements as with the corresponding scheduled announcement
sample with largest relative price impact (log-change in mid-price right before the event till the end of event window).
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Appendix A. Means, medians and standard deviations of regression variables
Table 1 presents the means, medians, and standard deviations of the variables in our regres-
sion. We can see that the size of the relative illiquidity shock after scheduled announcement releases
(∆ln(OBI)
Max
E,A+) is, on average, larger than the one after nonscheduled announcements.
2 The average
liquidity on bid side is lower than on the ask side (ln(OBI)
Med
E is higher), which is consistent with the
observation of Malo and Pennanen (2012). The illiquidity peak takes place most commonly around
3 minutes after the scheduled announcement releases. For non-scheduled announcement releases, the
peak happens usually around 13 (25) minutes after the announcement when we use the sample with 30
(60) minute pre- and post event windows. The maximum asymmetry of the book (ln(OBI)
Asymmetry
A− )
seems to be slightly larger before scheduled announcement releases, whereas relative spread remains
the same. The average price change from the estimation window to the pre-event window (rE,A−)is
positive for scheduled and negative for non-scheduled announcement releases in our sample. Moreover,
scheduled announcement sample includes relatively more announcements with positive price impact
after the release than the non-scheduled announcement sample.
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2See also Siikanen et al. (2017) for illustrations on evolution of OBI around scheduled and non-scheduled announce-
ments.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics of the regression variables. Means, medians, and standard deviations of the
regression variables. Side indicates for which side of the LOB, bid or ask side the variable is calculated. Some of the
variables, such as mid-price returns are common for both sides.
Scheduled
30 min 60 min
Side Variable Mean Median StDev Mean Median StDev
Ask
∆ln(OBI)MaxE,A+ 0.889 0.892 0.813 0.981 0.940 0.746
ln(OBI)MedE -4.926 -4.796 2.082 -5.049 -5.028 2.094
τ∗ 6.696 2.833 8.275 11.431 2.833 17.474
Bid
∆ln(OBI)MaxE,A+ 1.094 1.028 0.976 1.190 1.122 0.929
ln(OBI)MedE -4.810 -4.632 2.045 -4.931 -4.906 2.067
τ∗ 7.429 3.333 8.570 11.932 3.500 16.919
common
ln(OBI)AsymmetryA− 1.110 1.034 0.561 1.248 1.103 0.582
rE,A− 0.014 0.019 0.083 0.015 0.020 0.079
spreadMedA− 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
D+ 0.507 1.000 0.501 0.459 0.000 0.499
Number of observations 408 329
Non-Scheduled
30 min 60 min
Side Variable Mean Median StDev Mean Median StDev
Ask
∆ln(OBI)MaxE,A+ 0.340 0.289 0.627 0.417 0.363 0.625
ln(OBI)MedE -5.323 -5.429 2.033 -5.267 -5.376 2.043
τ∗ 13.210 11.833 10.019 26.591 24.667 20.219
Bid
∆ln(OBI)MaxE,A+ 0.355 0.324 0.659 0.452 0.411 0.664
ln(OBI)MedE -5.205 -5.335 2.036 -5.148 -5.288 2.048
τ∗ 13.587 12.667 9.933 26.791 24.500 20.083
common
ln(OBI)AsymmetryA− 0.961 0.840 0.565 1.080 0.948 0.578
rE,A− -0.009 0.003 0.093 -0.008 0.002 0.092
spreadMedA− 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.003
D+ 0.436 0.000 0.496 0.447 0.000 0.497
Number of observations 2,629 2,102
Appendix B. Regression results with 60-minute event windows
Table 2 presents the regression results using 60 minute pre-and post event windows.
2
Table 2: Association between LOB illiquidity shock and LOB related factors using 60 minute pre- and
post event windows. The robust standard errors appear in parentheses. The regression results using the 30- and
60-minute pre- and post-event windows are mostly consistent, though some small variation exists. A potential reason
for this is that an increase in the length of the window decreases the sample size, as some news releases occur too close
to the beginning or end of the trading day to form the pre- and post-event windows. The use of the 60-minute window
leads to around 20% decrease in the sample size when compared to the 30-minute window.
Scheduled announcements Non-scheduled announcements
Parameter Variable ask bid ask bid
α1 ln(OBI)
Med
E -0.080 -0.180* -0.036 -0.036
(0.049) (0.082) (0.022) (0.027)
α2 ln(OBI)
Asymmetry
A− 0.199** 0.422*** 0.087** 0.270***
(0.073) (0.121) (0.031) (0.054)
α3 rE,A− -0.012 0.006 -1.736*** -1.040***
(0.597) (0.575) (0.337) (0.297)
α4 SPREAD
Med
A− 86.849** 73.779** 26.331*** 21.096*
(30.803) (22.181) (7.767) (10.412)
α5 τ
∗ -0.006* -0.009*** -0.002** -0.001
(0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001)
α6 D+ 0.146 -0.263* 0.144*** -0.142***
(0.075) (0.106) (0.034) (0.040)
Number of observations 329 329 2,102 2,102
R2 0.100 0.166 0.100 0.090
*** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05
Appendix C. Squared Return Regression
We run a linear regression to explain the squared returns from the estimation window to the
illiquidity shock for non-scheduled announcements. In particular, the dependent variable is
r2E,A+ =
(
ln
[
mmax, ln(OBI)
]
− ln
[
Median
t∈E
(mt)
])2
,
where mmax, ln(OBI) is the mid-price at the moment when ln(OBI) reaches its maximum value in the
post-event window. Note that r2E,A+ is not the log return to the maximum mid-price in the post event
window, but for the moment, ln(OBI) reaches its maximum value after the event. For a robustness
check, we also use the squared periodic return instead of log return, i.e.
r2E,A+ =
(
mmax, ln(OBI)
Mediant∈E(mt)
− 1
)2
,
An explanatory variable is rE,A−. We run the regression separately for the ask and bid sides (the
maximum ln(OBI) can be reached at different times for the ask and bid sides), 30- and 60-minute event
windows, and both log-return and periodic return versions of r2E,A+ for non-scheduled announcements.
We use the within-transformation as in the regressions of the original paper.
Only one out of eight regressions gives a statistically significant regression estimate (bid side, 30-
minute window, log-return version: αˆ = 0.234∗ (robust standard error = 0.119)), while the rest of the
regression estimates are insignificant and are not provided here, but are available upon request.
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